DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs R.C.JAIN

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 14.3.1999, passed by District Forum No. V in Complaint Case No. 504/98 entitled - Shri R.C. Jain v. Delhi Development Authority.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the respondent Shri R.C. Jain had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum averring that he was allotted a flat, bearing No. 333, Category-II, Second Floor, Pocket-10, Sector-XI, Rohini, Delhi, under the Residential Scheme (Self Financing Scheme), by the appellant vide letter dated 27th May, 1991. It was stated by the respondent/complainant that he made all the payments towards the cost of the abovesaid flat to the appellant as required by the schedule. It was averred by the respondent/complainant that as per the terms and conditions of the allotment it was stipulated that in case the construction of the flat was delayed due to unforeseen reasons and the delay was beyond 30 months to 36 month till the issue of Demand Letter for 5th and final instalment, the allottee was to be paid interest at the rate of 7% per annum and beyond 36 months the interest was to be paid at the rate of 10% annum on the deposit made by the allottee. THE grievance of the respondent/complainant, in the complaint filed by him before the District Forum, was that in terms of the above stipulation he was entitled to a sum of Rs. 80,377/- on account of belated construction interest (BCI) as per the policy of the appellant, but the appellant had given him the adjustment to the tune of Rs. 39,455/- only. THE respondent/complainant had prayed that the appellant be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 40,922/- i.e. the difference of the amount to be adjusted (80,377 - 39,455 = 40,922/-) alongwith interest at the rate of 18% per annum with effect from 1.3.1996 till realization. The claim of the respondent in the District Forum was contested by the appellant. The stand taken by the appellant was that belated construction interest had been paid to the respondent/complainant correctly as per the policy of the appellant being followed by the appellant in such like cases.

The learned District Forum, vide impugned order, has allowed the complaint filed by the respondent/complainant and has directed the appellant to pay to the respondent/complainant a sum of Rs. 40,922/- alongwith interest at the rate of 12% per annum with effect from 1.3.1996 and future interest at the rate of 15% per annum till realization together with a sum of Rs. 5,000/- as compensation and Rs. 1,000/- as costs.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. The order, being impugned in the proceedings, was passed by the learned District Forum on 14.3.1999. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, the present appeal should have been filed within a period of thirty days from the date of the order. However, proviso to the above section provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the abovesaid period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the abovesaid period. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of thirty days. The same has been filed on 3.12.1999. Alongwith the appeal, the appellant has also filed an application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. In the abovesaid application, seeking condonation of delay, it is stated that certified copy of the impugned order was received by the appellant on 21st May, 1999. Thereafter, as per the case of the appellant, the same was received in the Housing Department of DDA on 7.6.1999 and the Joint Director (Housing) took the decision to file an appeal in the matter on 13.8.1999. The file thereafter was sent to the panel lawyer on 22.9.1999 for the purpose of filing appeal. The reason for not filing the appeal in time has been given in paragraph-3 of the application as ''procedural delay''.

AS already stated, there is a statutory provision enabling the Commission to entertain the appeal even after the expiry of the statutory period prescribed for filing the appeal, provided the appellant satisfies that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within time. The words ''sufficient cause'' occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act are of utmost significance. AS per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal construction, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. If the above criterion is applied to the present case, it is noticed that the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, miserably fails to meet the above requirement because as per appellant''s own case a decision to file an appeal in the present case was taken by the Jt. Director (Housing) on 13.8.1999 and the file was forwarded to the panel lawyer for the abovesaid purpose on 22.9.1999. Even after taking decision to file the appeal and sending the file to the panel lawyer on 22.9.1999, the present appeal has not been filed within 30 days and has been filed much afterwards on 3.12.1999 and there is no explanation whatsoever for delay caused in the matter after 22.9.1999 except a bald statement has been made in para-3 of the application that the delay is simply a ''procedural delay''. Having regard to the above facts, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'', it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence or want of bona fides on the part of the appellant. In our opinion, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and, therefore, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal is hereby rejected. In our above views, we stand fortified by a decision of the National Commission in case - Maria Francis Ajijia & Anr. v. Rev. Fr. R. Ratchgar, reported as II (1994) CPJ 108 (NC)=1986-95 CONSUMER 1349 (NS).

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation is also devoid of substance on merits because it has been held by the learned District Forum in the impugned order that the appellant have acted in clear violation of the stipulation made in Clause (4) of the terms and conditions of the SFS Scheme. In our opinion, no fault can be found with the above findings of the learned District Forum. THE same suffer from no infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Commission in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In view of the above discussion, the present appeal filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. THE same merits dismissal and accordingly the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.