Gopi Ram vs State of Haryana

The petitioners, after purchase of the plots in question constructed residential Kothas for their own use and occupation and are presently living therein. They do not have any other residential plot or house in village Nangal Chaudhary. Besides the petitioners, six other persons had purchased land in the same locality and constructed houses thereon. The land in dispute was entered in the revenue records as Gair Mumkin Abadi even prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. According to the petitioners, land measuring 222.17 kanals was to be acquired for the same purpose but subsequently the acquisition was reduced to an area measuring 213.18 kanals in order to favour the highly placed persons in Government machinery.

It is alleged by the petitioners that the entire acquisition is discriminatory and against the principles of natural justice and more so when the plots/houses/shops belonging to other persons similarly situated have been released from acquisition. Some plots were released by the respondents in order to favour Shri Surjan Singh, Smt. Shanti Devi, Col. Ram Singh, Speaker Haryana Vidhan Sabha, Devi Sahai and others. According to the petitioners, deletion of this area under Section 6 of the Act tantamounts to discrimination and misuse of power as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners filed objections under Section 5A of the Act but the same have not been decided so far.

The respondents contested the petitions and controverted the allegations made therein. It was pleaded that the plots in question were lying vacant and as per the revenue record, the land in dispute was Chahi as well as Gair Mumkin. It was admitted that the land measuring 8 Kanal 19 Marlas was released from the acquisition proceedings due to construction of houses therein. The pucca houses were released from acquisition. It was denied if the acquisition was reduced under Section 6 of the Act to favour any highly placed person in the Government. It was specifically pleaded that Col. Ram Singh does not own any land in the area under acquisition and the averment that the land has been released to favour Shri Surjan Singh, Smt. Shanti Devi and Col. Ram Singh etc. is highly misconceived. It was further pleaded that the petitioners were afforded opportunity to file objections under Section 5A of the Act and the same were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Collector.

At the outset, the learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the petitioners had already constructed Kothas/Chhapars on the plots in dispute prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act and as such, their property was liable to be released from the acquisition proceedings especially when the plots of other persons (mentioned in the petition) who had constructed houses, have been released from acquisition. According to the learned counsel, the action of the respondents in not releasing the plots of the petitioners from acquisition proceedings, is mala fide, discriminatory and arbitrary, and as such, the notification under Section 4 of the Act, is liable to be quashed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decisions rendered in Mohinder Singh Sharma v. State of Haryana, 1988(2) R.R.R. 502 : 1988 PLJ 525 and Sukhdev Sharma etc. v. State of Haryana, 1993 LACC 86 : 1993(3) RRR 28(P&H).

On the other hand, the learned State counsel has submitted that there was no construction on the land of the petitioners prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act and that only those plots wherein construction had been raised were released and as such, the action of the respondents in not releasing the land of the petitioners was not discriminatory or mala fide.

After giving thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, I do not feel inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioners. The case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners will not come to the rescue of the petitioners in the instant case. In Mohinder Singh Sharma''s case (supra), it was found as a matter of fact that as a policy of the Government, all built up area at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, was to be left out of the acquisition and the petitioners had raised construction on the acquired land and as such, it was also liable to be exempted. Similar view was taken in Sukhdev Sharma''s case (supra), wherein it was found that some constructed areas were left out from the purview of acquisition whereas the land belonging to the petitioners was acquired over which construction had been raised and this amounted to discrimination and the notification was struck down on the ground that the policy of pick and choose adopted by the Government was not proper.

In the instant case, the averments of the petitioners that they had constructed the houses/Kothas on the disputed land prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, and that similarly situated plots of influential persons were left out from the acquisition, have been controverted by the respondents. It was specifically pleaded that there was no construction at all over the plots of the petitioners and that the land wherein construction was in existence, was released and the objections filed by the petitioners were declined after due consideration. The stand taken by the respondents in the written statement has not been controverted by the petitioners by way of filing replication, meaning thereby that whatever is stated by the respondents in the written statement, is to be taken as correct. No material whatsoever has been brought on the record to prove or suggest that in fact there was any construction over the plots of the petitioners prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act or any favour was shown by the respondents while releasing the land of other persons wherein pucca houses were constructed. From the mere averments in the petition, without any further material on record, the action of the respondents in not releasing the land of the petitioners, cannot be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or against the principles of natural justice.

In view of what has been stated above, the writ petitions are dismissed with no order as to costs.