DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs ANITA BARAYA

THE impugned order dated 1.1.2004 passed by District Forum-II has been assailed by the appellant solely on the ground that the respondent does not come within the definition of consumer as she has independent remedy by way of recovery of the excess amount if any paid by her towards allotment of the flat.

THE respondent/complainant was allotted a flat in Dwarka and was asked to pay Rs. 8,63,800/-. Admittedly the respondent paid Rs. 2,19,590/- as excess money than demanded through letter dated 5.11.1998. It is contended by the Counsels for the appellant that as per the policy tentative price was demanded from the respondent which subsequently was found to be higher amount and, therefore, refunded the excess amount to the respondent on 9.8.1999 but without interest. Feeling aggrieved the respondent filed the complaint before the District Forum claiming interest for the period from 30.10.1997 to 9.8.1999. So far as the contention of the Counsel for the appellant that the respondent does not fall within the definition of consumer is concerned, we do not feel inclined to agree as any person who applies for allotment of the flat is a consumer as whatever action or demands are taken or made by the appellant in pursuance of the scheme for allotment these are services provided by the appellant in prosecuting its scheme and, therefore, every applicant or allottee is a consumer as defined under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer Protection Act. The decision relied upon by the Counsel for the appellant in the Uttaranchal State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission in case Haridwar Development Authority v. Pawan Kumar Jain, III (2003) CPJ 84, is of no avail to the appellant as the difference in fact of the instant case and the case referred sticks out of miles. In the relied case relief sought for was regarding fixation of instalments on the parity of similar flats and this relief was not allowed because of being outside the purview of Consumer Protection Act whereas the other two reliefs namely refund of excess amount along with interest and for rectifying defects in construction were allowed.

The next contention of the Counsel is with regard to its liability to pay interest @ 15% because of its being higher than the Bank rates and secondly that it is liable to pay interest for the period when the refund was asked by the respondent till the possession was given. We do not find any merit in this contention as Bank rates are neither binding nor guiding rate for awarding interest while granting compensation against the providers of services as they themselves charge higher rate of interest whenever their consumers commit default. Thus it does not lie in their mouth that the rate of interest be charged from them on the parity of Bank rate. So far as the relevant period from which the interest to be awarded is concerned it is the date when the amount was deposited. The appellants knew it well that they have demanded much higher amount than the original cost and, therefore, retention of excess amount by the appellant till its refund was unauthorised as the moment the appellant found that excess amount has been received, they were obliged to refund the same forthwith.

THERE is no reason for interference in the impugned order. Appeal is dismissed in limine. The FDR furnished by the appellant along with the appeal be returned to the appellant forthwith.

A copy of this order, as per the statutory requirements, be forawarded to the parties free of charge and also to the concerned District Forum and thereafter the file be consigned to record room. Appeal dismissed.