D. Pattammal vs K. Kalyanasundaram

Srinivasan, J.—This matter relates to the correctness of the valuation of the plaint in the suit and the Court-fee payable thereon though the

revision petition is against an order appointing an advocate-Commissioner to determine the market value of the property.

The petitioner herein filed the suit out of which this revision petition arises for delivery of possession ""of the entire ground floor and the portion in

the rear side of the first floor in No. 18 Nattu Pillayar Koil St., G.T. Madras 1, more particularly described in Schedule B to the plaint. In

paragraph 4 of the plaint the plaintiff had stated that the property described in Schedule A originally belonged to one Perumal Mudaliar, father-in-

law of the plaintiff, and, by a registered deed of settlement dated 29-9-1933, he settled the same in favour of the plaintiffs husband granting him life

interest and after his death, his widow, the plaintiff to have a life interest and after her lifetime, the male heirs of her husband should take the

property absolutely. It was further stated in the plaint that the plaintiff was in possession of a portion of the house and the other portion has been in

the unlawful occupation of the defendant. The defendant, according to the plaintiff, is a son of her husband through his first wife. It is not necessary

to refer to the other averments in the plaint for the purpose of this revision petition. The plaintiff has valued the suit for purposes of Court fee and

jurisdiction at Rs. 35486 being the market value of the 4/7th share in the possession of the defendant and paid a Court fee of Rs. 2382-50 u/s 30

of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. In the memo of calculation attached to the plaint, the market value of the entire

property was stated to be Rs. 62240 and the value of the property in the possession of the defendant was stated to be Rs. 35486. The basis on

which the market value was arrived at by the plaintiff was not set out either in the plaint or in the memo of calculation. In the written statement filed

by the defendant, the correctness of the valuation of the suit property for purposes of Court fee and jurisdiction was challenged. The defendant did

not raise any express plea that the market value of the property should be ascertained on any particular basis. However, the defendant stated that

the suit should be framed as one for declaration of title and possession.

The defendant filed I.A. No. 21854 of 1984 for appointment of an advocate-Commissioner to determine the market value of the property. In

the affidavit filed in support of the application, it was stated that the property was a very valuable one worth more than Rs. 4 lakhs and it had been

wantonly undervalued by the plaintiff in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. The application was contested by the petitioner

herein who denied the allegations made in the affidavit filed by the defendant in support of his application for appointment of an advocate-

Commissioner.

The learned 16th Asst. Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras took the view that the plaintiff had not valued the suit property correctly and that

the value would be much more than the value mentioned in the plaint. Consequently, the learned Judge appointed an advocate-Commissioner in

order to determine the market value of the property. It had to be stated that the defendant had filed two sale deeds before the learned Judge

purporting to relate to properties in the locality and be relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the market value of the suit property.

It is the said order of the learned Judge which is challenged in the present revision petition. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner argued that

the plaintiff is claiming only a life estate in the suit property and that she does not make any claim as full owner thereof. According to him, u/s 30 of

the Court-fees Act, the property to be valued is only the interest claimed by the plaintiff in the property and not the property as suck The second

contention urged by the learned counsel is that even if the property is to be valued as such it should be on the basis of 20 times the annual value of

the property and the method of capitalisation has been accepted to be a reasonable method by this Court on several occasions. Ultimately, learned

counsel contended that in the background of the facts of the case, the plaintiff is claiming only a life interest and that she has adopted a reasonable

method for arriving at the valuation for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction and therefore the Court should accept the value mentioned in the

plaint and should not insist upon the market value being ascertained otherwise. Learned counsel referred to certain decisions in support of his

contention to which I will refer at a later stage.

Learned counsel appearing for the defendants invited my attention to the provisions contained in Sections 7, 10, 12, 25(a), 30 and 53 of the

Court-fees Act and Order 26, Rule 9, C.P. Code, and argued that there is no provision in the Court-fees Act for determining the market value of a

building on the basis of 20 times the annual value or capitalisation of the income. According to him, whenever the Act wanted to fix the market

value on the basis of any multiplication of the assessment or revenue, it had made a specific provision therefore as found in Section 7 of the Act.

