Dhup Singh vs Phulla Ram and Others

Mukul Mudgal, C.J.—This reference to the Full Bench has arisen by virtue of an order dated 16.11.1987 passed by a Division Bench. The

said referral order reads as follow:

There is a clear cleavage of judicial opinion between the decisions of the two Division Benches reported as Suresh Chand and Ors. v. Director of

Panchayats, Haryana and Ors. 1979 P.L.J. 116 and Ram Saroop v. The Director of Panchayats Haryana, Chandigarh and Ors. 1983 P.L.J. 350,

on the point as to whether before revoking a suspension order passed against a Panch or a Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat, it is necessary to hear

the complainant on whose complaint the order of suspension has been passed.

Admitted. We direct that the papers of this case be placed before Hon''ble the Chief Justice for decision by a larger Bench.

The referral order shows that the issue referred to the Full Bench for consideration is as to whether before revoking a suspension order passed

against a Panch or a Sarpanch of a Gram Panchayat, it is necessary to hear the complainant on whose complaint the order of suspension had been

passed?.

No one is present on behalf of the petitioner. However, we have gone through the judgments referred to in order dated 16.11.1987and the

records of this case with the assistance of Mr. Randhir Singh, Addl. Advocate General, Haryana. On going through the judgments referred to in

the reference order, we find that the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Saroop v. The Director of Panchayats Haryana,

Chandigarh and Ors. 1983 P.L.J. 350 does not have any essential difference of opinion with the view expressed in Suresh Chand and Ors. v.

Director of Panchayats, Haryana and Ors. 1979 P.L.J. 116. The view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Saroop''s case (supra) is

that there is no necessity of giving an opportunity of hearing to the person who makes a complaint if the authority concerned wants to revoke its

own earlier order based on the complaint because the complainant is merely an informant and cannot be party to a lis or an aggrieved party. The

view taken by the Division Bench reads as under:

Where information is given to the appropriate authority for taking action against a public servant and action is taken in pursuance of that

information, we do not think that it is necessary to give an opportunity to the informant, if the authority concerned later wants to revoke its earlier

order. The informant is no more than a mere informant and cannot be considered to be a party to the lis or an aggrieved party, on that account

alone so as to entitle him to be heard before an order against the public servant is revoked. He is not in a better position that a person who gives

information to the police about the commission of an offence. Such a person has no right to be heard, if no action is taken against the person

against whom he gives information or if action is taken initially and then dropped. We disagree with the view expressed in Gram Panchayat

Kamalpur v. Deputy Commissioner, District Jind. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed.

In Suresh Kumar''s case (supra), the Division Bench held as under:

There is yet another ground justifying the quashing of this order, that is, it was on the complaint of petitioner No. 1, that respondent No. 2 had

come to the conclusion as recorded in Annexure P-2. When the respondent No. 1 was to differ with Annexure P-2 so soon after its passing, the

exigency of the situation and principles of natural justice and the principle laid down in Mange Ram''s case (supra) required that petitioner No. 1

should have been heard against the proposed order. Order Annexure P-3 is, therefore, quashed the above reasons.

emphasis supplied.

but the above view was in the facts and circumstances of the case particularly when the revocation of suspension was soon after passing the

suspension order and not a view laying down law in general. The Hon''ble Division Bench in Suresh Chand''s case has also held as under:

Cases may not be wanting when the information may be incomplete and the Director may feel the necessity of a further probe into the matter, for

which he may require the assistance of the complainant. In that case, he will have to hear the person supplying the information.

The above observation made in Suresh Chand''s case (supra) regarding grant of hearing was in the context that where the Director felt that

information supplied is incomplete for taking action in the matter and feels necessity of a further probe into the matter, the assistance of the

complainant may be required. However, this hearing could only be at the discretion of the Director and not as a matter of right for the complainant.

These observations of the Division Bench in no event can be construed as a difference of opinion with the view taken in Ram Saroop''s case

(supra) because these observations would show that where information is complete and no further assistance is required, opportunity of hearing to

the complainant is not necessary to be granted while setting aside the order of suspension passed on Sarpanch or Panch and that order could be

revoked by the Director on the basis of record available before him. Even the Division Bench in Suresh Kumar''s case (supra) has held that the

proper remedy available for a complainant who has not been afforded opportunity of hearing is the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution of India. In our view, giving an automatic opportunity to every complainant, would multiply the scope of litigation in Local Self

Government issues arising from the concept of Panchayati Raj and such multifareous litigation could not be countenanced in matters relating to

panchayat. The functioning of the Panchayat is required to be simple in nature so that the rural populace can easily understand its functioning.

Introduction of various layers of intervention such as the hearing to a complainant would obviate against simple and uncomplicated functioning of

Panchayats.

Even if Suresh Chand''s case (supra) was construed to mean that the complainant was required to be heard prior to revocation of suspension,

we are satisfied that for the aforesaid reasons Suresh Chand''s case does not lay down the correct position of law. Accordingly, we fully agree with

the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Ram Sarup''s case (supra) and affirm the same holding that while revoking the order of

suspension passed at the behest of a complainant, the complainant is not required to be heard and in case the complainant is aggrieved by what is

perceived to be an unjust order of revocation, the writ jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India is always available to him. In

so far as the present writ petition is concerned, the grievance raised therein with the passage of time has indeed been rendered infructuous because

the term of the office of the Sarpanch/Panch had expired long ago and even the period for which he could be debarred in case of having been held

guilty had also elapsed. Therefore, the writ petition is also dismissed as having become infructuous. The reference is ordered accordingly.