D. Pattammal vs K. Kalyanasundaram

Srinivasan, J.—This matter relates to the correctness of the valuation of the plaint in the suit and the court fee payable thereon though the revision petition is against an order appointing an advocate - Commissioner to determine the market value of the property.

The petitioner herein filed the suit out of which this revision arises for delivery of possession of the entire ground floor and the portion in the rear side of the first floor in No. 18, Nattu Pillayar Koil Street, George Town, Madras-1, more particularly described in Schedule B to the plaint. In paragraph 4 of the plaint, the plaintiff had stated that the property described in Schedule A originally belonged to one Perumal Mudaliar, father-in-law of the plaintiff, and by a registered deed of settlement dated 29-9-1933, he settled the same in favour of the plaintiff''s husband granting him life interest and after his death, his widow, the plaintiff to have a life interest and after her lifetime, the male heirs of her husband should take the property absolutely. It was further stated in the plaint that the plaintiff, was in possession of a portion of the house and the other portion has been in the unlawful occupation of the defendant. The defendant, according to the plaintiff, is a son of her husband through his first wife. It is not necessary to refer to the other averments in the plaint for the purpose of this revision petition. The plaintiff has valued the suit for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction at Rs. 35,486 being the market value of the 4/7ths share in the possession of the defendant and paid a court-fee of Rs. 2,382-50-p, u/s 30 of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act of 1955. In the memo of calculation attached to the plaint, the market value of the entire property was stated to be Rs. 62,240 and the value of the property in the possession of the defendant was stated to be Rs. 35,486. The basis on which the market value was arrived at by the plaintiff was set out either in the plaint or in the memo of calculation. In the written statement filed by the defendant, the correctness of the valuation of the suit property for purposes of court-fees and jurisdiction was challenged. The defendant did not raise any express plea that the market value of the property should be ascertained on any particular basis. However, the defendant stated that the suit should be framed as one for declaration of title and possession.

The defendant filed I.A.No. 21854 of 1984 for appointment of an advocate - Commissioner to determine the market value of the property. In the affidavit filed in support of the application, it was stated that the properly was a very valuable one worth more than Rs. 4 lakhs and it had been wantonly undervalued by the plaintiff in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the City Civil Court. The application was contested by the petitioner herein who denied the allegation made in the affidavit filed by the defendant in support of his application for appointment of an advocate-Commissioner.

The learned 16th Assistant Judge of the City Civil Court, Madras took the view that the plaintiff had not valued the suit property correctly and that the value would be much more than the value mentioned in the plaint. Consequently, the learned Judge appointed an advocate-Commissioner in order to determine the market value of the property. It has to be stated that the defendant had filed two sale deeds before the learned Judge purporting to relate to properties in the locality and relevant for the purpose of ascertaining the market value of the suit property.

It is the said order of the learned Judge which is challenged in the present revision petition. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner argued that the plaintiff is claiming only a life estate in the suit property and that she does not make any claim as full owner thereof. According to him, u/s 30 of the Court-Fees Act, the property to be valued is only the interest claimed by the plaintiff in the property and not the property as such. The second contention urged by the learned Counsel is that even if the property is to be valued as such, it should be on the basis of 20 times the annual value of the property and the method of capitalisation has been accepted to be a reasonable method by this Court on several occasions. Ultimately, the learned Counsel contended that in the background of the facts of the case, the plaintiff is claiming only a life interest, and that she has adopted a reasonable method for arriving at the valuation for the purpose of court-fees and jurisdiction and, therefore, the Court should accept the value mentioned in the plaint and should not insist upon the market value being ascertained otherwise. Learned Counsel referred to certain decisions in support of his contentions to which I will refer at a later stage.

Learned Counsel appearing for the defendant invited my attention to the provisions contained in Sections 7, 10, 12, 25(a), 30 and 53 of the Court-Fees Act and Order 26, Rule 9 of the CPC and argued that there is no provision in the Court-Fees Act for determining the market value of a building on the basis of 20 times the annual value or capitalisation of the income. According to him, whenever the Act wanted to fix the market value on the basis of any multiplication of the assessment or revenue, it had made a specific provision therefore has in Section 7 of the Act. Learned Counsel submitted that the market value in Section 30 would only mean the actual value which the property would fetch in the open market and that should be ascertained with the relevant materials such as sales of similar properties in the locality. Learned Counsel submitted that in the present case, two sale deeds had been filed before the trial Court and a prima facie case was made out to prove that the value given by the plaintiff in the plaint was erroneous and it was only thereafter the Court below appointed an advocate-Commissioner for determining the market value.

