Gantepatgi Pedda Jangadu and others vs Kondur Venkatlakshmikant Rao

Manohar Pershad, J.—This is a revision petition on behalf of the defendants against the decision of the Munsiff Magistrate, Suryapet, on the preliminary issue of jurisdiction in a case for possession and mesne profits of certain agricultural lands. The defendants alleged that they were protected tenants having acquired tenancy rights over the land in dispute from one Venkateshwar Rao, who, they alleged, was the Manager of the plaintiff, Kondur Venkat Lakshmikant Rao. They produced a certificate of permanent tenancy and pleaded that the civil Courts were debarred by the Tenancy Act from taking cognizance of the case. The Court below overruled the contention holding that since the grant by Venkateshwar Rao could not give rise to a valid tenancy inasmuch as the defendants did not succeed in establishing that he was the Manager of Kondur Venkat Lakshmikant Rao, the suit must be deemed to be one against a trespasser and not a suit against a tenant and it was not hit by S. 99 of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the learned Munsiff on the issue of jurisdiction, the defendants have come up to this Court by way of revision under S. 115, C.P.C.

A preliminary objection is taken by the plaintiff-opposite party to the maintainability of the revision on the ground that the decision of the lower Court does not amount to a decision of a case within the meaning of S. 115, C.P.C. We think the contention is sound and the recent Pull Bench decision of this Court in--Molugu Paniah v. Molugu Ramanatham, AIR 1954 Hyd 66 (A) applies and the application cannot be entertained as a revision under S. 115, C.P.C. The petitioners'' learned counsel, however, asks us to exercise our powers of superintendence under Art. 227 of the Constitution. He relies in this connection upon the case of� Waryam Singh and Another Vs. Amarnath and Another, ). This case is an authority for the proposition that the power of superintendence possessed by the High Court extends to judicial matters also and that it can be exercised in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority. We have to see whether the present case is of that nature and interference under the article is necessary in order to prevent serious injustice.

It was admitted by the plaintiff in the Court below and it is also conceded before us that the defendants hold a certificate of protected tenancy from the Tahsildar. We also understand from the parties that proceedings for the cancellation of the certificate are pending in the Revenue Court.

Section 99, Hyderabad Tenancy Act provides :

No Civil Court shall have the jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under this Act required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tahsildar, Tribunal or Taluqdar or by the Board of Revenue or Government.

The validity of the tenancy can be obviously determined by the Revenue Court alone in view of the provisions of Sections 32, 34 and 35 of the Act. It is, in our judgment, wholly wrong to entertain and decide that the tenancy is invalid and then to hold that the suit being not a suit between the landlord and tenant it cannot attract to itself the bar of Section 99. A person who holds a tenancy certificate from a competent authority must be regarded as a tenant till the certificate remains in force. The learned Munsiff proceeded to do that which the law prohibited him from doing. Clearly, therefore, he exceeded the bounds of his authority and his order must be set aside.

The learned advocate for the respondent relying on the case of--''Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji'', AIR 1954 Bom 100 (C) contends that in the circumstances of the case it would be just and proper to stay the proceedings in the Civil Court till the petition of the plaintiff for cancellation of the tenancy pending before the Tahsildar is finally decided. We are not inclined to accept this argument. The provisions of the Bombay Tenancy Act are different from the provisions of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act in many respects. There is, for example, no provision in the Bombay Tenancy Act like S. 35 of the Hyderabad Tenancy Act dealing with the declaration of a protected tenant by a Tahsildar. The decision of the Tahsildar in this behalf is given conclusive effect in Hyderabad. The Act also vests in the Revenue Courts the power to cancel the certificates and to put the rightful person in possession where such a course is warranted by the circumstances of the case. No useful purpose would, therefore, be served by staying the proceedings in the Civil Court.

We allow the revision under the powers of superintendence possessed by this Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution and set aside the order of the Court below. We hold that the case is not cognizable by the Civil Court. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.