High CourtsSingle Bench

Gokara Konda Sita vs Cheedella Ramakrishna Rao

Andhra Pradesh High Court · Decided on 22 March 2006 · Citation: (2006) 3 ALT 593

HON’BLE JUDGES
P.S. Narayana, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 — Section 22
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
C.R.P. No. 507 of 2006
Ask AI about this case

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

No AI summary yet

Generate an eight-section analysis of this judgment — facts, issues, reasoning, ratio and a plain-language gist.

Judgment

19 paragraphs · 1,670 words

P.S. Narayana, J.—Heard Sri Nandigam Krishna Rao, learned Counsel representing the revision petitioner, hereinafter referred to as ''tenant'', and Sri A. Rajasekhar Reddy, learned Counsel representing the respondent, hereinafter referred to as ''landlord''.

2.

The revision petition is filed u/s 22 of Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, hereinafter in short referred to as ''Act'' for the purpose of convenience, by the tenant aggrieved by the concurrent findings recorded in relation to the bonafi depersonal requirement of the landlord in RCC No. 169 of 1999 and RC CMA No. 52 of 2000 on the file of the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority respectively. It is not in serious controvery that the ground of willful default had been negatived by the learned Rent Controllerand the same was not questioned and the tenant alone appears to have carried the matter by way of appeal as aforesaid.

3.

Sri Nandigam Krishna Rao, the learned Counsel representing the petitioner-tenant made the following submissions:

The learned Counsel had taken this Court through the findings which had been recorded by the learned Rent Controller and also the appellate authority and would contend that both the Courts below had adopted a wrong approach by arriving at a conclusion that the ground of bona fide personal requirement of the landlord had been established only on the strength of the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.1 alone. The learned Counsel would maintain that the stand taken by the landlord is that he is in dire necessity of the premises in question inasmuch as he is residing in rented premises. Except the sole testimony of P.W.1, there is no other evidence available on record in the light of the stand taken by D.W. 1, the tenant, and the said stand cannot be believed unless there is other additional acceptable evidence in support of the evidence of P.W.1. The learned Counsel also pointed out to Exs.A-1 to A-3 and Ex.B-1 and would comment that inasmuch as the main ground of wilful default had been negatived even by the learned Rent Controller, the stand taken by the landlord in relation to bona fide personal requirement should be viewed with strong suspicion in the light of the conduct of the landlord.

4.

Per contra, Sri Rajasekhar Reddy, learned Counsel representing the landlord would maintain that clear findings had been recorded by both the Courts below in relation to the bona fide personal requirement. The stand taken by the landlord as P. W. 1 is clear and categorical and when no contra evidence is forthcoming on the part of the tenant, the same had been taken note of and the learned Rent Controllerarrived atthe correct conclusion that the landlord had established the ground of bona fide personal requirement and ordered eviction. The learned Counsel also pointed out the relevant portions of the findings recorded by the appellate authority and would contend that in the light of the concurrent findings which had been recorded by both the Courts below on the aspect of bona fide personal requirement, the said findings need not be disturbed by this revisional Court. The learned counsel also placed reliance on the decisions of this Court in S.K. Sharma Vs. A. Viswanath, . and Sri Rama Trading Co. Vs. Kollepara Nookaraju, .

5.

Heard the counsel on record.

6.

The landlord filed RCC No. 169 of 1999 on the file of the learned Rent Controller, Vijayawada praying for eviction as against the tenant on the ground of wilful default in payment of rents and also yet another ground of bona fide personal requirement. The learned Rent Controller recorded the evidence of P.W.1, the landlord, D.W.1- the tenant, marked Exs.A-1 to A-3, the counter-foil of the rent receipt, office copies of notice and reply and Ex.B-1, the rent receipt dated 23-5-1997, but, while answering point No. 2 recorded a positive finding that in view of the admitted fact that the landlord is residing in rented premises by paying monthly rent, he is in dire necessity of building for personal occupation and accordingly ordered eviction.The tenant carried the matter by way of appeal. The appellate authority also recorded reasons while answering point No. 3 on the aspect of bona fide personal requirement at paragraphs 11 and 12 and ultimately dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved by the same, the present CRP is preferred.