Learned counsel submitted that the market value in Section 30 would only mean the actual value which the property would fetch in the open

market and that should be ascertained with the relevant materials such as sales of similar properties in the locality. Learned counsel submitted that

in the present case, two sale deeds had been filed before the trial Court and a prima facie case was made out to prove that the value given by the

plaintiff in the plaint was erroneous and it was only thereafter the Court below appointed an advocate-Commissioner for determining the market

value.

The learned Government advocate invited my attention to the form prescribed u/s 10 of the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and Suits valuation Act,

1955, for giving the particulars of immovable properties and submitted that apart from the provisions in the Act, referred to by learned counsel for

the defendant and the above form, there is no other provision with reference to the ascertainment of market value under the Act. He argued that in

the absence of any specific provision, the market value will have to be fixed on the basis of the price of the property which it would fetch in the

open market. He referred to certain decisions of this Court which, according to him, took that view.

Before considering the contentions of learned counsel, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions found in the Tamil Nadu Court-fees and

Suits Valuation Act, 1955 which is hereafter referred to as the Act. Section 7 of the Act provides for the determination of market value. Under

Clause (1) of Section 7, the market value shall be determined as on the date of the presentation of the plaint. Clause 2 provides that the market

value of land in suits falling under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 or 48, shall be deemed to be thirty times the survey

assessment on the land where it is a ryotwari land. The section contains similar provisions based on the assessment, rent peishkush or melwaram

with reference to the different kinds of lands described in the different sub-sections of Section 7(2) of the Act. Admittedly, none of the sub-clauses

of Clause (2) of Section 7 would apply to the present case. Though there is a provision in Clause (g) of Section 7(2) for a land which is a house

site, whether assessed to full revenue or not, there is no provision for assessment with the market value of buildings. Section 7 as such does not

come into play in the present case.

Section 10 of the Act provides that in every suit in which the fee payable under the Act on the plaint depends on the market value of the subject

matter of the suit, the plaintiff shall file with the plaint, a statement in the prescribed form, of particulars of the subject matter of the suit and his

valuation thereof unless such particulars and the valuation are contained in the plaint. The Form referred to in Section 10 has been prescribed by

G.O. Ms. No. 820 Home dated 18-3-1956. The Form provides for mentioning the following particulars therein : (i) Section and sub-section of the

Act; (ii) nature pf suit, (iii) annual revenue or rent payable, (iv) market value and (v) The value for purposes of Court-fees. In the instructions

contained in the Form, there is a provision relating to building sites, buildings, garden, etc. That provision calls upon the plaintiff to mention the

market value as estimated by the plaintiff with details as to how it is calculated and the annual rental value of the property as entered in the register

of the Municipality or the Panchayat, if any, within whose jurisdiction the property is situate. The last instruction contained in the Form is to the

effect that in addition to the particulars required by Instructions I and II, the plaintiff may also furnish such additional information which he considers

material to his own valuation. The form requires the plaintiff to mention the annual revenue or rent payable and also the market value. A reading of

the form as a whole including the instructions contained therein would only indicate that the market value need not necessarily depend upon the

annual revenue or rent payable and it may be independently arrived at by the plaintiff. But he should give the details as to how the value is

calculated.

It is not necessary to refer to the contents of Section 12 of the Act, though learned counsel for the defendant invited ray attention thereto. That

section only provides for the Court taking a decision as to the proper Court-fee payable on the plaint and the stage at which such decision should

be taken. Section 25(a) of the Act relates to a suit where the prayer is for a declaration and for possession of the property to which the declaration

relates. According to that section, the fee in such a suit shall be computed on the market value of the property or on Rs. 300 whichever is higher.

Section 30 of the Act deals with suits for possession not otherwise provided for. That section prescribes that the fee shall be computed on the

market value of the property or on Rs. 400, whichever is higher. If the suit contains a prayer for declaration it would fall u/s 25(a) and if it is a suit

for possession simpliciter, it will fall u/s 30. But under both the sections, the fee has to be computed on the market value of the property or on Rs.

300 under the former section and Rs. 400 under the latter section, whichever is higher. Both the sections refer to the market value of the property.

