Divisional Controller, KSRTC and Another vs G.P. Raghavendra

N. Kumar, J.—The Plaintiff filed a suit for a declaration that he has not committed breach of any lawful agreement between himself and Defendant and he is entitled to be continued for another term in the suit property as per the terms and conditions entered into between the Plaintiff and Defendants and for a consequential decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant from forcibly evicting or dispossessing the Plaintiff from the suit property.

In the plaint the Plaintiff pleaded that the suit property is the refreshment room situated in bus stand premises of K.S.R.T.C. bus station at Hassan under the control of the Plaintiff. He has been running the refreshment room for the last six years. He has been a licensee of the suit property. There is a bilateral agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. The suit property is in actual possession and enjoyment of the Plaintiff and he has been catering and serving the general public to the satisfaction of the public as well as the department. He has invested huge amounts for the decoration and clean maintenance of the premises apart from furnishing the same. Originally he was allotted the ground floor premises to house his refreshment room. As it was totally inconvenient for the public, the Defendants asked the Plaintiff to shift the refreshment room to the cellar and therefore he was forced and compelled to shift his business to the cellar. The Defendants assured the Plaintiff that they would allow the Plaintiff to continue in the suit property for one more term as per Clause 37 of the agreement provided if the Plaintiff fulfils the said clause.

The Defendants invited fresh tenders in respect of the suit property by their notification dated 16.11.2000. The Plaintiff also participated in the said tender and filed his valid tender on 20.12.2000 by offering to pay licence fee of Rs. 26,544.00 per month and pay a security deposit of Rs. 1,45,000.00. He complied with all other legal requirements. After the opening of the tender the Plaintiff''s tender was found to be valid. Thus, the Plaintiff was entitled to be continued for one more term as provided under Clause 37 of the agreement. Therefore, the Defendant has no right to refuse to continue the Plaintiff for one more term. He has been requesting the Defendants to consider his case and grant him one more extension. The Defendant has maintained deliberate silence. However, he received a letter from Defendant No. 1 on 22.9.2000 well before the Defendants invited tenders asking the Plaintiff to vacate the premises which is totally contrary to the agreement Clause.

The Plaintiff stated that though the document dated 1.3.1995 which is an agreement purports to describe the Plaintiff as a licensee, in fact and in reality as well as in law the Plaintiff has been a lessee of the suit property and this is so because all ingredients of lease are available to Plaintiff. The Plaintiff has been in settled possession of the suit property and he has not committed any breach of the agreement. He is not guilty of any latches on his part. Since the Plaintiff is entitled to be continued for one more term the Plaintiff cannot be asked to vacate the suit property when he is ready and willing to abide by the reasonable terms and conditions as per his tender filed on 20.12.2000 which is valid. Even otherwise Plaintiff cannot be evicted from the suit property except in accordance with law and he cannot be forcibly evicted or dispossessed from the suit property. Lastly, he contended that Defendants actually threatened the Plaintiff of forcible dispossession of the suit property if the Plaintiff fails to hand over the suit property to them and therefore the cause of action for suit arose on 22.9.2000 when the Defendant sent its letter and on 20.12.2000 when the Plaintiff filed his tender papers and when the tender filed by the Plaintiff was found to be valid on opening it.

