ESTATE OFFICER, HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, HISAR vs SH.RATTAN SINGH

THIS is an application purporting to be under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for the condonation of considerable delay in filing the present appeal.

THE order under appeal is dated the 10th of April, 1991 whilst the appeal was presented before the Commission as late as the 10th of June, 1991. THEre is thus a delay of nearly 30 days or more in filing the appeal beyond the period prescribed therefore by Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act When the appeal was originally presented beyond time it was accompanied neither by any application for the condonation of delay nor supported by art affidavit as prescribed. Sub-Rule 4 of Rule 8, the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, which governs the procedure for hearing the appeal under Section 15 of the Act mandates as under : - Sub-Rule 4 : "When the appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation as specified in the Act, the memorandum shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit setting forth the fact on which appellant relies to satisfy the State Commission that he has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of limitation." It is manifest from the plain provision afore-quoted that there has been a patent and flagrent violation of the said rule in so far as the memorandum of appeal was neither accompanied by any application for condonation nor supported by any affidavit setting forth the facts relied upon as being the sufficient cause for delay. That being so this application is liable to fail on this statutory ground alone.

Apart from the above, even otherwise there appears to be no adequate ground which may merit the condonation of the delay & a consequential interference with the new vested rights of the respondent-consumer in favour of whom the order under appeal has been rendered. Learned counsel for the appellant had attempted to argue that though the order under appeal was dated the 10th of April, 1991 a copy thereof was however, received by the appellant later on the 24th of April, 1991. It was sought to be submitted that limitation should be compute the date aforesaid and not from the date of the order and, consequently a considerable reduction in the delay in filing would ensue. This submission has to be only noticed and rejected. Within this Commission it has now authoritatively settled in First Appeal No. 16 of 1991 Haryana State Electricity Board v. Dinesh Kumar, II (1991) CPJ 38 decided on April 22,1991 that the terminus-a-quo for computing limitation under Section 15 runs from the date of order and not from any actual or presumed date of the receipt of a copy thereof. Consequently the appellant has to explain a delay of nearly 30 days or more and it is well settled that under the rules of limitation every day delay has to be explained. This indeed has been very far being done in the present case.

THE solitary ground taken in the application and the supporting affidavit very belatedly presented on the 9th of July, 1991 is that some staff members of the appellant (Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Hisar) were deputed for election duty and consequently the appeal could not be prepared for filing within limitation. THE aforesaid ground presumes that because the appellant herein happens to be a corporation, therefore, it is on some preferential ground than the ordinary litigant for the purposes of limitation. This stand is also concluded against the appellant within this jurisdiction by the order in Appeal No. 13 of 1991 ''Housing Board, Haryana, Chandigarh v. Dr. S.L. Chaudhary of Hisar & Others'' decided on 13.11.1990 wherein it has been held that the State or a statutory Corporation is on no different footing than a private litigant for the purposes of limitation in filing appeals etc. The some what sketchy ground taken on behalf of the appellant even otherwise does not hold water on a closer scrutiny. As already noticed the order under appeal having been rendered on the 10th of April, 1991. The limitation for filing of the appeal had expired on the 10th of May, 1991. Judicial Notice can be taken of the fact that polling in the State of Haryana took place on the 20th of May, 1991 i.e. full 10 days after the expiry of the date for limitation. Consequently the subsequent assignment of some members of the staff of the appellant beyond the point of the expiry of the limitation becomes wholly irrelevant.

LASTLY the vague & omni-bus averments that because some of the staff was busy on election duty by itself affords no ground for the condonation of delay. It has not even been said in terms that the person or persons specifically entrusted for the filing of the appeal were unavailable or absent for that reason. Generally that some staff members of the appellant (H.U.D.A.) were deputed for election work on or around the 20th of May, 1991 is a reason wholly unsatisfactory for by-passing the mandate of limitation for preferring the appeal. For all the aforesaid reasons individually and collectively there is not the least merit in this application which is, therefore, dismissed. Inevitably the main appeal also must founder on the ground of limitation and is hereby rejected. Appeal dismissed.