In this connection it may be mentioned that the suit is one for possession. No doubt, it is now stated that an application for amendment has been

filed before the trial Court for including a prayer for declaration and thereby bringing the suit u/s 25(a) of the Act. It appears that the amendment

has not yet been carried out and as on date the suit has to be construed as one for possession simpliciter u/s 30 of the Act. The order of the Court

below has considered the valuation of the property only with reference to Section 30 and in this revision petition, I am called upon to decide the

correctness of that order. Hence, for the purpose of this revision it is enough if Section 30 of the Act is considered.

The terms of Section 30 are as follows --

In a suit for possession of immovable property, not otherwise provided for fee shall be computed on the market value of the property or on Rs.

Four hundred, whichever is higher.

The question which arises for consideration is, when the section says, the fee has to be computed on the market value of the property, does it

relate-to the value of the property as such or value of the interest claimed by the plaintiff in that property. According to learned counsel for the

petitioner, the words ''market value of the property'' should be construed as ''market value of the interest claimed by the plaintiff in the property''.

Learned counsel submits that it is not in every case the plaintiff claims as absolute owner of the entire property. When he claims only a restricted

interest in the property, or a portion of the property, in all such cases, the fee shall be computed only on the market value of such restricted interest

or such portion of the property. Learned counsel submits that if any other construction is adopted, it would cause hardship to the litigants. No

doubt, the argument is very attractive. But unfortunately for him, the language of the section is unambiguous. The section refers to ''immovable

property'' in the earlier part of it, and in the later part of it, it refers to ''the market value of the property''. The word property'' occurring in the later

part of the section should necessarily refer to the immovable property'' occurring in the first part of the section. Hence, the value that has to be

computed is, the market value of the immovable property, the possession of which is sought by the plaintiff in the suit. The contention that it can

refer to the market value of the restricted interest claimed by the plaintiff cannot be accepted In the case of a portion of the property the matter will

be different. With regard to a portion of the property, the value is the market value of that portion of the property of which possession is sought.

Therefore, that portion of the property will be the immovable property contemplated in the first part of the section and the market value of that

portion alone is to be ascertained. But in the case of interest covering the entirety of the immovable property, the market value of the property as

such has to be computed as the plaintiff seeks to recover khas possession of the entire property. It is not as if the plaintiff wants to recover

symbolical possession of the interest in the property which by itself is intangible though the immovable property is tangible.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision of a Bench of this Court in In Re: Mazumdar Sobhanadri Rao Pantulu Garu and

Others, : . That case related to a claim made by an Inamdar entitled to both kudiwaram and melwaram in the land. In the plaint, the relief prayed

for was one for recovery, of possession from the tenants let into the land for temporary periods. While the tenants did not dispute the plaintiff''s

right to claim melwaram, they asserted their occupancy rights in the land and resisted the prayer for recovery of possession. The plaintiff had paid

Court-fee u/s 7(xi)(cc) of the old Court-fees Act, 1870. The trial Court had ordered that the fee shall be computed u/s 7(v) and against that order,

the plaintiff filed an appeal. The Bench held that Clause (xi) of Section 7 would apply only when the suit is based on a lease, but not when the

plaintiff wants a decree establishing his title. Thus, the Bench agreed with that part of the order of the lower Court. But the Bench held that the

finding of the lower Court that the suit would fall u/s 7(v) was not correct. It was held that Section 7(v) would apply only in the case of a dispute

between alleged owner and trespasser. As the melwaram right of the plaintiff was admitted in that case, the Bench took the view that the relief

which the plaintiff had claimed was really one for a declaration that he was the owner of the kudiwaram arid consequently entitled to the relief of

possession. Thus, the Bench held that the matter fell u/s 7(iv)(c) of the old Court-fees Act.

Section 7(v) of the old Act, related to suits for possession of land, houses and gardens. It was prescribed that in such cases, the Court-fee

should be paid according to the value of the subject matter. The section provided for the computation of such value differently in the case of

different kinds of lands. It is significant to note that even under the old Act, when the subject matter was a house, or garden, the value was to be

calculated according to the market value of the house or garden as per Section 7(v)(e). Section 7(iv)(c) of the old Act pertained to suits for

declaratory decrees or orders with prayers for consequential reliefs under the old Act, the value was to be computed according to the amount at

which the relief sought was valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. Thus, in suits for declaration with consequential reliefs, the plaintiff had

the option to value the relief as he chose and Court-fee was payable only on such value. Once the Bench took the view that the suit was really one

