Puttasiddaiah vs The K.S.R.T.C., Shanthinagar and Others

Anand Byrareddy, J.—1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondents.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent No. 1, which is the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, has a bus-station at Mysore Road, known as the Mysore Road Satellite Bus-station. In the bus-stand area, a commercial space measuring about 55,886 square feet was licensed in favour of M/s. Pantaloon Retail India Limited (PIL), where they are running a commercial establishment in the name and style of M/s. Big Bazaar since the year 2008. Thereafter, PIL had with the permission of the respondents allotted a portion measuring 48 square feet to run a Sugarcane Juice Stall on a monthly license fee of Rs. 7,500/- to the petitioner under an agreement.

It is further stated that pursuant to the license, the petitioner had established a stall and was running the same in the name and style of ''Cane Club'' and he was paying license fee regularly to the respondents apart from other charges towards the water and electricity consumed. He has been regular in such payment. However, since there was a slump in business, the Big Bazaar was shut down and the entire premises was handed over to the respondent - Corporation.

Thereafter, the petitioner had entered into a separate license agreement with respondent No. 4 to run the business on the condition that if the respondent required the premises he would immediately vacate the premises. It is stated that under a fresh agreement dated 23.5.2013, the said respondent No. 2 had granted license to run the commercial complex for a period of ten years in favour of one Sateesh Chandra. Thereafter, the petitioner had entered into an agreement with the said fourth respondent to run the Sugarcane Juice stall until another licensee was selected and he has been paying license fee regularly to the respondents. However, respondent No. 2 had suddenly issued a notice calling upon the petitioner to vacate and hand over the premises as the same was required for the use of a new tenant. On receiving the notice, he had replied to the same, but respondent No. 2 was firm in its stand that if he had failed to vacate before 31.3.2015, he would be evicted by using force. Therefore, the present petition.

The respondents have entered appearance and have filed statement of objections to contend that the petition proceeds on a wrong premise. It is pointed out that the true and correct facts are not stated though it is admitted that respondent No. 4 is the present licensee in respect of the commercial premise in the bus stand measuring 55,886 square feet and the said area did not include the stall, which is occupied by the petitioner. When Sateesh Chandra who had entered into an agreement with the present petitioner realized his mistake in having entered into an agreement in respect of an area which was not covered under license, he had immediately intimated the petitioner that he had no authority to grant any such license and he had no authority to receive any consideration in respect of the said premises and had immediately refunded the said amount to the petitioner which he has categorically stated in his statement before the court having impleaded himself as a respondent.

The learned counsel for the respondent - Corporation would submit that the legal position insofar as the licensee''s power and authority to occupy the premises is well settled in a catena of decisions and would submit that once the license is revoked, the licensee would have no objection whatsoever and it is not even necessary for the licensor to file a suit for his ejectment and this is the law as laid down by the Supreme Court. Reliance is placed on Munshi Ram vs. Delhi Administration, , AIR 1968 SC 704, which has been followed by a full bench of the Delhi High Court in Chandu Lal vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, , AIR 1978 Delhi 174(1).

Reliance is also placed on a decision of a learned single judge of this court in case of G. Raja vs. The Government of Karnataka, WP 2581/2015 c/w. WP 3740/2015 dated 1.6.2015, whereby the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Corporation of Calicut vs. K. Sreenivasan, , AIR 2002 SC 2051 and C.M. Beena vs. P.N. Ramachandra Rao, , AIR 2004 SC 2103 is followed.

