District Manager, Food Corporation of India, Rohtak vs Parkash Narain Goyal through his LRs. and Another

Paramjeet Singh, J.—Present regular second appeal has been filed by the appellant-defendant against the judgment and decree dated 12.09.1988 passed by the learned District Judge, Jind, whereby judgment and decree dated 29.03.1983 passed by the learned Senior Sub Judge, Jind has been set aside. Brief facts of the case are that plaintiff-respondent No. 1 - Parkash Narain Goyal filed a suit for declaration and permanent injunction that order dated 09.11.1978 passed by the Senior Regional Manager, Food Corporation of India, order dated 05.05.1979 passed by Zonal Manager, Food Corporation of India and order dated 08.05.1980 passed by the Managing Director are illegal, void, vague, against the facts and law. It was further prayed that the defendants may be restrained from effecting recovery from the salary of the plaintiff. The learned Trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 29.03.1983. However, appeal was allowed by the learned lower Appellate Court vide impugned order dated 12.09.1988. Hence, this regular second appeal.

At the time of filing of the appeal, no substantial question of law was framed nor mentioned in the grounds of appeal. However, the following substantial questions of law have been placed on record:

1.Whether the respondent/plaintiff was entitled to engage a Legal Practitioner as his Defence Assistant before the Inquiry Officer despite the fact that this was specifically prohibited by Regulation 58(8) of the FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971?

Whether the respondent/plaintiff could legally insist that he be represented by a Legal Practitioner before the Inquiry Officer even when the Presenting Officer appointed by the Disciplinary Authority was not a Legal Practitioner?

Whether it was incumbent upon the Inquiry Officer to permit the respondent/plaintiff to engage a Legal Practitioner although there was no special circumstances which warranted such permission, more so since he had over 2 weeks to arrange for the assistance of any other employee of the FCI to act as his Defence Assistant?

Whether the Inquiry can be vitiated despite the fact that the prejudice to his defence was neither pleaded nor proved by the respondent/plaintiff before the Inquiry Officer, which is essential for vitiating the Inquiry in the light of recent pronouncement of the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India in this regard?

Whether the respondent / plaintiff who did not insist before the Inquiry Officer to summon his remaining 2 DWs and himself closed his evidence after examining his 3 present DWs can now turn around and say that the remaining 2 DWs should also have been summoned by the Inquiry Officer and whether the inquiry can be vitiated on this ground?

I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

Learned counsel for the appellant has argued that the plaintiff was not entitled to engage a legal practitioner and as his Defence Assistant before the Inquiry Officer in view of the prohibition provided under Rule 58(8) of the FCI (Staff) Regulations, 1971. It is further submitted that whether the inquiry can be said to be vitiated when no prejudice is caused, neither it was pleaded or proved before the Inquiry Officer with regard to the prejudice to the defence of the plaintiff caused during the inquiry.

Learned District Judge, after referring to the various judgments recorded a finding with regard to issue No. 1, which is reproduced as follows:

There is no quarrel with the proposition of law canvassed by the learned counsel for the respondent and laid down in the authorities relied upon. However, the respondent has no case on merit. On this point the proceedings before the Enquiry Officer was relevant. It would be seen what the order of closing the evidence of the plaintiff-appellant has been added at the end of the page in the hand of the Enquiry Officer, which is neither signed by the plaintiff nor his conducting Advocate. It cannot be said to be a case of voluntary closing the case of the appellant. As regards the letter Ex.D1, it is no proof of the fact that the plaintiff-appellant had been given a full opportunity to defend his case. This recital only speaks of the regard shown by the plaintiff-appellant addressing the letter to his seniors. Otherwise the aforesaid facts clearly suggest that it is a case where there is denial of opportunity to the plaintiff-appellant by not permitting him to cross examine the witnesses by engaging a counsel for refusing permission to summon all his DWs and by denying the request to recall the witnesses. So the order passed on such enquiry report therefore to be held as illegal and void.

In addition to it, it is also admitted that no defence assistant on behalf of the plaintiff was present on the date of argument. It was not possible for the plaintiff to address argument. As a result of it, the plaintiff has been denied the opportunity of hearing. The learned District Judge has set aside the orders impugned before him by holding that respondent herein was not afforded opportunity of hearing and as such, those orders are against the principles of natural justice. The liberty has been granted to the appellant to conduct another inquiry after complying with the proper procedure on the lines indicated in the orders. In view of this fact, no prejudice would have been caused to the appellant - F.C.I. and they might have conducted subsequent enquiry in pursuance of the impugned order passed by the learned District Judge.

For the reasons recorded above, I do not find any ground to interfere in the order passed by the learned lower Appellate court. As such, no substantial question of law is involved in the present appeal. The regular second appeal is accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.