for declaration, it fell u/s 7(iv)(c) of the old Act. That decision cannot be invoked by the petitioner herein as the present suit is one for possession

and there is no prayer for declaration. As stated already, there is an application for amendment of the plaint to convert the suit into one for

declaration and consquential relief and if that amendment is allowed, it will fall u/s 25(a) of the Act. In that event, under that section, Court-fee has

to be computed on the market value of the property. Thus, there is no difference with regard to the computation of Court-fee whether the suit falls

u/s 30 or u/s 25. Under the old Court-fees Act, the computation of the Court-fee for suits falling u/s 7(iv)(c) was entirely on a different basis from

the suits which fell u/s 7(v)(e) of the old Act. Even assuming that the decision relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner applies to the facts of

the case, it would not make any difference as under the present Court-fees Act, the petitioner will have to pay the Court-fees on the market value

of the property even if the suit is treated as one for declaration and consequential relief.

There is no definition of the term ''market value'' in the Court-fees Act, nor is there any definition in the General Clauses Act. Hence, the term

''market value'' has to be understood in its plain meaning as in common parlance, i.e., the value which the property will fetch in the market. The

term ''market value'' has occurred in the Land Acquisition Act and Courts have frequently considered that the term ''market value'' means. The

uniform view of the Courts is that ''market value of the property'' is the value which a willing purchaser will pay to a willing seller having regard to

the location and advantages attached to the property and also the potential value thereof. As there is no definition in the Court-fees Act, as such,

the definition which has been adopted for the purpose of Land Acquisition Act can be adopted for the purpose of Court-fees Act also. Particularly

when Section 7 of the Court-fees Act, provides for the market value being computed on a particular basis with reference to suit for different kinds

of lands and is silent with reference to a suit for a building and the land appurtenant thereto, it has to be inferred that the Legislature intended that

the computation of market value of buildings and lands attached thereto should be on the basis of the value, the property would fetch in the open

market. The particulars called for in the Form prescribed u/s 10, referred to already, would not in any way alter the situation. When the main Act

does not provide for calculating the market value on the basis of capitalising the income or multiplying the annual revenue by a factor, the form

prescribed by the Government Order u/s 10 cannot go beyond the scope of the Act and provide for computation of market value on a particular

basis. The very fact that the Form itself requires the plaintiff not only to mention the annual revenue or rent payable but also to mention the market

value as estimated by the plaintiff with details as to the calculation thereof, shows that the intention of the Legislature has not been in any way

transgressed by the Government in prescribing the Form in that manner. Thus, a reading of the provisions of the Act along with the Form

prescribed by the Government would only lead the conclusion that the market value of the property to be computed u/s 30 is the value which the

property would fetch in the market. Such value can be proved by production of sale deeds of properties similarly situated in the neighbourhood. If

such evidence is not available at all, it may be open to the Court to arrive at the market value by capitalisation of the income or by multiplying the

annual revenue by a particular factor. If the evidence with regard to the actual market value is available, in the shape of sale deeds or other

dependable evidence, then the Court has to determine the market value on such basis and not on the basis of capitalisation.

Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon an unreported decision of this Court in Mohamed Bathumal Beevi v. Kathija Beevi in C.R.P.

No. 1235 of 1965 order dated 4-8-1967. That was a revision which arose out of a suit in which one of the defendants was the State of Madras.

In the trial Court, Court-fee was paid by the plaintiff on a sum of Rs. 7750 which was arrived at on the basis of a revenue sale held in the year

1954. The suit was filed in the year 1962. The Court-fee examiner raised on objection that the market value should be fixed with reference to the

date of the plaint and the revenue sale held in 1954 could not be taken as the basis for fixing the market value on the date of plaint. After enquiry,

the trial Court held that the market value for the buildings involved in that suit should be fixed by approximating the tax payable to the monthly

rental and arriving at the annual income by taking the monthly rental income for ten months, excluding rent for two months for maintenance and

taxes and further capitalising the annual rental at 20 years'' purchase. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff preferred the revision.