The learned Counsel would further place reliance on a decision of a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes and others vs. Erasmo Jack de Sequeria, , AIR 2012 SC 1727, wherein the question whether the licensor was required to eject a licensee, by recourse to due process of law namely, to file a suit for ejectment, having been considered by the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, while approving the view taken by the Delhi High Court in Thomas Cook (India) Limited vs. Hotel Imperial, , 2006(88) DRJ 545 has reiterated the findings of the Delhi High Court on the issue aforesaid, as follows:--

"The expressions ''due process of law'', ''due course of law'' and ''recourse to law'' have been interchangeably used in the decisions referred to above which say that the settled possession of even a person in unlawful possession cannot be disturbed ''forcibly'' by the true owner taking law in his own hands. All these expressions, however, mean the same thing -- ejectment from settled possession can only be had by recourse to a court of law. Clearly, ''due process of law'' or ''due course of law'', here, simply mean that a person in settled possession cannot be ejected without a court of law having adjudicated upon his rights qua the true owner.

Now, this ''due process process'' or ''due course'' condition is satisfied the moment the rights of the parties are adjudicated upon by a court of competent jurisdiction. It does not matter who brought the action to court. It could be the owner in an action for enforcement of his right to eject the person in unlawful possession. It could be the person who is sought to be ejected, in an action preventing the owner from ejecting him. Whether the action is for enforcement of a right (recovery of possession) or protection of a right (injunction against dispossession), is not of much consequence. What is important is that in either event it is an action before the court and the court adjudicates upon it. If that is done then, the ''bare minimum'' requirement of ''due process'' or ''due course'' of law would stand satisfied as recourse to law would have been taken. In this context, when a party approaches a court seeking a protective remedy such as an injunction and it fails in setting up a good case, can it Page 321 then say that the other party must now institute an action in a court of law for enforcing his rights i.e., for taking back something from the first party who holds it unlawfully, and, till such time, the court hearing the injunction action must grant an injunction anyway? I would think not. In any event, the ''recourse to law'' stipulation stands satisfied when a judicial determination is made with regard to the first party''s protective action. Thus, in the present case, the plaintiff''s failure to make out a case for an injunction does not mean that its consequent cessation of user of the said two rooms would have been brought about without recourse to law."

Therefore, in the present facts and circumstances, the petitioner having been put on notice of termination of the license as early as on 17.3.2015, would indicate that there is revocation of the license even if granted to the petitioner. The petitioner''s further contention that the license would be co-terminus with the license granted to the fourth respondent is concerned, since there was an agreement between him and the fourth respondent, who has been granted license for ten years, even if the license were to be terminated, it is only a notice which would have to be issued, which is also satisfied in the admitted issuance of a notice dated 17.3.2015 by the second respondent.

The further circumstance that the fourth respondent has made a categorical statement before this court that there is no privity of contract existing between himself and the petitioner and that the petitioner shall directly pay the license fee to the respondent No. 2 would afford the second respondent the power and authority to terminate the license and to seek recovery of the premises.

Given the law as laid down by the Supreme Court in Munshi Ram vs. Delhi Administration, , AIR 1968 SC 704, which has been followed by a full bench of the Delhi High Court in Chandu Lal vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, , AIR 1978 Delhi 174 (1), notwithstanding other judgments of the Supreme Court which indicates that a suit requires to be filed and due recourse to law has to be taken to eject a licensee of its possession, whether the petitioner qualifies to claim the settled possession of the property would be another question. Since it was a short term license, it cannot be said that the petitioner had established settled possession over the property.

Further, there is some controversy as to the why the license was being revoked. Though the respondent may have indicated that it is a revocable license in order to identify another licensee, it is now canvassed by the respondents that it actually is required to raise the present stall occupied by the petitioner to the ground, in order to provide case of movement of the vehicles of the respondent and it is a more pressing need and requirement, which is yet another contention which would indicate that the revocation of the license was warranted. In any event, it is not an area which requires to be adjudicated. The fact remains that the petitioner was a licensee and the license has been revoked. The need for any further adjudication in this matter would be unnecessary as the relationship is established and the law is clear. Hence, the petition lacks merit and is dismissed.

However, in order to enable the petitioner to relocate as he is a small time businessman and this may result in financial ruin to the petitioner unless he finds a better location to house his Juice Stall, three months time would be a reasonable time to quit and deliver vacant possession, failing which, the respondent shall be free to take possession of the property not using more force than necessary.