The learned Government Advocate invited my attention to the form prescribed u/s 10 of the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 for giving the particulars of immovable property and submitted that apart from the provisions in the Act referred to by learned Counsel for the defendant and the above form, there is no other provision with reference to the ascertainment of market value under the Act. He argued that the absence of any specific provision, the market value will have to be fixed on the basis of the price of the property which it would fetch in the open market. He referred to certain decisions of this Court which, according to him, took that view.

Before, considering the contentions of learned Counsel, it is necessary to refer to the relevant provisions found in the Tamil Nadu Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955 which is hereafter referred to as ''the Act''. Section 7 of the Act provides for the determination of market value. Under Clause (1) of Section 7, the market value shall be determined as on the date of the presentation of the plaint. Clause (2) provides that the market value of land in suits falling under Sections 25(a), 25(b), 27(a), 29, 30, 37(1), 37(3), 38, 45 or 48 shall be deemed to be thirty times the survey assessment on the land where it is a ryotwari land. The section contains similar provisions based on the assessment, rent, peinshkush or melvaram with reference to the different kinds of lands described in the different Sub-sections of Section 7(2) of the Act. Admittedly, none of the Sub-clauses of Clause (2) of Section 7 would apply to the present case. Though there is a provision in Clause (g) of Section 7(2) for a land which is house site, whether assessed to full revenue or not, there is no provision for assessment with the market value of buildings. Section 7 as such does not come into play in the present case.

Section 10 of the Act provides that in every suit in which the fee payable under the Act on the plaint depends on the market value of the subject matter of the suit, the plaintiff shall file with the plaint, a statement in the prescribed form, of particulars of the subject matter of the suit and his valuation thereof unless such particulars and the valuation are contained in the plaint. The form referred to in Section 10 has been prescribed by G.O.Ms.No. 820, Home, dated 15th March, 1956. The Form provides for mentioning the following particulars therein: (i) Section and sub-section of the Act, (ii) Nature of suit, (hi) Annual revenue or rent payable, (iv) Market value of and (v) Value for purposes of Court-fees. In the instructions contained in the Form, there is no provision relating to building sites, buildings, gardens, etc. That provision calls upon the plaintiff to mention the market value as estimated by the plaintiff with details as to how it is calculated and the actual rental value of the property as entered in the register of the Municipality or the Panchayat, if any, within whose jurisdiction the property is situate. The last instruction contained in the Form is to the effect that in addition to the particulars required by Instructions I and II, the plaintiff may also furnish such additional information which he considers material to his own valuation. The form requires the plaintiff to mention the annual revenue or rent payable and also the market value. A reading of the form was whole including the instructions as contained therein would only indicate that the market value need not necessarily depend upon the annual revenue or rent payable and it may be independently arrived at by the plaintiff. But he should give the details as to how the value is calculated.

It is not necessary to refer to the contents of Section 12 of the Act though learned Counsel for the defendant invited my attention thereto. That section only provides for the Court taking a decision as to the proper court-fee payable on the plaint and the stage at which such decision should be taken. Section 25(a) of the Act relates to a suit where the prayer is for a declaration and for possession of the property to which the declaration relates. According to that section, the fee in such a suit shall be computed on the market value of the property or on Rs. 300 whichever is higher. Section 30 of the Act deals with suits for possession not otherwise provided for. This section prescribes that the fee shall be computed on the market value of the property or on Rs. 400 whichever is higher. If the suit contains a prayer for declaration, it would fall u/s 25(a) and if it is a suit for possession simpliciter, it will fall u/s 30. But under both the sections, and fee has to be computed on the market value of the property or on Rs. 300 under the former section and Rs. 400 under the latter section, whichever is higher. Both the sections refer to the market value of the property. In this connection, it may be mentioned that the suit is one for possession. No doubt, it is now stated that an application for amendment has been filed before the trial Court for including a prayer for declaration and thereby bringing the suit u/s 25(a) of the Act. It appears that the amendment has not yet been carried out and as on date the suit has to be construed as one for possession simpliciter u/s 30 of the Act. The order of the Court below has considered the valuation of the property only with reference to Section 30 and in this revision petition. I am called upon to decide the correctness of that order. Hence, for the purpose of this revision, it is enough if Section 30 of the Act is considered.