Ananthanarayanan C.J. who heard the revision petition, held that the evidence available for fixing the value as on the relevant date was in the shape

of receipts for payment of tax for 1963 and that should be taken as the basis for the computation of market value. The learned Judge upheld the

market value fixed by the Court below as well the method of computation adopted as there was no other reliable evidence. The net result of the

order passed by the learned Judge is to multiply the tax payable on the building by two hundred for arriving at the market value of the building.

The only question which arose for consideration before the learned Judge was, whether the value should be fixed on the basis of a revenue sale

which took place eight years prior to the suit or on the basis of capitalisation of the annual income arrived at by multiplying the property tax by ten.

Even though the State Government was a party to the suit, no contention was raised either by the State or by the defendants in that case that the

market value should be fixed at the value which the property would fetch in the open market. The learned Judge had no occasion to consider

whether the value should be fixed on the basis of the actual market value or on the basis of capitalisation of the annual income. It does not appear

from the order that any sale deed or any other evidence was available before the Court to prove the actual market value on the relevant date,

namely, the date of filing of the plaint. In the absence of evidence to prove the actual market value, the learned Judge was certainly right in

accepting the capitalisation method adopted by the trial Court. Hence the order passed in that case cannot be taken to be an authority for the

proposition that the market value of the property should always be fixed on the basis of capitalisation of annual rental value or annual revenue.

Reliance is placed on a judgment of Justice Bhaskaran in Diary No. 16426 of 1985. That was a proceeding for issue of Letters of

Administration with will annexed. The question related to the value of the estate as on the date of the application. The applicant adopted the value

fixed by the Wealth Tax authorities under the Rules framed under the Wealth tax Act. The Registry of this Court raised an objection to the value

stated by the applicant and insisted upon fixing the value at 20 times the annual value of the building as assessed by the Municipal authorities and

placed the matters before the Court. The applicant therein relied upon certain decisions under the Estate Duty Act and the Wealth Tax Rules. The

learned Judge held that those decisions would not apply with regard to the valuation of the estate for the purposes of payment or duty under

Schedule I, Article 6 of the present Court-fees Act. The learned Judge relied upon a decision of this Court in The Sub-Collector Vs. Pillarisetti

Parthasarathi Naidu and Another, . That was a case under the Land Acquisition Act. A Division Bench of this Court held that where definite

material is not forthcoming either in the shape of sales of neighbouring lands at or about the date of notification or otherwise, the market value of

the property should be fixed by capitalising the net annual income at 20 years'' purchase. The Division Bench also administered a note of caution

that the number of years'' purchase which should be adopted in a case must vary with individual cases and must be based upon the materials

placed before the Court. Relying on that decision and also on an unreported decision of this Court in Appln. No. 1228 of 1939 in O.P. 197 of

1937, which was also a case relating to the value of the estate of the deceased in respect of which Probate was sought, the learned Judge held that

the value should be fixed on the basis of 20 times the annual assessment value as pointed out by the Registry. Here again, the question was not

whether the actual market value should be adopted or the value on the basis of capitalisation should be accepted While the applicant sought to

adopt the peculiar method prescribed under the rules framed under the Wealth-tax Act, the Registry insisted upon the method of capitalisation

value. The fact that the learned Judge has relied upon the Division Bench judgment in The Sub-Collector Vs. Pillarisetti Parthasarathi Naidu and

Another, shows that there was no material available before the Court at that time by way of sales of neighbouring lands or similarly situated

properties, and therefore he was right in adopting the capitalisation method. The decision of Justice Bhaskaran will not help the petitioner in the

present case.

Learned counsel for the defendant, respondent herein, invited my attention to Smt. Kamala Devi v. Sunni Central Board of Wakfs, reported in

AIR 1949 All 63, wherein a Division Bench of that Court observed that the market value of a property is the value which the property would fetch

in the open market irrespective of any limitations to which it may be subject. Justice Sapru who delivered a separate judgment concurring with

Justice Harish Chandra, observed as follows--

I would interpret the word market value to mean value for which it would be possible for a property to be sold in the open market, regardless of

any consideration such as litigation relating to it.

With respect, I agree with the learned Judge.