7.

The learned Rent Controller while answering point No. 2atpara7 recorded reasons in detail and had appreciated the evidence of both P.W.1 and D.W. 1, the landlord and tenant, and recorded a positive finding that it is an admitted fact that the landlord is residing in rented premises by paying monthly rent of Rs. 500/- and this would clearly go to show that the schedule property is imminently necessary for the landlord for his personal occupation and his requirement is bona fide.

8.

The learned Rent Controller framed the following points for consideration:

(1) Whether the petitioner/landlord is entitled to seek eviction on the g round of wilful default in paying the rents?

(2) whether the petitioner/landlord is entitled to seekeviction on the ground of personal occupation of the schedule property?

9.

The appellate authrotiy framed the following points for consideration at para 8:

(1) Whether the petitioner is entitled to seek eviction on the ground of wilful default in paying the rents?

(2) Whether the petitioner/landlord is entitled to seek eviction on the ground of personal occupation of the petition schedule property?

10.

While answering point No. 3, the appellate authority, at paragraphs 11 and 12 observed as hereunder:

The lowercourt has believed the version of the landlord to the effect that the premises is required by the landlord bona fidely for his personal occupation. The contention of the landlord is that he has no other residential building to reside and that he is residing in a rented house and he is feeling much inconvenience. If really, the landlord has no other alternative residential premises, certainly it can be said that the requirement of the landlord is a bona fide one. As the landlord is contending that he has no other residential premises, he may not adduce any negative evidence to establish that he has no other property. Since the tenant is contending that the landlord has some other residential premises, it is not at all difficult for the tenant to adduce evidence that there is a house in the name of the landlord. To substantiate the contention of the appellant that the respondent has a residential premises of his own she deposed before the Court to the effect that the schedule property is not at all required for the petitioner for his personal occupation. No where she stated that the petitioner/landlord has any other residential premises for his residence. On the other hand, P.W.1 stated in his evidence that he is residing in a rented building of one Appala Swamy and it is in convenient for him. No suggestion was given to P.W.1 to the effect that he has any other alternative residential building. Basing on the material available in the record, it is clear that the landlord has no other residential building for his residence. Simply because the area of the petition schedule property is 30 sq. yards, the same is not a ground to disbelieve the version of the landlord. When it is sufficient for the residence of the tenant it could not be said that it is not sufficient for the landlord. When the relative hardship is considered, the circumstances reveal that the landlord is forced to reside in a rented house in spite of having his own house. So, it can be said that if the tenant is not get evicted, the inconvenience that should be caused to the landlord is more inconvenience than that should be caused to the tenant. The tenant cannot be permitted to continue to stay in the premises by causing hardship to the landlord. The circumstances clearly establish that the landlord required this premises for his personal occupation and his request is a bona fide one. So, this point is answered accordingly in favour of the landlord.

11.

The Courts below believed the version of the landlord to the effect that the premises is required by the landlord bona fide for his personal occupation and the point was answered in favour of the landlord. It is no doubt true that as far as the ground of wilful default is concerned, the appellate authority also had considered the same as point No. 1, but arrived at a conclusion that no further reasons need be recorded and the appellant is bound to succeed on the ground of wilful default in the light of the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller. It is needless to say that on appreciation of evidence, both the Courts below had recorded concurrentf indings as far as bona fide personal requirement is concerned. It is no doubt true that there is evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.1 alone, but unless contra is established by the tenant, it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the learned Rent Controller and the appellate authority sufferfrom any illegality whatsoever. Even otherwise, on appreciation of evidence available on record, both the Courts below had arrived at a conclusion that the landlord was able to establish the ground of bona fide personal requirement. These are all factual aspects and inasmuch as no misappreciation of evidence by both the Courts below had been pointed out, this Court is thoroughly satisfied that this is not a fit matter to be interfered with u/s 22 of the Act.

12.

Accordingly the CRP shall stand dismissed. No costs.

13.

However, inasmuch as the tenant has been in possession of the premises for sufficiently a long time, it would be just and proper to give her sufficient time to vacate the premises on payment of rents for the rest of the period also. In view of the facts and circumstances, the tenant herein is granted six (06) months time to vacate the premises.