The terms of Section 30 are as follows:

In a suit for possession of immovable property not otherwise provided for, fee shall be computed on the market value of the property or on rupees four hundred, whichever is higher.

The question which arises for consideration is, when the section says, the fee has to be computed on the market value of the property, does it relate to the value of the property as such or value of the interest claimed by the plaintiff in that property. According to learned Counsel for the petitioner, the words "market value" of the property should be construed as" market value of the interest claimed by the plaintiff in the property". Learned Counsel submits that it is not in every case, the plaintiff claims as absolute owner of the entire property. When he claims only a restricted interest in the property, or a portion of the property, in all such cases, the fee shall be computed only on the market value of such restricted interest or such portion of the property. Learned Counsel submits that if any other construction is adopted, it would cause hardship to the litigants. No doubt, the argument is very attractive. But unfortunately for him the language of the section is unambiguous. The section refers to ''immovable property'' in the earlier part of it, and in the later part of it, it refers to the market value of the property. The word ''property'' occurring in the later case of the section should necessarily refer to the ''immovable property'' occurring in the first part of the section. Hence, the value that has to be computed is, the market value of the immovable property, the possession of which is sought by the plaintiff in the suit. The contention that it can refer to the market value of the restricted interest claimed by the plaintiff cannot be accepted. In the case of a portion of the property, the matter will be different. With regard to a portion of the property, the value is the market value of that portion of the property of which possession is sought. Therefore, that portion of the property will be the immovable property contemplated in the first part of the section and the market value of that portion alone is to be ascertained. But in the case of interest covering the entirety of the immovable property, the market value of the property as such has to be computed as the plaintiff seeks to recover his possession of the entire property. It is not as if the plaintiff wants to recover symbolical possession of the interest in the property which by itself is intangible though the immovable property is tangible.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies on the decision of the Bench of this Court in Mazumdar Sobhandri Rao Pantulu Garu and Ors. 63 M.L.J. 759. That case related to a claim made by an Inamdar entitled to both Kudivaram and Melvaram in the land. In the plaint, the relief prayed for was one for recovery of possession from the tenants let into the land for temporary periods. While he the tenants did not dispute the plaintiff''s right to claim Melvaram, they asserted their occupancy rights in the land and resisted the prayer for recovery of possession. The plaintiff had paid court-fees u/s 7(xi)(cc) of the old Court-Fees Act, 1870. The trial Court had ordered that the fee shall be computed u/s 7(c) and against that order, the plaintiff filed an appeal. The Bench held that Clause (xi) of Section 7 would apply only when the suit is based on a lease, but not when the plaintiff wants a decree establishing his title. Thus, the Bench agreed with that part of the order of the lower Court. But the Bench held that the finding of the lower Court that the suit would fall u/s 7(v) was not correct. It was held that Section 7(v) would apply only in the case of a dispute between alleged owner and trespasser. As the Melvaram right of the plaintiff was admitted in that case, the Bench took the view that the relief which the plaintiff had claimed was really one for a declaration that he was the owner of the Kudivaram and consequently entitled to the relief of possession. Thus, the Bench held that the matter fell u/s 7(iv)(c) of the old Court-Fees Act.

