Surisetty Venkateswara Rao vs Konda Praveen Kumar and Another

L. Narasimha Reddy, J.—These two civil revision petitions present almost similar questions of law and facts. Hence, they are disposed of through a common judgment. The tenants in respect of two separate residential-cum-non-residential premises are the petitioners in these two CRPs.

CRP No. 10 of 2000 is directed against the order of the Rent Control Appellate Authority-cum-Senior Civil Judge, Nellore, in RCA No. 4 of 1987 and CRP No. 11 of 2000 is directed against the order of the same authority in RC No. 5 of 1987. The respondent in CRP No. 10 of 2000 filed RCC No. 54 of 1981 in the Court of the Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, Nellore, seeking eviction of the petitioner pleading the grounds of wilful default in payment of rents by the tenant. Commission of acts of waste and the bonafide requirement for personal occupation of the schedule premises. The Rent Controller, through orders dated 27-10-1996 dismissed the RCC rejecting all the grounds pleaded by the respondent-landlord. Thereupon, the respondent filed RCA No. 4. of 1987 before the appellate authority. The appeal was dismissed on 26-3-1990.

Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed CRP No. 2240 of 1990. Through orders dated 5-7-1996, this Court had set aside the order of the appellate authority and remitted the matter back to record a finding on the question on bona fide requirement. After the matter was remitted, both the parties had filed IAs, requesting the Court to permit them to place additional material. After taking into account the additional material as well as the other facts borne out by record, the appellate authority, through its order dated 7-10-1999 directed eviction of the petitioner holding that the premises are required for personal occupation of the respondent and the bona fides in the plea have been established.

Similarly, the respondent in Civil Revision Petition No. 11 of 2000 filed RCC No. 55/81 in the Court of the Rent Controller-cum-Principal District Munsif, Nellore, seeking eviction of the petitioner pleading the grounds of wilful default in payment of rents by the tenant, commission of acts of waste and the bona fide requirement for personal occupation of the schedule premises. The Rent Controller, through orders dated 27-10-1986 dismissed the RCC rejecting all the grounds pleaded by the respondent-land lord. Thereupon, the respondent filed RCA. No. 5 of 1987 before the appellate authority. The appeal was dismissed on 26-3-1990. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent filed CRP No. 2237 of 1990. Through orders dated 5-7-1996, this Court had set aside the order of the appellate authority and remitted the matter back to record a finding on the question on bona fide requirement. After the matter was remitted, both the parties had filed LAs, requesting the Court to permit them to place additional material. After taking into account the additional material as well as the other facts borne out by record, the appellate authority, through its order dated 7-10-1999 directed eviction of the petitioner holding that the premises are required for personal occupation of the respondent and the bona fides in the plea have been established. Thus arise the two revisions.

In these revisions, the only question that falls for consideration is whether the requirement pleaded by the respondents for their occupation of the premises in question was bonafide or not.

Sri T. Veerabhadraiah, the learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the respondent is a member of the joint family, several items of properties are held by the joint family and that there are no bonafides in the plea that the respondent requires the premises for their personal occupation. He further submits that the fact that several items of properties have been acquired in the names of several members of the family would only show that there are no bona fides in their claims. He further submits that the acquisition of the properties by one of the members of the family, particularly, the spouse would disentitle the landlord from seeking eviction on the ground of personal requirement. He places reliance on several judgments of this Court as well as the Hon''ble Supreme Court.

Sri P. Sridhar Reddy, the learned Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that except taking a specious plea that the members of the family of the respondents have acquired various properties, nothing has been stated either in the counter filed to the RCC or the IA filed subsequently that the respondents were the owners of any property other than the property, the eviction of which is sought in the petitions. Relying upon several judgments of this Court as well as the Hon''ble Supreme Court, he submits that to disentitle the landlord from seeking the eviction of any premises on the ground of personal requirement, the tenant should plead and establish that he owns some premises, which are suitable for the purpose of which eviction is sought. According to him, neither there was pleadings nor proof of the said fact.

It was pleaded before the appellate authority after remand that the wife of the respondent in CRP No. 10 of 2000 has acquired several items of property covered by Exs.B11 to B13. The learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that though the said items of the property were acquired in the name of the wife of the respondent in CRP No. 10 of 2000, the respondent himself is entitled to occupy the same. Inasmuch these items of property, some of which are exclusively residential and some of which are exclusively non-residential, the respondents, could have occupied any one of them and it cannot be said that there was any bona fide requirement for the respondent to seek eviction of the subject premises. In support of his contention, he places reliance upon the judgment of this Court in KVSS Prasada Rao Vs. Godavari Bai and Others, . He has also submitted that where a landlord is entitled for the occupation of the premises as co-owner in respect of some other premises, that would disentitle him from seeing the eviction of the tenant on the ground of bonafide requirement. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Super Forgings and Steels (Sales) Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Thyabally Rasuljee (Dead) through Lrs., . He also contends that the freedom of the landlord to choose the vacation of the premises, as he likes is restricted as held by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in M.M. Quasim Vs. Manohar Lal Sharma and others, .

