Dilbag Rai vs Smt. Lajwanti

Harbans Lal, J.—This is a revision petition challenging the order of the Rent Controller dated the 11th April, 1977, by which the petition by the present petitioner u/s 18-B(4) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as applicable to the Union Territory of Chandigarh was dismissed.

Smt. Lajwanti (hereinafter to be called the respondent) filed an application u/s 13-A of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, as amended by the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction (Chandigarh Amendment) Ordinance, 1976, thereinafter to be called the Act) for eviction of Shri Dilbag Rai (hereinafter to be called the petitioner) from first floor of the premises in dispute. The ground of eviction according to the averments in the petition was that the husband of the respondent was an employee of the Chandigarh Administration and had been allotted Government accommodation as such but had to vacate the same under the directions of the Central Government on the ground that he owned a building in Chandigarh in the name of his wife. It was further averred that the husband of the respondent was entitled to IX type Government accommodation comprising of drawing room, dining room 3 bed rooms, one kitchen, two bath rooms, laterine and one barsati. The respondent was in occupation of the ground floor but the same was not sufficient for the family which consisted of 9 members including four sons and three daughters. Consequent to the notice of this application the petitioner filed an application u/s 18-B(4) of the Act, seeking leave to contest the application. This application was rejected by the impugned order.

The first contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner Is that the application u/s 13-A of the Act was not maintainable as the respondent though landlord of the petitioner regarding the demised premises was not an employee of the Central Government and no residential building had been allotted to her and, therefore, the question of vacating the same under the orders of the Central Government did not arise, has been stressed that section 13-A (1) of the Act has been wrongly interpreted by the Rent Controller. In support of this proposition reliance has been placed, on a judgment of Delhi High Court as reported in Tilak Ram v. Smt. Maya Devi 1977 Ren. L.R. 645. To appreciate the contention, the relevant part of section 13-A (1) of the Act is reproduced below.

13A (1). Where a landlord who, being a person in occupation of any residential building allotted to him by the Central Government or any local authority, is required by, or in pursuance of any general or special order made by that Government or authority, to vacate such residential building, or in default, to incur certain obligations, on the ground that he owns, in the Union Territory of Chandigarh, a residential or a scheduled building either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependant child, there shall accrue, on and from the date of such order, to such landlord, notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force or in any contract (whether express or implied) custom or usage to the contrary a right to recover immediately the possession of any residential or scheduled building let out by him.

It is not disputed that the husband of the respondent is an employee of the Chandigarh Administration i.e., Central Government, that he was allotted a Government accommodation and that after the coming into force of the new Rules regarding Government accommodation he had vacated the same on 20th January, 1977. It is contended that the application u/s 13-A of the Act is maintainable only if it is submitted by an employee of the Central Government himself as a landlord. In the present case the respondent was the landlord of the petitioner and not her husband and respondent was not an employee of the Central Government. A close perusal of section 13-A (1) as reproduced above clearly shows that the landlord for the purpose of this provision is one who not only owns house in his own name but also if he owns residential or a scheduled building in the Union Territory of Chandigarh in the name of his wife or dependent child. Thus the definition of landlord has been extended. If any other interpretation is adopted then the words, "that he owns, in the Union Territory of Chandigarh, a residential or a scheduled building either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child" will have to be read as non-existent or having been deleted. This cannot be done according to the well settled principles of interpretation of statutes. We must proceed with the presumption that every word or expression in the provision was incorporated by the Legislature deliberately and with a purpose. Besides, if the interpretation as suggested by the Learned Counsel is adopted the result will be that an employee of the Central Government will be deprived of Government accommodation on the ground that his wife or dependant was having an accommodation of his own but the employee will not be able to get the premises vacated. The clear purpose and intention of the New Rules regarding Government accommodation is that those Government employees who have residential accommodation of their own whether in their own name or in the name or their wives or dependent children must vacate the Government accommodation and occupy their own premises so that the Government accommodation falling vacant may be available to those who need the same. This laudable object will be defeated if restricted meaning is given to section 13-A (1) of the Act as stressed by the Learned Counsel. Tilak Ram''s case (supra) does lend support to the contention of the Learned Counsel for the petitioner wherein section 14-A (1) of the Delhi Act 18 of 1976, which is in pari materia with section 13-A (1) of the Act has been interpreted. From the perusal of the judgment it appears that pointed attention was not drawn to the words "that he owns a residential accommodation, either in his own name or in the name of his wife or dependent child". Keeping in view the scheme of the provision, namely, section 13-A and the purpose of the Rules of the Government regarding Government accommodation, I am not persuaded to subscribe to the view in the above mentioned judgment.

Thus in my considered opinion the petition out of which this revision petition has arisen was maintainable as the same was filed by the landlord though she herself was not the Government employee and instead her husband was in the service of the Central Government and the house had been allotted in his name.

The second contention of the Learned Counsel is that the petition was not maintainable by the respondent as she was not in occupation of any residential building allotted to her or to her husband by the Central Government at the time of the petition. Admittedly the present petition by the respondent is made on 29th January, 1977, whereas the Government accommodation allotted to her husband as a Central Government employee had been vacated by them on 20th January, 1977. According to the Learned Counsel, the application could lie if at the time the same was submitted, the respondent and her husband were in physical occupation of Government accommodation. This contention is entirely misconceived. It was not necessary for the respondent to stick to the Government building at the time of making this petition. The new Rules regarding vacation of Government accommodation were already in force at the time when the present petition was made and the husband of the respondent was bound to act upon those rules and vacate the Government accommodation. He had no right to continue in Government accommodation till the present petition had been decided and the order of eviction had been passed in their favour. The plain meaning of section 13-A (1) is that only those persons can avail of this provision who are evicted by the new rules of the Government and have to vacate the Government accommodation. It is not denied that the husband of the respondent had been allotted a Government building and had vacated the same after the enforcement of the new rules.

Lastly it was contended that the respondents had three tenants in different portions of the premises in dispute and a portion of the premises had already been got vacated by her from one tenant and the said portion was occupied by her at the time the present petition was made. Though the record of this case was not summoned, I asked the Learned Counsel for the petitioner to read to me the grounds of his application. In this application it is nowhere stated that there was any other tenant on the demised premises except the petitioner or that any other tenant had already been made to vacate the portion of these premises. The principle of law cannot be disputed that u/s 13-A(1) the employee of Central Government who is required to vacate Government accommodation in pursuance of the new Rules is entitled to get his own premises vacated from one tenant only. The perusal of the two provisions immediately following section 13-A(1) shows that the employee concerned is entitled to recover the possession of one residential of scheduled building or such number of residential units as are sufficient for his own use or occupation and that this provision does not confer a right on the employee to get vacated more than one residential or scheduled building. In the present case no case is made out that the respondent wanted to evict more than one tenant or had already evicted any other tenant or that the present order of eviction by the Rent Controller had entitled the respondent to more than one residential units which were on lease.

Thus there is no merit in the revision petition and the same is dismissed with no older as to costs.