Section 7(v) of the old Act related to suits for possession of land, houses and gardens. It was prescribed that in such cases, the court-fee should be paid according to the value of the subject matter. The section provided for the computation of such value differently in the case of different kinds of lands. It is significant to note that even under the old Act, when the subject-matter was a house, or gardens, the value was to be calculated according to the market value of the house or gardens as per Section 7(v)(e). Section 7(iv)(c) of the old Act pertained to suits for declaratory decrees or orders with prayers for consequent, reliefs. Under the old Act, the value was to be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought was valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. Thus, in suits for declaration with consequential relief, the plaintiff had the option to value the relief as he chose and court-fee was payable only on such value. Once the Bench took the view that the suit was really one for declaration it fell u/s 7(iv)(c) of the old Act. That decision cannot be invoked by the petitioner herein as the present suit is one for possession and there is no prayer for declaration. As stated already, there is an application for amendment of the plaint to convert the suit: into one for declaration and consequential relief and if that amendment is allowed, it will fall u/s 25(a) of the Act. In that event under that section, court-fee has to be computed on the market value of the property, thus, there is no difference with regard to the computation of court-fee, whether the suit falls u/s 30 or u/s 25. Under the old Court-Fees Act, the computation of the court-fee for suits falling u/s 7(iv)(c) was entirely on a different basis from the suits which fell u/s 7(v)(a) of the old Act. Even assuming that the decision relied on by learned Counsel for the petitioner applies to the facts of the case, it would not make any difference as under the present Court Fees Act, the petitioner will have to pay the court-fees on the market value of the property even if the suit is treated as one for declaration and consequential relief.

There is no definition of the term "market value" in the Court-Fees Act, nor is there any definition in the General Clauses Act. Hence, the term "market value" has to be understood in its plain meaning as in common parlance, i.e., the value which the property will fetch in the market. The term "market value" has occurred in the Land Acquisition Act and Courts have frequently considered what the term "market value" means. The uniform view of the courts is that ''market value of the property'' is the value which a willing purchaser will pay to a willing seller having regard to the location and advantages attached to the property and also the potential value thereof. As there is no definition in the Court Fees Act as such, the definition which has been adopted for the purpose of Land Acquisition Act can be adopted for the purpose of Court-Fees Act also. Particularly when Section 7 of the Court-Fees Act provides for the market value being computed on a particular basis with reference to suits for different kinds of lands and is silent with reference to a suit for a building and the land appurtenant thereto, it has to be inferred that the Legislature intended that the computation on the market value of buildings and lands attached thereto should be on the basis of the value, the property would fetch in the open market. The particulars called for in the Form prescribed u/s 10, referred to already, would not in any way alter the situation. When the main Act does not provide for calculating the market value on the basis of capitalising the income or multiplying the annual revenue by a factor, the form prescribed by the Government Order u/s 10 cannot go beyond the scope of the Act and provide for computation of market value on a particular basis. The very fact that the Form itself requires the plaintiff not only to mention the annual revenue or rent payable but also to mention the market value as estaimated by the plaintiff with details as to the calculation thereof, shows that the intention of the Legislature has not been in any way transgressed by the Government in prescribing the Form in that manner. Thus, a reading of the provisions of the Act along with the Form prescribed by the Government would only lead to the conclusion that the market value of the property to be computed u/s 30 is the value which the property would fetch in the market. Such value can be proved by production of sale deeds of properties similarly situated in the neighbourhood. If such evidence is not available at all it may be open to the Court to arrive at the market value by capitalisation of the income or by multiplying the annual revenue by a particular factor. If the evidence with regard to the actual market value is available in the shape of sale deeds or other dependable evidence then the Court has to determine the market value on such basis and not on the basis of capitalisation.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner relies upon an unreported decision of this Court in Mohamed Bathumal Beevi and Ors. v. Kathija Beevi and Ors. C.R.P.No. 1235 of 1965, Order dated 4-3-1967. That was a revision which arose out of a suit in which one of the defendants was the State of Madras. In the trial Court court-fee was paid by the plaintiff on a sum of Rs. 7,750 which was arrived at on the basis of a revenue sale held in the year 1954. The suit was filed in the year 1962. The Court-fee Examiner raised an objection that the market value should be fixed with reference to the date of the plaint and the revenue sale held on 1954 could not be taken as the basis for fixing the market value on the date of plaint. After enquiry the trial Court held that the market value for the buildings involved in that suit should be fixed by approximating the tax payable to the monthly rental and arriving at the annual income by taking the monthly rental income for 10 months, excluding rent for two months for maintenance and taxes and further capitalising the annual rental at twenty years'' purchase. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff preferred the revision. Ananthanarayanan, C.J., who heard the revision petition, held that the evidence available for fixing the value as on the relevant date was in the shape of receipts for payment of tax for 1963 and that shall be taken as the basis for the computation of market value. The learned Judge upheld the market value fixed by the court below as well the method of computation adopted as there was no other reliable evidence. The net result of the order passed by the learned Judge is to multiply the tax payable on the building, two hundred for arriving at the market value of the building. The only question which arose for consideration before the learned Judge was, whether the value should be fixed on the basis of a revenue sale which took placed eight year prior to the suit or on the basis of capitalisation of the annual income arrived at by multiplying the property tax by ten. Even though the State Government was a party to the suit, no contention was raised either by the State or by the defendants in that case that the market value should be fixed at the value which the property would fetch in the open market. The learned Judge had no occasion to consider whether the value would be fixed on the basis of the actual market value or on the basis of capitalisation of the annual income. It does not appear from the order that any sale deed or any other evidence was available before the Court to prove the actual market value on the relevant date, namely, the date of filing of the plaint. In the absence of evidence to prove the actual market value, the learned Judge was certainly right in accepting the capitalisation method adopted by the trial Court. Hence the order passed in that case cannot be taken to be an, authority for the proposition that the market value of the property should always be fixed on the basis of capitalisation of annual rental value or annual revenue.

