RAJINDER KUMAR vs S.D.O.TELEPHONES, NARWANA

THIS appeal has been listed for arguments on the preliminary question of limitation. The order of the District Forum, Jind is dated the 19th of May, 1992 whilst the appeal has been received in the office of the Commission on 20th of July, 1992. Obviously, it has been preferred after 31 days of the expiry of the prescribed time of 30 days under Section 15 of the Act.

THE Haryana Consumer Protection Rules vide Sub-rule (4) of Rule 8 in express terms provides that wherever a memorandum of appeal is preferred beyond that prescribed time, the same must be accompanied by an application for condonation showing sufficient cause for the delay and also be supported by an affidavit, therefor. Herein neither an application in the mandatory terms has been made nor any affidavit has been placed on the record. THE appeal, therefore, deserves to be dismissed on this primal score of violation of the mandatory rule his plea for condonation was somewhat off the mark being a lay-man unaware of the strict provisions of limitation. It was sought to be submitted that the copy of the order was received somewhat late and the limitation be comuted from the alleged receipt of the said copy. It was also the plea that the postal authorities had been remiss in not delivering the appeal within time in the first instance. Within this jurisdiction, the matter is concluded against the appellant by the considered order of this Commission in I (1992) CPJ 359 ''Haryana State Electricty Board v. Dinesh Kumar. The order under appeal itself indicates that the complainant was present in person before the District Forum and the order was announced in open Court on the 9th of May, 1992. Obviously, enough he was fully aware of the order which had granted substantial, though partial relief to him. The plea that the limitation should run from the supposed date of the receipt of the copy is negatived by the ratio of Dinesh Kumar''s case (Supra) in the following terms :- "The answer to the question posed at the outset is rendered in the terms that the period for determining the limitation prescribed by Section 15 of the Act runs from the date of the order under appeal, and not from any alleged date of the receipt of the copy thereof forwarded under Rule 4(10) of the Rules."

In view of the above, it has to be necessarily held that no sufficient cause has been made out for condoning a substantial delay of more than the prescribed period of limitation, in preferring the present appeal. This being so, the appeal must fail on the preliminary bar of limitation and is dismissed as such. Appeal dismissed.