Ghaziabad Development Authority vs Deep Chand Pandey

This Execution Appeal, by Ghaziabad Development Authority, the sole Opposite Party in the Complaint, is directed against the order dated

02.06.2017, passed by the Uttar Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission at Lucknow (for short “the State Commissionâ€) in

Execution Petition No. 14/2013 in Complaint Case No. 328/1993. By the impugned order, the State Commission has directed the Appellant herein to

pay to the Decree Holder, the Respondent herein, the excess amount of 1,06,110/-, along with interest @ 18% p.a. from 31.08.1992 till the date of

actual payment; 1,24,300/- being the claim for repairs; 12,000/- towards changing the doors; and 5,000/- the costs imposed by this Commission on an

earlier occasion, within a period of 45 days.

In the absence of all the documents, including the Complaint, the material facts, leading to the filing of the present Appeal, are culled out from the

list of dates and events. These are:

On 06.06.1990, the Complainant had applied for allocation/allotment of a house with the Appellant Authority in its “Lajpat Nagar projectâ€. On

request of the Complainant, a house was allocated for him, out of turn, in Brajvihar, on 27.03.1991. A total sum of 5,03,490/-, including the sale

consideration of 3,90,000/- and simple interest, was to be deposited till 30.04.1997. On 10.03.1992, the Appellant Authority issued allotment-cum-

possession letter, informing the Complainant that he could take possession of the house allotted to him, i.e. House No. E/19, Brijvihar, subject to

payment of differential amount of 26,500/-, as the total cost of the said house was 4,16,500/-, as also lease rent of 12,138/-, till 30.03.1992. Perhaps,

the amounts demanded by the Appellant Authority were deposited by the Complainant. However, since the Complainant was not satisfied with the

additional demands, raised by the Appellant Authority, he filed the afore-stated Complaint before the State Commission, praying for a direction to the

Authority to refund the excess amount realized from him, together with damages etc.

On analysis of the evidence adduced by the parties before it, vide order dated 04.04.2001, the State Commission allowed the Complaint, inter alia,

holding that the Complainant was entitled to the refund of the excess amount, if any, paid to the Appellant Authority, along with interest @ 18% p.a.

from 31.08.1992, as also compensation of 13,000/- and litigation costs, quantified at 3,000/-. The State Commission had also observed that the quantum

of the amount, to be spent towards removal of deficiencies in the house, of which possession had already been taken by the Complainant, would be

decided in the Execution proceedings.

Aggrieved, the Appellant filed First Appeal No. 178 of 2001 before this Commission. Since the controversy requiring consideration related only to

the implementation of the final order in the Complaint, i.e. the excess amount payable by the Appellant Authority, vide order dated 05.02.2009, the said

Appeal was dismissed by this Commission, with liberty to the parties to raise the issues raised in the Appeal, before the State Commission in the

Execution proceedings. The Appellant Authority was also directed to pay litigation costs, quantified at 5,000/-, to the Complainant.

In the said background, the Execution proceedings were initiated by the Complainant, wherein the order, impugned in the present Execution Appeal,

has been passed by the State Commission.

It is pointed out by the Office that the Appeal is barred by limitation, in as much as there is a delay of 98 days in filing the same. An Application,

praying for condonation of the said delay, has been filed along with the Appeal. In paragraph-4 of the said Application, following explanation for the

delay has been furnished:

“4. … That after the Execution Petition No. 14 of 2013 was decided by the Hon’ble State Consumer Dispute Redressal Commission, Uttar

Pradesh, Lucknow the Appellant decided to challenge the impugned judgment before this Hon’ble Commission. That since the present matter was

al in all related to as to how much amount has been deposited by the Respondent and how much amount in particular was received by the Appellant,

all the original documents and memo since 1990 were searched to quantify the amount. A meeting was scheduled between the officials of the

Appellant and the Counsel whereupon the right amount was derived after considering all the documents and Memos. Thus, some delay occurred in

filing the instant First Appeal.â€​

Having heard learned counsel for the Appellant Authority on the question of delay, we are of the opinion that the explanation furnished by the

Authority is absolutely unsatisfactory and does not make out any cause, much less a sufficient cause for condonation of the afore-stated delay, which

at the first blush may not look to be large but on the facts at hand is very significant.

A perusal of certified copy of the impugned order dated 02.06.2017, placed on record, reveals that the same was issued to the Appellant Authority

on 05.06.2017. If the Appellant Authority was aggrieved by the directions in the impugned order, it was required to challenge the same before this

Commission within a statutory period of 30 days from the said date. However, it has filed the present Execution Appeal with an inordinate delay of 98

days, over and above the said statutory period. The said delay is sought to be explained on the short and crisp ground that in quantifying the amount

deposited by the Complainant and received by the Appellant, which involved convening a meeting, wherein all the documents and Memos issued by

the Appellant Authority were considered by its officials, the said delay has occurred.

Though the certified copy of the impugned order had been promptly issued to the Appellant Authority on 05.06.2017, yet, according to the

Appellant/Applicant, it took over three months in ascertaining the amounts deposited by the Complainant. Except for the said bald plea, for which there

is no indication in the Application â€" when the said meeting was convened, there is no other explanation as regards delay in filing the Appeal. Further,

the Application is also conspicuously silent when the matter was assigned to the Counsel; how-much time was taken by the Counsel in filing the

Appeal, etc.

In the absence of all these details, it can safely be inferred that the Appellant Authority was not bothered by the directions issued to it by the State

Commission, because even after promptly receiving the certified copy of the impugned order, the Appellant Authority did not show any seriousness in

pursuing the matter at its end to ensure that the Appeal was filed within time. Such casual and indifferent attitude on the part of the government

functionaries has been deprecated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and Ors. V. Living Media India Limited And Anr.,

(2012) 3 SCC 563 , wherein the Apex Court has been pleased to observe thus:

“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or

lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the

Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic

methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation

undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

In our view, it is right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and

acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for

several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to

ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated

benefit for the government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. â€​

In the light of the afore-noted factual scenario, we have no hesitation in holding that the Appellant Authority has failed to make out any cause, much

less a “sufficient cause†for condonation of afore-stated delay of over three months in filing the present Appeal, which we are not inclined to

condone.

Consequently, the Appeal is dismissed on the short ground of limitation.