Reliance is placed upon a judgment of Justice Bhaskaran in Diary No. 16426 of 1985. That was a proceeding for issue of Letters of Administration with will annexed. The question related to the value of the estate as on the date of the application. The applicant adopted the value fixed by the Wealth-tax authorities under the Rules framed under the Wealth Tax Act. The Registry of this Court raised an objection to the value stated by the applicant and insisted upon fixing the value at 20 times the annual value of the building as assessed by the municipal authorities and placed the matter before the Court. The applicant therein relied upon certain decisions under the Estate Duty Act and the Wealths Tax Rules. The learned Judge held that those decisions would not apply with regard to the valuation of the Estate for the purpose of payment of duty under Schedule I, Article 6 of the present Court-Fees Act. The learned Judge relied upon a decision of this Court in The Sub-Collector Vs. Pillarisetti Parthasarathi Naidu and Another, . That was a case under the Land Acquisition Act. A Division Bench of this Court hold that where definite material is not forthcoming either in the shape of sales of neighbouring lands at or about the date of notification or otherwise, the market value of the property should be fixed by capitalising the net value income at twenty years'' purchase. The Division Bench also administered a note of caution that the number of years'' purchase which should be adopted in a case must vary with individual cases and must be based upon the materials placed before the Courts. Relying on that decision and also on an unreported decision of this Court in Application No. 1228 of 1939 in O.P.No. 197 of 1937, which was also a case relating to the value of the estate of the deceased in respect of which probate was sought, the learned Judge held that the value should be fixed on the basis of twenty times the annual assessment value as pointed out by the Registry. Here again, the question was not whether the actual market value should be adopted or the value on the basis of capitalisation should be accepted. While the applicant sought to adopt the peculiar method prescribed under the Rules framed under the Wealth Tax Act, the Registry insisted upon the method of capitalisation value. The fact that the learned Judge has relied upon the Division Bench judgment in Sub Collector Rajamundry v. Parthasarathy, ILR 1943 Mad. 127 shows that there was no material available before the Court at that time by way of sales of neighbouring lands or similarly situated properties and, therefore, he was right in adopting the capitalisation method. The decision of Justice Bhaskaran will not help the petitioner in the present case.

Learned Counsel for the defendant, respondent herein invited my attention to Sm. Kamaladevi v. Sunni Central Board of Wakfs AIR 1949 All. 63 wherein in a Division Bench of that Court observed that the market value of a property is the value which the property would fetch in the open market irrespective of any limitations to which it may be subject. Justice Sapru who delivered a separate judgment concurring with Justice Harish Chandra, observed as follows:

I would interpret the word "market value" to mean value for which it would be possible for a property to be sold in the open market, regardless of any consideration such as litigation relating to it.

With respect, 1 agree with the learned Judge.

