Gian Singh vs Surinder Lal and another

Mahajan, J.—Facts giving rise to this petition for revision,which has been filed by a tenant u/s 35 of the Delhi & Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952, are as follows: Shri Mohan Lal, Advocate, who is the owner of the premises, according to him as the Karta of the joint Hindu family, let out one flat out of a building consisting of four flats to Gian Singh and Siri Ram in the year 1952 at a monthly rental of Rs. 150/-. The premises are situate in Karol Bagh. The tenancy was for a period of three months. It may be mentioned that Siri Ram surrendered possession of his portion to Gian Singh with the result that Gian Singh has been the sole occupant as a tenant of the premises from the year 1955 onwards. On the 21st March, 1958 there was a family partition of the joint Hindu family of which Shri Mohan Lal was the Karta and a decree was obtained. Under this decree the flat in question fell to the share of his son Surinder Lal. The tenant started attorning to him with effect from the 1st of April, l958. The present petition for ejectment of the tenant was filed by the son, Surinder Lal, u/s 13(1)(e) and Section 13(1)(h) of the Act. The grounds were that the landlord required the premises for his own use and for the use of his family and that the tenant had built premises after the coming into force of the 1952 Act, that is, in the year 1955. Both these grounds prevailed with the trial Court and a decree for eviction followed. On appeal by the tenant, the decision of the trial Court was affirmed. The present petition for revision is by the tenant, Gian Singh.

It may be mentioned that the lower appellate Court dismissed the appeal as barred by time. The ground on which the appeal was held to be barred by time was that the copies of the judgment and decree were insufficiently stamped. Though the appeal was filed within limitation but as the deficiency was made good after the period of limitation, therefore, the appeal, according to the lower appellate Court, would be treated as having been filed when the deficiency was made good. So far as this matter is concerned, the deficiency can be allowed to be made good at any stage of the proceedings and once it is allowed the appeal would be taken to have been filed on the date when it was originally filed though with deficient court-fee. If reference is made to Section 149 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the matter can admit of no doubt whatever. I, therefore, hold that the decision of the lower appellate Court that the appeal is barred by time is absolutely erroneous

So far as the merits of the matter go. it appears to me that the decision of the Courts below is correct and must be upheld. Mr. Vohra, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, urges that under Clause (h), which is in these terms:

(h) that the tenant has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of, or been allotted, a suitable residence,

a tenant is only liable to eviction if he builds premises when he is a tenant of the landlord, who is seeking his eviction. I, however, find no warrant for this contention. The term ''tenant'' is defined as follows:

2.(j) ''tenant'' means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises and includes such sub-tenants and other persons as have derived title under a tenant under the provisions of any law before the commencement of this Act.

Turning to Section 13, which is the section dealing with the grounds on which a tenant can be evicted, the proviso in which the various eviction clauses figure provides-

that nothing in this Sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied * * *

and then follows Clause (h) and according to this clause all that has to be seen is whether the person who is sought to be evicted is a tenant of the landlord and if he is a tenant, has he built his own premises either before or after the commencement of the Act. If so Clause (h) will straightway come into operation. There is no warrant for holding, as the learned Counsel for the Petitioner would like me to hold, that the premises must be built by the tenant when he was the tenant of the landlord. That being so, there is no merit in this contention. I would accordingly dismiss this petition and in view of the fact that on one matter the tenant his succeeded, that is, the limitation, I would make no order as to costs in this Court, but the order as to costs in the Courts below will stand.

I allow the tenant three months time to vacate the premises.