The Defendants contested the claim of the Plaintiff by filing a detailed written statement. The Defendants admitted the licence pleaded by the Plaintiff. It is their specific case that the Plaintiff is a licensee and he has been given right to do hotel business on the suit property without creation of any interest on the suit property and it is purely a permissive right and is personal to the Plaintiff. It is merely leave to the Plaintiff to run refreshment room on the suit property. The lawful and legal possession of the suit property continues with the Defendants only. The allegation of the Plaintiff that the Plaintiff is in actual possession and enjoyment of the suit property is false. It is also admitted initially the ground floor premises was allotted to the Plaintiff. In fact the commuters were not moving heavily on the ground floor and hence Plaintiff''s business was not so adequate. Therefore the Plaintiff voluntarily submitted a written requisition dated 27.1.1995 requesting the Defendants to change his business place to cellar floor. Accordingly permission was granted to shift his refreshment room to the cellar floor but not at the instance of the Defendants. They admit that the Defendants issued fresh tender notification No. 5 of 2000, dated 16.11.2000 calling for applications from the intending parties for issue of license to run the refreshment room in the suit property. The Plaintiff has also participated and filed tender on 20.12.2000 by offering to pay monthly license fee of Rs. 26,544.00. They admit that the Plaintiff had produced all requisite documents and necessary security deposit of Rs. 1,45,000.00 and Earnest Money Deposit of Rs. 64,484.00. As the Plaintiff quoted lowest monthly licence fee of Rs. 26,544/- the same was rejected. One Sri D. Puttegowda quoted the monthly licence fee of Rs. 65,222.00 and deposited security deposit of Rs. 3,91,332.00 along with earnest money deposit of Rs. 68,484.00 and as he complied with other terms and conditions his bid was accepted and later approved from the Central Office and an agreement was entered into. The Plaintiff has deliberately suppressed these facts and the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, namely the said successful bidder Sri D. Putte Gowda. Once the Plaintiff participated in the tender and was not successful he is estopped from claiming for another term either relying on Clause 37 of the agreement or on any other ground. In terms of the conditions of the agreement the Defendants have written a letter on 22.9.2000 intimating the Plaintiff that the licence period will expire on 28.2.2001 and he should make all arrangements to shift his belongings and take precautionary measures to stop doing business well in advance. They asserted that the Plaintiff is only a licensee. He is not in possession of the suit property and the judicial possession of the suit property is always with the Defendants.

They also pleaded that during the year 1991 the licence was issued to one Bhaskar Rao to run the refreshment room. The said agreement expired on 28.2.1992. In view of this a tender notification dated 11.12.1991 was published well in advance. The said licensee Bhaskar Rao and Plaintiff submitted their bid. As the said Bhaskar Rao quoted monthly licence fee of Rs. 10,005.00 and the Plaintiff quoted Rs. 10,100.00 Plaintiff''s tender was accepted. Plaintiff was the successful tenderer and accordingly licence was granted in his favour. Again after the expiry of three years period a tender notification was issued on 9.1.1995 well in advance and Plaintiff participated in the said tender offering a sum of Rs. 12,600.00 as licence fee per month. As he was the highest bidder, he was the successful bidder and licence was issued for one more term of 6 years. It is after the expiry of the said six years period again the tender was called well in advance. Plaintiff submitted his bid and this time as he was not successful, suppressing these facts he has filed the above suit for the aforesaid reliefs. Therefore, Plaintiff has not come to the Court with clean hands. He has deliberately suppressed facts which are within his knowledge.

The Plaintiff made an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 for an order of temporary injunction reiterating the aforesaid allegations made in the plaint. The suit was filed on 17.2.2001 and an ex-parte ad-interim order of injunction came to be passed. The Defendants also filed a detailed statement of objection reiterating the allegations made in the written statement. On consideration of the rival contentions the learned trial Judge held that the possession of the Plaintiff is that of licensee and not lessee. He further held that on the date of the filing of the suit Plaintiff''s possession was lawful, on the date of passing of the order the possession of the Plaintiff becomes unlawful and further proceeded to hold as the Plaintiff is in settled possession he cannot be evicted without due process of law and therefore he granted an order of temporary injunction. Defendants being aggrieved by the said order dated 3.3.2001 passed on I.A. No. I in O.S. No. 42 of 2001 preferred a Miscellaneous Appeal before the District Judge. Hassan. The Appellate Judge held in view of the limited scope for interference under Order 43, Rule 1 CPC as the order of the trial Judge do not suffer from any arbitrariness, caprice or perversity a case for interference is not made out. He also noticed the finding of the trial Judge that it is a transaction of licence and not the transaction of lease but as the Plaintiff has been in judicial possession and settled possession of refreshment room where he has been carrying on the business he cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law. Therefore, he dismissed the Appeal. Aggrieved by the said orders of the Courts below, the Petitioner-KSRTC has preferred this revision petition.

During the pendency of this revision the successful bidder D. Puttegowda has made an application to implead himself as a Respondent in this revision petition. Therefore, he was also heard in the matter.

