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Judgment
Deshpande, J.—This second appeal is directed against the judgment of the District and Sessions Judge, Karimnagar, allowing the respondents'' appeal and reversing the decree of the learned Munsif, Sirsilla, dated 9-3-1950, dismissing the plaintiff''s suit.
The suit was for possession of land called Kalvakunda, Survey No. 486, in village Sireilla on the basis of a sale deed executed by defendants Nos. 3 and 4 in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 5000/- on 2-7-1947. Defendants Nos. 3 and 4 admitted the plaintiff''s claim. The first two defendants contested it on the ground that they were in possession of the plot as tenants and were protected by the Asami Shikmi Act. The plaint was filed on 19-1-1950. On 7-7-1950, defendants Nos. 1 and 2 filed a petition stating that under the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act (XXI of 1950) the Civil Courts are debarred from entertaining such suits. This contention was disallowed and after taking evidence the plaintiffs'' suit was decreed. Defendants Nos. 1 and 2 went up in appeal before the District Judge, who reversed the decree of the trial Court and dismissed the suit. Hence the present appeal.
On behalf of the plaintiffs-appellants it is argued that as the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act came into force on 10-7-1950 and the present suit was filed before that date, the appellants had a vested right to get their case tried by the Civil Court. The Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, it is said, is not retrospective in its effect and the decision of the lower appellate court dismissing the plaintiffs'' suit for want of jurisdiction is wrong. Reliance in support of the argument is put upon -- AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court) - ''Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji'', AIR 1954 Bom 100 (B); Ramachander v. Ramappa'', AIR 1954 Hyd 158 (FB) (C); and - AIR 1940 105 (Privy Council)
On behalf of the respondents it is contended that the law regarding the determination of forum is only a procedural law; that the plaintiff cannot have any vested right in procedure and that the provision of the Tenancy Act operated, therefore, to deprive the Civil Courts of jurisdiction over the present case as soon as it came into force. Reliance is placed for this argument on - Bunni Pandy Vs. Brahmdeo Pandy and Another -- Bireswar Moral and Another Vs. Indu Bhushan Kundu and Others, -- Janakinath Singha Ray Vs. Nirodbaran Ray and Others, - ''Shree Kant Pandurang v. Emperor'', AIR 1943 Bom 169 (FB) (H); -- '' AIR 1954 Bom 100 (B)'', -- Trimbak Sopana Vs. Gangaram Mhatarba, -- Deoraj Singh v. Rambilas Singh'', AIR 1951 Pat 629 (J); and -- AIR 1941 5 (Federal Court)
It is an admitted fact that the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act came into force during the pendency of the suit, which was instituted about six months prior to its commencement. The defendants'' objection regarding the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to decide the point was overruled and the suit was decreed as the defendants failed to establish their plea of tenancy. In appeal the defendants were allowed to produce additional evidence which showed that the appellants were tenants. Under S. 99, Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, no Civil Court has the jurisdiction to settle, decide or deal with any question which is by or under the enactment required to be settled, decided or dealt with by the Tehsildar or the Taluqdar or by the Board of Revenue or the Government. Under Ss. 34 and 37 the definition of ''protected tenants'' is given and under S. 35 it is provided that the Tehsildar is the person who is entitled to declare any person to be a protected tenant. The jurisdiction conferred on that officer is exclusive. The sole question which needs determination is whether the disability imposed by the Act on the Civil Court operates to debar the lower court from trying the suit which gives rise to this appeal.
It is contended that the Act is not at all applicable to the present case as Statutes affecting vested rights must be construed strictly and not given liberal interpretation and as was held in -- AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court) -- '' AIR 1954 Bom 100 (B)'', a pending proceeding in respect of vested rights is saved from the operation of the Tenancy Act. Reference is also invited to the case of '' AIR 1954 Hyd 158 (FB) (C)'', for the contention that the Act does not apply to a case like the present. We think the argument is unsound.
As stated above the Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act came into force during the pendency of the suit. It provides a specific procedure and does not make any change in the vested rights of the parties. The only change made is that the exclusive jurisdiction to settle the question whether a particular person is a protected tenant or not is given to Tehsildars. This right to have a case tried by one court or another is obviously a procedural right and the rule which protects pending proceedings in the event of any change being affected in substantive law does not apply to it.
In '' Bunni Pandy Vs. Brahmdeo Pandy and Another their Lordships of the Allahabad High Court observed that:
..........The rule as to the appropriate forum for a particular kind of suits is one of procedure and not of substantive right, and a plaintiff cannot claim to have the choice of a forum in spite of an enactment which has come into force on the supposed ground that his cause of action had accrued before the new Act was passed.
Similarly in the case of Bireswar Moral and Another Vs. Indu Bhushan Kundu and Others, it was held that:
When the Legislature alters the rights of parties by taking away or conferring any right of action, its enactments, unless in express terms they apply to pending actions, do not affect them. But there is an exception to this rule, namely, where enactments merely affect procedure, and do not extend to rights of action. If a statute deals merely with the procedure in an action, and does not affect the rights of the parties, ''it will be held to apply prima facie to all actions, pending as well as future''. Whether a person has a right to recover property is a question of substantive law. But in what Court he must institute proceedings is a question of procedural law.
The same view was taken in '' Janakinath Singha Ray Vs. Nirodbaran Ray and Others, , and '' AIR 1943 Bom 169 (FB) (H).
Generally speaking, an alteration in the procedural law affects pending as well as future cases. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Civil court had got jurisdiction to hear and decide the question relating to the tenancy of defendants Nos. 1 and 2. The case of -- ''Ramchander v. Ramappa'', (C), is not applicable to the present case as there the question regarding the retrospective operation of an enactment affecting vested rights was under consideration. The factors which apply to such cases have no relevancy to the present case.
The decision of the Federal Court in AIR 1941 16 (Federal Court) , is of a similar nature for all that was laid down by their Lordships in that case was that statutes affecting vested rights should be construed strictly and not given liberal interpretation. The case of -- ''Dhondi Tukaram v. Dadoo Piraji'', (B), is irrelevant and is of no avail to the appellant. It is well settled that where a new enactment altering the procedural law comes into force during the pendency of the suit that Act will be applicable to the pending proceedings also. See - Bhikham Vs. Natha, , and -- Soman v. Kedamath'', AIR 1963 All 254 (M), and the recent Pull Bench case of this High Court in -- ''Ramchander v. Ramappa'' (C).
We hold that the lower court was right in holding that the jurisdiction of the learned Munsiff was lost with the enforcement of the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, and he could no longer embark upon an investigation of the question whether or not the defendants were protected tenants. The court below rightly allowed the appeal and there is no reason to interfere.
We dismiss the appeal with costs.