DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs RAM GULATI

THE present appeal has been filed by the appellant under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') assailing the order dated 27.9.2000 of District Forum, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi passed in Complaint Case No. 1898/1999 entitled Shri Ram Gulati v. Delhi Development Authority.

THE brief facts, necessary for deciding the instant appeal, are that the respondent had filed a complaint before the District Forum averring therein that he had applied for MIG flat in 1978 and had accordingly been allotted Flat No. 527 in Pocket 8, Rohini, Delhi on the top floor on 23.11.1987. An allotment-cum-demand letter dated 23.11.1987-27.11.1987 was issued to him, wherein the total cost of the said flat was reflected as Rs. 1,27,500/- and the respondent accordingly made the payment of the initial deposit, as well as one instalment. THEreafter, the respondent applied for change of floor from top floor to ground floor on 20.12.1987 on account of disability of his wife. In response to the said request, the respondent received a letter dated 15.5.1989 from the appellant informing him that the change of floor from top to the ground floor had been approved by the Hon''ble Lt. Governor, Delhi and accordingly, flat No. 5, Block CA, Shalimar Bagh, Delhi had been allotted to him. THErefore, in accordance with the demand letter dated 30.8.1988, the respondent deposited a sum of Rs. 40,292.61 p. along with out-of-turn charges of Rs. 7,500/-. THEreafter the respondent received another letter dated 9.11.1989 demanding interest of Rs. 9,016.90 p. on full value of the flat No. 527, Pocket 8, Rohini, Delhi, from the date of allotment of the said flat, till the date of allotment of ground floor flat in Shalimar Bagh, Delhi. It was the case of the respondent before the District Forum that since the respondent had requested for an allotment of flat under the hire-purchase scheme and deposited all the dues as demanded i.e. initial deposit of Rs. 19,925.27 p. and one instalment for the month of January amounting to Rs. 1,574.27 p. THE appellant was not justified in charging interest from him on the full value of the old flat allotted to him. Accordingly, the respondent represented against the charging of interest on the ground that he had never taken the possession of the earlier allotted flat. However, since the said representation of the respondent went unheeded, the respondent filed a complaint before the District Forum praying for the refund of the interest amount or in the alternative directions to the appellant to charge interest only on the instalments and not on the entire cost of the flat, as well as, to refund the amount of out-of-turn allotment charges of Rs. 7,500/-, together with compensation and costs. The complaint of the complainant was resisted by the appellant who raised preliminary objection that since the allotment in question related to the year 1987, the complaint of the complainant was hopelessly barred by time. On merits, it was stated by the appellant that the flat No. 527, Pocket 8, Rohini, Delhi was allotted in favour of the respondent on 23.1.1987 and the same remained allotted in the name of the respondent for a long time and as such the respondents was liable to pay interest on the full cost of the previous allotted flat, in terms of the policy of the appellant. Furthermore, since an alternative flat had been allotted to the respondent at his request, on out-of-turn basis, the out-of-turn allotment charges, amounting to Rs. 7,500/- were also payable by the respondent and as such there was no deficiency in service on the part of the appellant.

Vide impugned order, the learned District Forum allowed the complaint of the respondent directing the appellant, to calculate the interest to be paid by the respondent, for the earlier allotted flat, on the basis of instalments due from the respondent and to refund the excess amount deposited by the respondent together with interest @ 9%. The appellant was also directed to pay Rs. 2,500/- as compensation and Rs. 500/- as cost of litigation to the respondent.

AGGRIEVED by the aforesaid order, the appellant has preferred the present appeal before this Commission. We have carefully perused the documents/material on record, as well as have heard the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties at length. Before touching the merits of the case, we will first decide the objection raised by the respondent regarding the maintainability of the present appeal, having been filed beyond the statutory period of 30 days as prescribed under Section 15 of the Act. The appellant has annexed an application for condonation of delay along with the appeal. In the said application filed by the appellant, the reason assigned for the delay is that the certified copy of the impugned order dated 27.9.2000 was received by the appellant on 29.9.2000. Thereafter, the concerned file was sent through various departments of the appellant till the filing of the appeal on 5.12.2000.