Sri R.V. Jayaprakash, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, submits when once the Courts below have recorded a finding that the Plaintiff is a licensee and not a lessee their finding that Plaintiff is in settled possession of the suit property and therefore he cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law runs counter to the settled legal position namely a licence does not create any right in the immovable property and that it cannot be said that licensee is in possession of the property in question. The Courts below have not appreciated the scope of the suit filed by the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff is not seeking a declaration that he is a tenant of the suit property. On the contrary the relief sought is that he is entitled to be continued for another term of the suit property as per the terms and conditions entered into between the Plaintiff and the Defendants. If that is so, the only question that arise for consideration is under the terms of the agreement is he entitled to continue for one more term as contended by him. If not, he is not entitled to any order of injunction. Lastly he contended the suit is based on an assertion that he has submitted his tender in pursuance of the notification dated 16.11.2000 along with the requisite deposits and has complied with other legal requirements and after opening the tender the Plaintiff''s tender has found to be valid and therefore he is entitled to continue for one more term as provided under Clause 37 of the deed of agreement, but in spite of the same without permitting the Plaintiff to continue for one more term the Defendant is trying to forcibly dispossess the Plaintiff from the suit property. The material on record discloses firstly he was not the successful tenderer. His bid was not the highest and Clause 37 does not confer any right on him to continue for one more term. On these factual aspects the Plaintiff has deliberately lied and has not come to the Court with clean hands and therefore the Plaintiff''s conduct disentitles him for an order of injunction. Therefore, he prays for setting aside the impugned orders passed by the Courts below and he relied on several decisions in support of his contention.

Learned Counsel for the impleading applicant Sri K.V. Narasimhan adopting the arguments of the Petitioner''s Counsel submits once the Plaintiff participated in the tender and when he was not successful he cannot fall back and contend that he is a lessee of the premises and even his possession is unlawful as he is in settled possession, he cannot be dispossessed except in accordance with law.

Sri G.S. Visweswara, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Respondent, contends firstly when admittedly for the last six years the Plaintiff is carrying on business in the suit property after the expiry of the period agreed upon at the most he can become an unauthorized occupant and he becomes liable to be evicted from the suit premises under the provisions of the Public Premises Act and therefore the Plaintiff cannot be forcibly dispossessed without recourse to law. Secondly he contends whether the Plaintiff is a licensee or lessee is a matter to be gone into during trial and as a triable issue is involved in the suit, the Plaintiff''s possession is to be protected till the controversy is resolved. The finding of the Courts below that the Plaintiff is a licensee is opposed to the terms of the agreement, and therefore on that ground he cannot be denied the relief. As such the order granting the interim injunction is legal and valid. Lastly he contends when two Courts have concurrently found that the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for grant of an order of injunction and has granted an order of injunction it is not open for this Court to interfere with the said concurrent finding of fact in exercise of its jurisdiction u/s 115 of Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, seen from any angle the revision petition filed by the Petitioners is liable to be dismissed. In support of his contention he relied on several decisions of this Court and the Apex Court.

Before adverting to the respective contentions it is necessary to state the undisputed facts in this case. The suit property which is a refreshment room situated in the bus-stand premises of K.S.R.T.C. bus station, Hassan, is a public premises belong to the Petitioner-corporation. As the Plaintiff was a successful bidder in 1991 and 1995 the licence to run the said refreshment room was given to the Plaintiff. After he was successful in the year 1995 an agreement for grant of licence to run the catering business came to be executed on 1.3.1995 between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The licence fee was Rs. 12,600.00 per month with 10% escalation fee for every year. The said amount is not in dispute. the Courts below have concurrently held the possession of the Plaintiff under the said agreement is that of licensee only and not lessee as contended by the Plaintiff. The said licence period which commenced on 1.3.1995 came to an end on 28.2.2001. Much before the expiry of the said period the Petitioners invited fresh tenders in respect of the suit property by their Notification No. 5 of 2000, dated 16.11.2000. The Plaintiff participated in the said tender and filed his tender on 20.12.2000 by offering to pay licence fee of Rs. 26,544/- per month and also a sum of Rs. 1,45,000.00 towards security deposit and Rs. 64,484.00 as E.M.D. As the tender submitted by the Plaintiff was not the highest and as the tender submitted by D. Puttegowda was found to be highest, he was declared as the successful bidder and an agreement came to be executed between the said D. Puttegowda and the Petitioners. After knowing that he is not the successful bidder, the Plaintiff filed the suit on 17.2.2001 for a declaration that he is entitled to be continued for another term in the suit property as per the terms and conditions entered into between the Plaintiff and Defendants and sought for an injunction restraining the Defendants from forcibly evicting or dispossessing the Plaintiff from the suit property. The specific case pleaded by the Plaintiff is after opening the tender the Plaintiff''s tender has been found to be valid. Thus the Plaintiff is entitled to be continued for one more term as provided under Clause 37 of the deed of agreement. Clause 37 of the agreement reads as under:

In case the licensee desires to compete in the tender procedure, he shall expressly do so and in case the licensee satisfies the conditions, his case is liable to be considered for grant of licence for another term. This shall not give any right whatsoever to the licensee to continue in the premises, even after expiry of the period of licence.