My attention is also drawn to a passage in the Commentary on Law of Court-Fees in Tamil Nadu" by K. Krishnamurthy and R. Mathrubutham Seventh Edition at page 95 which reads thus:

Suits by persons having restricted interest. The provisions of the Act do not make any distinction between a suit by an absolute owner and one by a person having a restricted interest, such as a life estate-holder, a tenant or a mortgagee. The special modes of valuation prescribed in Sub-clauses (a) to (f) of Section 7, for value of land do not obviously admit of any such distinction, while Sub-clause (g) refers simply to the market value of the land of ILR (1939) Mad. 367 under Old Act where a suit by a lessee for possession was required to be valued at market value of the property though value of his leasehold interest would have been much less. This is a great hardship. In the unreported judgment in C.R.P.No. 1939 of 1949, cited in (1951) 1 M.L.J. (N.R.C.) 21, the hardship was avoided by applying Clause (iv) (c) of Section 7 of the old Act corresponding to Section 25 of this Act on a suit by a lessee praying for a declaration as to his lease hold right and for possession, and allowing the plaintiff to put his own valuation. The decision of the Calcutta High Court in 62 Cal. 417 was relied on for the purpose. This method of avoiding the hardship is no longer possible under this Act became Section 25(a) specifically provides that even where a declaration is asked for, court-fee should be paid on the value of the property, the possession of which is sought as a consequential relief.

I agree with the statement of law found in the Text book. Learned authors have also, pointed out that there is great hardship in directing the plaintiff to value the property as such even in cases where the party claims an interest which is lesser than that of a fee simple. But unfortunately the Legislature has chosen to make the provisions of the Act more stringent than what they were under the old Act. Under the old Act, there was a possibility of granting relief from payment of heavy court-fee by construing the plaint as one for declaration u/s 7(iv)(o) to was done by the Bench in Mazumdar Subhanadri Rao Pantulu Garu and Ors. 63 M.L.J. 759, because the court-fee payable under that sub-section was according to the amount at which the relief sought for was valued in the plaint by the plaintiff. But u/s 25(a) of the Present Act which corresponds to Section 7(iv)(c) of the Old Act, the court-fee is payable on the market value of the property. The change which has been brought about by the Legislature in the new Act would only indicate that the Legislature did not want to mitigate the hardship if any, of the litigant. It has chosen to impose on the litigant a greater burden whether he claims a restricted interest or an absolute interest in the property - which is the subject matter of the suit. However, it is a matter for the Legislature to consider again and decide whether court-fee should be paid on the market value of the property as such even in cases where the plaintiff does not claim the absolute ownership thereof. This is necessary, particularly, in view of the fact that on the Original Side of the High Court, the situation has been easedby making a provision for payment of court-fee on the basis of slab system. But under the Court-Fees Act of 1955, court-fee is to be paid on ad valorem basis. In my view, the matter requires a second look by the Legislature.

The learned Government Advocate places reliance on the decision of Justice Ramachandra Iyer in Varadarajulu v. Venkatakrishnan in C.R.P.No. 57 of 1958 reported in (1959) 1 M.L.J. (S.N.) 9. That was a case relating to a village house. The learned judge has held that in villages the market value of houses is far below the actual cost of construction and where the plaintiff estimates the value of such properties at a particular amount for purposes of court-fee and adduces evidence in that behalf, it is the plain duty of the Court to accept such valuation if there is no evidence to the contrary. The learned Judge held that such properties should not be valued on the basis of the costs that would have taken to construct them.

The next decision relied on by the learned Government Advocate is that of Justice Ananthanarayanan in Ramachandran v. Anjammal (1963) 11 M.L.J. 59. The learned Judge held that the price offered by the plaintiff for the purchase of the property is certainly the ordinary measure of value and the proper basis for court-fee valuation. In that case, the Court below held that the plaintiff ought to pay Court-fee, not on the exfacie value of Rs. 1,000 recited in his sale deed, but upon the capitalised value of the estimated mesne profits or rent, which was Rs. 2,500. That conclusion of the Court below was reversed by the learned Judge holding that the formula of capitalisation could be adopted only when no other basis was available. In that case, the sale of the plaintiff gave the value as Rs. 1,000 and the learned Judge held that it should be adopted as the market value. The last of the judgments to which my attention was drawn by the learned Government Advocate is that of a Division Bench in The Collector of Kistna at Masulipatnam v. Sreemanthu Raja Varlagadda Siva Rama Prasad Bahadur, Zamindar of Challapalli (1937) 1 M.L.J. 744 : 173 I.C. 735 : ILR (1938) Mad. 431. The question which arose for consideration in that case related to the method of valuing the Melvaram interest in the property acquired for a public purpose under the Land Acquisition Act. While dealing with that question, the Division Bench held that the rule of the number of years'' purchase was not a theoretical or legal rule, but depended upon economic factors, such as, the rate of interest prevailing on gilt-edged securities at the time of the acquisition, i.e., on the date of the notification u/s 4 of the Act. It was pointed out that there was no uniform or rigid principle that no more than twenty years'' purchase should be allowed and that twenty times the net income would be fair if the prevailing rate of interest was 5 per cent. No doubt, the decision has no direct application to the facts of this case. The method of number of years of purchase is not uniform. Therefore, the method of capitalisation should be adopted with some care and caution having regard to the facts of the particular case. I have already referred to the decision of the Division Bench in The Sub Collector Rajamundry v. Parthasarathy ILR 1943 Mad. 127 in which the same view had been expressed.