My attention is also drawn to a passage in the Commentary on Law of Court-fees in Tamil Nadu'' by K. Krishnamurthi and R. Mathrubutham,

7th Edn. at page 95 which reads thus: --

Suits by persons having restricted interest: The provisions of the Act do not make any distinction between a suit by an absoslute owner and one

by a person having a restricted interest, such as, a life estate holder, a tenant or a mortgagee. The special modes of valuation prescribed in Sub-

clauses (a) to (f) of Section 7, for value of land do not obviously admit of any such distinction, while Sub-clause (g) refers simply to the market

value of the land. Panangipalli Suryanarayanacharyulu Vs. Ravi Narasimhaswamy and Others, , under old Act, where a suit by a lessee for

possession was required to be valued at market value of the property though value of his leasehold interest would have been much less. This is a

great hardship. In the unreported judgment in C.R.P. 1989 of 1949 cited in (1951) 1 MLJ 21, the hardship was avoided by applying clause (iv)(c)

of Section 7 of the old Act corresponding to Section 25 of this Act, to a suit by a lessee praying for a declaration as to his leasehold right and for

possession, and allowing the plaintiff to put his own valuation. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in 62 Calcutta 417 was relied on for the

purpose. This method of avoiding the hardship is no longer possible under this Act because Section 25(a) specifically provides that even where a

declaration is asked for, Court-fee should be paid on the value of the property, the possession of which is sought as a consequential relief.

I agree with the statement of law found in the text book. Learned authors have also pointed out that there is great hardship in directing the

plaintiff to value the property as such even in cases where the party claims only an interest which is lesser than that of a fee simple. But

unfortunately the Legislature has chosen to make the provisions of the Act more stringent than what they were under the old Act. Under the old

Act, there was a possibility of granting relief from payment of heavy Court-fee by construing the plaint as one for declaration u/s 7(iv)(c) as was

done by the Bench in In Re: Mazumdar Sobhanadri Rao Pantulu Garu and Others, , because the Court-fee payable under that sub-section was,

according to the amount at which the relief sought for was valued in the plaint by the plaintiff. But u/s 25(a) of the present Act, which corresponds

to Section 7(iv)(c) of the old Act, the Court-fee is payable on the market value of the property. The change which has been brought about by the

Legislature in the new Act would only indicate that the Legislature did not want to mitigate the hardship, if any, of the litigant. It has chosen to

impose on the litigant a greater burden whether he claims a restricted interest or an absolute interest in the property which is the subject matter of

the suit. However, it is a matter for the Legislature to consider again and deckle whether Court-fee should be paid on the market value of the

property as such even in cases where the plaintiff does not claim the absolute ownership thereof. This is necessary, particularly, in view of the fact

that on the Original Side of the High Court, the situation has been eased by making a provision for payment of Court-fee on the basis of slab

system. But under the Court-fees Act of 1955 Court-fee is to be paid on ad valorem basis. In my view, the matter requires a second look by the

Legislature.

The learned Government Advocate places reliance on the decision of Justice Ramachandra Iyer in Vararajulu v. Venkatakrishna in C.R.P. 57

of 1958, reported in (1959) 1 MLJ 9. That was a case relating to a village house. The learned Judge has held that in villages the market value of

houses is far below the actual cost of construction and where the plaintiff estimates the value of such properties at a particular amount for purposes

of Court-fee and adduces evidence in that behalf, it is the plain duty of the Court to accept such valuation if there is no evidence to the contrary.

The learned Judge held that such properties should not be valued on the basis of the cost that would have taken to construct them.

The next decision relied on by the learned Government Advocate is that of Anantanarayanan J. in Ramachandra v. Anjammal, reported in

(1963) 2 MLJ 59. The learned Judge held that the price offered by the plaintiff for the purchase of the property is certainly the ordinary measure of

value and the proper basis for Court-fee valuation. In that case, the Court below held that the plaintiff ought to pay Court-fee, not on the ox facie

value of Rs. 1000, recited in his sale deed, but upon the capitalised value of the estimated mesne profits or rent, which was Rs. 2550. That

conclusion of the Court below was reversed by the learned Judge holding that the formula of capitalisation could be adopted only when no other

basis was available. In that case, the sale of the plaintiff gave the value as Rs. 1000 and the learned Judge held that it should be adopted as the

market value. The last of the judgments to which my attention was drawn by the learned Government Advocate is that of a Division Bench in the