(underlining by me)

Much prior to the tender notification the Defendants wrote a letter dated 22.9.2000 bringing to the notice of the Plaintiff that the licence period will expire on 28.2.2001 and he should make arrangements to vacate and stop doing business well in advance. As per Clause 37 if the Plaintiff was the successful bidder he was entitled to a licence for another term otherwise he has no right to continue in the suit premises. It is only when the Plaintiff realised that the licence period expires on 28.2.2001 and he has no right to continue in the suit premises and as the successful bidder would start functioning in the suit property from 1.3.2001 he filed the suit on 17.2.2001 and obtained an order of temporary injunction restraining the Defendants from forcibly evicting him from the suit property. On the date he filed the suit namely 17.2.2001 the licence granted to him had not yet expired as it was to expire only on 28.2.2001. There was no threat of forcible eviction of the Plaintiff from the suit property till the end of 28.2.2001. However, by virtue of the interim orders passed by the Trial Court and the appellate Court he is continuing to carry on business in the suit property until now. Therefore, the question that arise for my consideration is:

Whether the Plaintiff was entitled to an order of temporary injunction as prayed for and the Courts below were justified in granting the order of temporary injunction?

An interim order of temporary injunction is granted in aid of the main relief. An interim order is granted to a person on the footing that, that person is prima facie entitled to the right on which he has based the claim for the main relief as well as the interim relief. Therefore, the interim relief is granted as an interim measure till the disposal of the suit in which is to be investigated the validity of the claim of right that has been put forward. It is settled law that the grant of injunction is a discretionary relief. The exercise thereof is subject to the Court satisfying that (i) there is a serious disputed question to be tried in the suit and in other words the Plaintiff has a prima facie case in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. (ii) The Court''s interference is necessary to protect the party from the species of injury. In other words irreparable injury or damage would ensue before the legal right would be established at the trial and (iii) that the comparative hardship or mischief or inconvenience which is likely to occur from withholding the injunction would be greater than that would be likely to arise from granting it. The Supreme Court in the case of Dalpat Kumar and another Vs. Prahlad Singh and others, dealing with a case of grant of temporary injunction has held as under:

Therefore, the burden is on the Plaintiff by evidence aliunde by affidavit or otherwise that there is "a prima facie case" in his favour which needs adjudication at the trial. The existence of the prima facie right and infraction of the enjoyment of his property or the right is a condition for the grant of temporary injunction. Prima facie case is not to be confused with prima facie title which has to be established, on evidence at the trial. Only prima facie case is a substantial question raised, bona fide, which needs investigation and decision on merits. Satisfaction that there is a prima facie case by itself is not sufficient to grant injunction. The Court further has to satisfy that non-interference by the Court would result in "irreparable injury" to the party seeking relief and that there is no other remedy available to the party except one to grant injunction and he need protection from the consequences of apprehended injury or dispossession. irreparable injury, however, does not mean that there must be no physical possibility of repairing the injury, but means only that the injury must be a material one, namely one that cannot be adequately compensated by way of damages. The third condition also is that "the balance of convenience" must be in favour of granting injunction. The Court while granting or refusing to grant injunction should exercise sound judicial discretion to find the amount of substantial mischief or injury which is likely to be caused to the parties if the injunction is refused and compare it with that it is likely to be caused to the other side of the injunction is granted. If on weighing competing possibilities or probabilities or likelihood of injury and if the Court considers that pending the suit, the subject-matter should be maintained in status quo in an injunction would be issued. Thus the Court has to exercise its sound judicial discretion in granting or refusing the relief of ad interim injunction pending the suit.