Resisting the plea of the learned Counsel for the petitioner Sri. P. Sridhar Reddy, the learned Counsel for the respondents submits that the judgment of this Court in K.V.S.S. Prasada Rao''s case (supra), does not apply to the facts of the case. According to him that case dealt with the circumstances wherein the tenant securing alternate building as contemplated u/s 19(2)(v) of the Act; whereas the case on hand falls u/s 10(3)(iii) of the Act for which totally different connotation arises.

So far as the choice of the tenant is concerned, he placed reliance upon the judgments, of the Hon''ble Supreme Court reported in Ragavendra Kumar Vs. Firm Prem Machinary and Co., , Smt. G. Kaushalya Devi Vs. Ghanshyamdas, ; Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan, , and the judgment of this Court reported in J.R. Ramesh Kumar @ Rameshji Vs. N. Prabhakar Rao, .

Therefore, it has to be seen whether the various premises that have been acquired by the spouses or the members of the family as the case may be of the respondents, should be treated as those to which the respondents are entitled to occupation and whether the respondents have failed to establish that the premises so acquired are not suitable for the occupation of the respective respondents.

In support of the first contention, Sri T. Veerabhadraiah, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the premises acquired by the spouses or family members should also be treated as being available for occupation by the respondents. In support of this contention, he placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in K.V.S. Prasada Rao''s case (supra). That was a case in which the plea of the landlord was that the tenant had become entitled for occupation of certain premises and thereby enabled the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant on the ground stipulated in Section 10(2)(v) of the Act.

A learned Judge of this Court took the view that since Section 10(2)(v) does not require securing of alternative premises by the tenant in his own name, and since in that case the premises were acquired in the name of the wife of the tenant and as a fact it was found that they were living together, it was held that the tenant was liable to be evicted. However, in the present case, the provision relied upon is Section 10(3)(a)(iii). The two provisions are totally different. One deals with the securing of alternative building by the tenant whereas the other deals with the entitlement of the landlord to occupy the building in the city. Interpreting the very provisions like Section 10(3)(a)(iii), the Supreme Court, in Kaushalya Devi''s case (supra), held that the expression ''possession which he is entitled to'' does not include ''possession otherwise than own''." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court relied upon the judgment reported in M. Padmanabha Setty Vs. K.P. Papiah Setty, , in arriving at this conclusion. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted.

The second contention that the respondents even after being entitled to occupy the other premises cannot seek eviction of the demised premises would arise if only the answer on the first contention was in their favour. It was already held that the acquisition of premises by the respective spouses or family members of the respondents does not enure to the benefit of the respondent. Even if it is to be assumed that the premises so required enure to the benefit of the respondents and they are entitled to occupy the same, it is to be seen, whether that very fact would disentitle the respondents to seek eviction on the ground that they have failed to establish that such premises are not suitable to them.

It requires to be noticed that the question of acquisition of the premises by the family members of the respondents was pleaded for the first time only after the matter was remanded. The averments in the affidavit filed in support of IA No. 1 12 of 1994 filed by the petitioners herein before the appellate Court was only to the effect that certain premises came to be secured by the family members of the respondents. There was not even an allegation, muchless proof to the effect that such premises were suitable for the purpose for which the eviction of the demised premises was sought.

Sri T. Veerabhadraiah, learned Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon the judgment of this Court in M.M. Quasim ''s case (supra), which is to the effect that the freedom of the landlord to seek eviction on the ground of buna fide requirement is not absolute and it is subject to certain restrictions. Dealing with the similar contention, the Honourable Supreme Court in Raghavendra Kumar''s case (supra) held as under:

"The learned single Judge of the High Court while formulating first substantial question of law proceeded on the basis that the plaintiff-landlord admitted that there were number of plots, shops and houses in his possession. We have been taken through the judgments of the Courts below and we do not find any such admission. It is true that the plaintiff-landlord in his evidence stated: that there were number of other shops and houses belonging to him but he made a categorical statement that his said houses and shops were not vacant and that suit premises is suitable for his business purpose. It is settled position of law that the landlord is best judge of his requirement for residential or business purposes and he has got complete freedom in the matter. (See Prativa Devi Vs. T.V. Krishnan, . In the case in hand the plaintiff-landlord wanted eviction of the tenant from the suit premises for starting his business as it was suitable and it cannot be faulted."

In the present case, the premises under the occupation of the petitioner in both the cases are residential and non-residential in nature. The various items of properties that were alleged to have been acquired, even on the showing of the petitioner, were either residential or non-residential. It was not even pleaded that any of such premises were suitable for the type of business or activity proposed to be undertaken by the respondents. Therefore, this contention also cannot be accepted.

Learned Counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Super Forgings and Steel''s case (supra) to contend that the entitlement even as a co-owner of a landlord would disentitle him to seek eviction of the tenants from other premises. There is no comparison of facts of the present case and the one cited by the learned Counsel for the petitioner.

In view of the conclusions recorded above, I see no reason to interfere with the orders of the learned Rent Control Appellate Authority. Accordingly I dismiss the revision petitions.

However, the petitioner is given six months time to vacate the premises. No costs.