Collector of Kistna at The Collector of Kistna Vs. Sreemanthu Raja Yarlagadda Sivarama Prasad Bahadur, Zamindar of Challapalli, . The

question which arose for consideration in that case related to the method of valuing the melwaram interest in the property acquired for a public

purpose under the Land Acquisition Act. While dealing with that question, the Division Bench held that the rule of the number of years'' purchases

was not a theoretical or legal rule, but depended upon economic factors, such as, the rate of interest prevailing on gilt-edged securities at the time

of the acquisition i.e., on the date of the notification u/s 4 of the Act. It was pointed out that there was no uniform or rigid principle that no more

than 20 years'' purchase should be allowed and that 20 times the net income would be fair if the prevailing rate of interest was 5 per cent. No

doubt, the decision has no direct application to the facts of this case. The method of number of years of purchase is not uniform. Therefore, the

method of capitalisation should be adopted with some care and caution having regard to the facts of the particular case. I have already referred to

the decision of the Division Bench in the Sub-Collector Rajahmundry v. Parthasarathi, reported in ILR 1943 Mad 127 : AIR 1942 Mad 42 in

which the same view had been expressed.

Thus, an analysis of the various decisions cited by learned counsel on both sides shows that the market value of the property when it happens

to be a building and land appurtenant thereto, should be the actual market value. The method of arriving at the same is by considering the evidence

which is placed before the Court by the parties. If the parties are able to place evidence in the shape of sales of similar properties situated in the

neighbourhood or the locality, then that would be valuable evidence which should be taken into account. If, on the other hand, such evidence is not

available at all then, the Court is certainly entitled to fix the value of the property by adopting the capitalisation method.

The last contention urged by learned counsel for the revision petitioner is that when the value adopted by the plaintiff is reasonable, it should be

accepted by the Court. In support of this proposition, learned counsel refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tara Devi Vs. Sri Thakur

Radha Krishna Maharaj, through Sebaits Chandeshwar Prasad and Meshwar Prasad and Another, . That case was one u/s 7(iv)(c) of Court-fees

Act, 1870. As pointed out already, the Court-fee under that section is to be paid according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued by

the plaintiff in the plaint. While dealing with that section, the Supreme Court observed as follows --

It is now well settled by the decisions of this Court in S.Rm.Ar.S.Sp. Sathappa Chettiar Vs. S.Rm.Ar.Rm. Ramanathan Chettiar, and

Meenakshisundaram Chettiar Vs. Venkatachalam Chettiar, that in a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling u/s 7(iv)(c) of the Court-

fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff is free to make his own estimation of the reliefs sought in the plaint and such valuation both for the purposes of Court-

fee and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted. It is only in cases where it appears to the Court on a consideration of the facts and circumstances

of the case that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable, and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation

and can revise the same. The plaintiff has valued the leasehold interest on the basis of the rent. Such a valuation, as has been rightly held, by the

Courts below is reasonable and the same is not demonstratively arbitrary nor there has been any deliberate underestimation of the reliefs.

As the provision under the corresponding Section 25(a) of the present Act is entirely different from the provision u/s 7(iv)(c) of the old Act, the

principle laid down by the Supreme Court will not be helpful to the petitioner herein. u/s 25(a) or Section 30 of the Act, the plaintiff is not free to

make his own estimation of the value of the relief sought for in the plaint. He has to compute the market value of the property as such under both

the sections. Hence he has to furnish to the Court the relevant evidence and the relevant particulars on which the market value is computed by him.

In the present case, the Court below has appointed an advocate Commissioner to determine the market value. It is represented that the

advocate-Commissioner has taken evidence and submitted his report to the Court. It is for the trial Court to consider whether the report of the

Advocate-Commissioner is supported by relevant evidence, in the sense that the evidence placed before the Commissioner relates to similarly

situated properties or properties situated in the neighbourhood. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the evidence placed before the advocate-

Commissioner is not relevant or not sufficient, the Court had to determine under what basis the value has to be computed. If the Court ultimately

finds that there is no evidence to show as to what would be the value of the property in the open market, then the Court may arrive at the value by

adopting capitalisation method.

If, on the other hand, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence before the Court to fix the value which the property would fetch in the

open market, then the Court is bound to accept the same.

In the circumstances, the civil revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Counsel''s fee for Government Advocate is

fixed at Rs. 1000/- (Rs. One thousand only.)