When the Court is called upon to decide whether the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for the grant of an order of temporary injunction the said prima facie case is necessarily in relation to the main relief claimed in the suit. It is in that context the Court has to investigate and find out whether a prima facie case is made out. In the instant case the claim putforth by the Plaintiff is that he is entitled to be continued for another term in the suit property as per the terms and conditions entered into between him and the Defendants and that the agreement dated 1.3.1995 and for a consequential decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant from forcibly evicting or dispossessing the Plaintiff from the suit property. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief of injunction as a consequential relief only if the Plaintiff prima facie establishes that he is entitled to the main relief. Therefore, what the Court has to find is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to or whether he has made out a prima facie case for grant of the main relief and not the consequential relief of injunction. Unfortunately in the instant case both the Courts below have ignored the main relief sought for by the Plaintiff and have concentrated only in respect of the consequential relief and in respect of the consequential relief they have recorded a concurrent finding that the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie case for the grant of an order of temporary injunction on the footing that Plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property and that his possession has to be protected pending disposal of the suit on merits. Before me the learned Counsels appeared for the parties also concentrated all their energies in advancing arguments to the effect Plaintiff is in possession of the suit schedule property, his possession may be that of a lessee or a licensee, settled possession, unlawful possession, unauthorised occupation and under any of these circumstances it is settled law that person in possession cannot be evicted except in accordance with law and they relied on several authorities in support of the said contention. Appellant''s contention is the Plaintiff is a licensee and he is not in possession and therefore prima facie he has not made out a case for grant of an injunction. In my understanding that is not the point that arise for consideration in these proceedings having regard to the nature of the pleadings, the relief sought for and the scope of the suit. Therefore, both the learned Counsels argued at length on the said point and cited several authorities in support of their respective contentions. I deem it unnecessary to consider the said contentions and refer to those decisions.

The Plaintiff wants a declaration that he has not committed breach of any lawful agreement between himself and the Defendants and he is entitled to continue for another term in the suit property as per the terms and conditions entered into between him and the Defendants under the agreement dated 1.3.1995 and for a consequential decree of permanent injunction restraining the Defendant from forcibly evicting or dispossessing the Plaintiff from the suit schedule property. Therefore, he has to prima facie establish that he has a right to continue for another term under the terms of the agreement dated 1.3.1995 which is a document not in dispute between the parties. The Plaintiff has specifically pleaded that in the agreement dated 1.3.1995 the period stipulated comes to an end by 28.2.2001 and in pursuance of fresh tenders called in respect of the suit property has submitted his valid tender on 20.12.2000. He has complied with all the legal requirements and after opening of the tender his tender was found to be valid, therefore in view of Clause 37 of the agreement he is entitled to continue for one more term. His grievance is in spite of the aforesaid position, the Defendants are not permitting him to continue for one more term and they are trying to evict him by force. As such, he was contained to file the suit for the aforesaid reliefs and pending the suit he has sought for an order of temporary injunction to protect his possession.

In this context to be entitled to an order of temporary injunction the prima facie case the Plaintiff is expected to make out is that he was the successful bidder and therefore by virtue of Clause 37 under the agreement dated 1.3.1995 he is entitled to continue for one more term. If such a case is made out he would be entitled to an order of temporary injunction. The question for consideration is whether as he made out a prima facie such a case. The material on record which is not in dispute discloses that the agreement on which the Plaintiff relies on stipulates a period of six years from 1.3.1995 which comes to an end on 28.2.2001. Being fully conscious of the fact that he will have no right whatsoever to continue in the premises after the expiry of the period of licence he submitted his tender on 20.12.2000 in pursuance of the notification issued on 16.11.2000 by offering to pay a licence fee of Rs. 26,544.00 per month and a security deposit of Rs. 1,45,000.00. The tender was opened. Unfortunately, the Plaintiff''s bid was not the highest. One Sri D. Puttegowda offered Rs. 65,222.00 as the monthly licence fee and deposited security deposit of Rs. 3,91,332.00 along with E.M.D. of Rs. 68,484.00 and he being the highest bidder his bid was accepted and later approved by the Central Office and an agreement was entered in to. Clause 37 of the agreement on which the Plaintiff relies on categorically states in case the licensee desires to compete in the tender procedure, he shall expressly do so and in case the licensee satisfies the conditions, his case is liable to be considered for grant of licence for another term and this shall not given any right whatsoever to the licensee to continue in the premises even after expiry of the period of licence. Therefore, it becomes clear mere submitting a tender would not ipso facto give any right to the Plaintiff to continue in the premises even after expiry of the period of licence. If he was the successful bidder he could have continued in the premises after the expiry of the period of licence on fresh terms and conditions. When he is not the successful bidder his right to continue in the premises came to an end after the expiry of the period of licence. Therefore, prima facie the Plaintiff is not entitled to any declaration sought for as he was not the successful highest bidder. In view of these undisputed fact the question of Plaintiff succeeding in the suit after trial is very very bleak. If that is so the Plaintiff has no right to continue in the premises after the expiry of period of licence. In the absence of any right he cannot complain of any injury. Therefore, the question of balance of convenience would not arise. These aspects have been completely ignored by both the Courts below in arriving at their finding that the Plaintiff has made out a prima facie for the grant of an order of injunction though both the Courts concurrently held that the Plaintiff is only a licensee and not a lessee as contended by him. However, on a misunderstanding of the scope of the suit they have granted the injunction sought for. In this context it is useful to refer to the following passage of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Dalpat Kumar wherein it has been held as under:

6 ...The phrases "prima facie case", "balance of convenience" and "irreparable loss" are not rhetoric phrases for incantation, but words of width and elasticity, to meet myriad situations presented by man''s ingenuity in given facts and circumstances, but always is hedged with sound exercise of judicial discretion to meet the ends of justice. The facts are eloquent and speak for themselves. It is well nigh impossible to find from facts prima facie case and balance of convenience. The Respondents can be adequately compensated on their success.

In fact, another cardinal principle governing the grant of an equitable and discretionary relief of temporary injunction is the party who is seeking the aid of the Court should come to the Court with clean hands. His conduct should be anything but fair. He should not either suppress facts which are within his knowledge or state facts which are to his knowledge false. In the instant case the Plaintiff has deliberately stated that after opening of the tender his tender was found to be valid and therefore he is entitled to be continued for one more term as provided under Clause 37 of the agreement. It is demonstrated that his tender was not valid, he was not the highest bidder and he was not the successful bidder. Therefore, it is a clear case of Plaintiff being fully conscious of the true state of affairs has made false statement with the sole intention of obtaining an interim order. This conduct of the Plaintiff cannot be countenanced and the same disentitled him to the relief of temporary injunction. Even otherwise the Plaintiff has based his claim on the basis of the agreement dated 1.3.1995 entered into between him and the Defendants. He relies on Clause 37 of the said agreement. The said clause makes it abundantly clear that his competing in the tender procedure shall not give him any right in the tender whatsoever in the premises even after the expiry of the period of licence. Therefore, his tender not having been accepted, he has no right to continue in the premises after the expiry of the period of licence namely 28.2.2001. Therefore, the question of granting any order of temporary injunction to prevent his being removed from the premises after the expiry of the licence would not arise.

Even before the expiry of the stipulated period apprehending interference he has filed the suit on 17.2.2001. If his case is to be considered as if that he would be dispossessed during the period of licence which expired on 28.2.2001 any order of injunction to be granted by the Court is to be limited only till such period. The cause of action pleaded has to come to an end by 28.2.2001. If the grievance is after the expiry of the stipulated period he would be dispossessed forcibly by the Defendants and therefore he is entitled to an order of injunction, no temporary injunction could be granted to restrain events arising subsequent to the suit. Therefore, seen from any angle the Plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of injunction.

It is not out of place to mention herein the Plaintiff has approached the Court before the expiry of the stipulated period and obtained an interim order and by virtue of such order he has continued in the premises after the expiry of period of lease. Thus, successfully preventing the successful bidder from carrying on business in the premises in question thereby depriving the Defendant-KSRTC a public transport corporation, to get the market rent. The Plaintiff is paying a monthly licence fee of Rs. 12,600.00 with 10% escalation. In pursuance of the tender notice he has submitted his tender and offered Rs. 26,544.00 per month. However, the successful bidder has offered a sum of Rs. 65,222.00. The difference between the licence fee paid by the Petitioner at present and the licence fee payable by the successful bidder is roughly around Rs. 40,000.00 per month. In other words from 1.3.2001 upto this day for nearly ten months he is having the benefit of Rs. 40,000.00 per month consequently has deprived the Defendant of that Rs. 40,000.00 income. Therefore, in equity also the Plaintiff is not entitled to any indulgence from this Court. The Courts below have completely misdirected themselves in this regard and have not considered the case of the parties in proper perspective and have recorded findings of question of fact de hors the pleadings and also ignoring the main relief sought for. The said impugned order cannot be sustained as they are perverse, illegal and accordingly they are set aside.

In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. The impugned order of the Courts below are set aside. Application filed by the Plaintiff I.A. No. I for grant of temporary injunction dismissed. Respondent to pay a sum of Rs. 5,000.00 being the costs of this petition.