IN terms of the proviso to Section 15 of the Act, delay in filing an appeal can be condoned only if ''sufficient cause'' is shown for the delay. IN the context, ''sufficient cause'' would mean a cause which would justify the delay and inability of the appellant in filing the appeal within time. However, in the present case the application of the appellant for condonation of delay together with affidavit filed, explaining the delay, merely enumerates the dates and the officials through whose hands the concerned file of the case had passed. Mere tossing up the file from one table to another table would not constitute ''sufficient cause'' under the Act in order to enable us to condone the delay of about 66 days. IN the circumstances we are not inclined to condone the delay in filing the present appeal as no ''sufficient cause'' as per the requirements of proviso to Section 15 of the Act has been assigned for the delay. IN our above views, we are fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in the case of Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-96 CONSUMER 2731 (NS), which squarely covers the present application of the appellant for condonation of delay. It was held therein : "The appeal by DDA has been filed delayed by 38 days and is accompanied by an application for condonation of delay supported by an affidavit. It is stated therein that the copy of the order dated 10.3.1993 does not appear to have been received by DDA and so a copy of the order was obtained on 8.4.1993. The grounds for delay are given because the order had to be examined from all aspects and the various levels before a decision to file this appeal could be given. IN our view this does not contitute a valid and sufficient cause for the exercise of our discretion to condone the delay. Proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion. It was the duty of the DDA to establish as to how the matter was dealt with at all levels and each day''s delay had to be satisfactorily explained. INter office consultation for prolonged periods cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay. The delay cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity because the process of working in DDA has resulted in the delay. The application for condonation of delay is dismissed and consequently the appeal is dismissed as barred by time."

(Emphasis supplied) In another decision the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala & Anr., reported as AIR 1998 (SC), has held : "The High Court does not appear to have examined the reply filed by the appellant as reference to the same is conspicuous by its absence from the order. We are not satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of this case, any explanation, much less a reasonable or satisfactory one had been offered by the respondent - State for condonation of the inordinate delay of 565 days. Law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes and the Courts have no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. The discretion exercised by the High Court was, thus, neither proper nor judicious. The order condoning the delay cannot be sustained."

(Emphasis supplied) The Hon''ble High Court of Jammu and Kashmir in the case of State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Smt. Ram Kali, reported as AIR 1987 Jammu and Kashmir 71, while considering the question whether the norms for condonation of delay should be different for Government or a Statutory Body as compared to an individual, has held : "The delay in this case has accrued as the matter was referred to the Law Department and the office of the Executive Engineer, Chennai Hydel Project who is dealing with the case and the Government office such as Law Department, etc. were also at Srinagar and the matter being in rotation through proper channels took time. In our opinion, the above said explanation without mentioning the specific days and the reason for delay explaining each day of delay is no cause at all much less a sufficient cause for condonation of delay in filing the revision or an appeal within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. We are, therefore, in full agreement with the ratio of authority of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, AIR 1973 AP 43 (supra) and hold that no exception is made for the Government in the matter of condonation of delay which is not satisfactorily explained in terms of the Act."

(Emphasis supplied)

ON similar grounds for condonation of delay, as stated in the condonation application in the present case, we have in our earlier decision in the case of Delhi Development Authority v. R.C. Jain, reported as I (2000) CPJ 141, relying upon the decision of National Commission in the case of Maria Francis Ajijia & Anr. v. Rev. Fr. R. Ratchagar, reported as II (1994) CPJ 108 (NC), held that mere procedural delay does not constitute sufficient cause in order to exercise our discretion for condonation of the same.

THEREFORE, the present application does not disclose as ''sufficient cause'' for condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. The same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. With the dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is also dismissed being barred by limitation with no order as to costs. The present appeal stands disposed of in above terms. Appeal dismissed.