Thus, an analysis of the various decisions cited by learned Counsel on both sides shows that the market value of the property when it happens to be a building and land appurtenant thereto, should be the actual market value. The method of arriving at the same is by considering the evidence which is placed before the Court by the parties. If the parties are able to place evidence in the shape of sales of similar properties situated in the neighbourhood or the locality, then that would be valuable evidence which should be taken into account. If, on the other hand, such evidence is not available at all, then, the Court is certainly entitled to fix the value of the property by adopting the capitalisation method.

The last contention urged by learned Counsel for the revision petitioner is that when the value adopted by the plaintiff is reasonable, it should be accepted by the Court. In support of this proposition, learned Counsel refers to the decision of the Supreme Court in Tara Devi Vs. Sri Thakur Radha Krishna Maharaj, through Sebaits Chandeshwar Prasad and Meshwar Prasad and Another, . That case was one u/s 7(iv)(c) of Court-Fees Act, 1870. As pointed out already, the court-fee under that section is to be paid according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued by the plaintiff in the plaint. While dealing with that section, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

It is now well settled by the decisions of this Court in Sathappa Chettiar v. Ramanathan Chettiar and Meenakshisundaram Chettiar v. Venkatachalam Chettiar that in a suit for declaration with consequential relief falling u/s 7(iv)(c) of the Court-Fees Act, 1870, the plaintiff is free to make his own estimation of the reliefs sought in the plaint and such valuation both for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction has to be ordinarily accepted. It is only in case where it appears to the Court on a consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case that the valuation is arbitrary, unreasonable and the plaint has been demonstratively undervalued, the Court can examine the valuation and can revise the same. The plaintiff has valued the lease-hold interest on the basis of the rent. Such a valuation, as has been rightly held by the Courts below, is reasonable and the same is not demonstratively arbitrary nor there has been any deliberate underestimation of the reliefs.

As the provision under the corresponding Section 25(a) of the present Act is entirely different from the provision u/s 7(iv)(c) of the old Act, the principle laid down by the Supreme Court will not be helpful to the petitioner hearin. u/s 25(a) or 30 of the Act, the plaintiff is not free to make his own estimation of the value of the relief sought for in the plaint. He has to compute the market value of the property as such under both the sections. Hence he has to furnish to the Court all relevant evidence and the relevant particulars on which the market value is computed by him.

In the present case, the Court below has appointed an advocate-Commissioner to determine the market value. It is represented that the advocate-Commissioner has taken evidence and submitted his report to the Court. It is for the trial Court to consider whether the report of the advocate-Commissioner is supported by relevant evidence in the sense that the evidence placed before the Commissioner relates to similarly situated properties or properties situated in the neighbourhood. If the Court comes to the conclusion that the evidence placed before the advocate-Commissioner is not relevant or not sufficient, the Court has to determine under what basis the value has to be computed. If the Court ultimately finds that there is no evidence to show as to what would be the value of the property in the open market, then the Court may arrive at the value by adopting capitalisation method.

If, on the other hand, the Court finds that there is sufficient evidence before the Court, to fix the value which the property would fetch in the open market, then the Court is bound to accept the same.

In the circumstances, the civil revision petition is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Counsel''s fee for Government Advocate is fixed at Rs. 1,000 (Rupees one thousand only).