Jag Ram vs State of Haryana

N.C. Khichi, J. (Oral)

In the present writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, challenge has been made to Notification No. 390Agri.II(5)80/2577, dated 25.2.1980, under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, the `Act'') and notification No. 4278AgriII (5)81/3711, dated 18.3.1982, under Section 6(2) of the Act, issued by the Haryana Government, Urban Estate Department, vide which the land of the petitioner was acquired for a public purpose, namely, for construction of New Grain Market, Staff Quarters and FarmerRest House, Hadbast No. 244 in village Nangal Chaudhary, Tehsil Narnaul, District Mohindergarh, by the Market Committee, Narnaul. The facts are as follows :

The case set up by the petitioner is that he is owner of the land comprised in Killa Nos. 9/2,10/1, 11/1, 11/2 12/1, 12/2, situated in village Nangal Chaudhary, Tehsil and District Mohindergarh and that he had constructed a pucca Nohra in this land and had got an electric connection in the year 1971. He alongwith his family is residing in this Nohra since the year 1970. Adjacent to the Nohra, an Ahata is attached which is being used by him for parking his tractor etc. The respondents acquired a part of the residential Nohra of the petitioner thus bifurcating the same into two parts; one which has been acquired and the other which has been released. According to the petitioner, respondents have thought it fit to release a part of the Nohra situate in killa Nos. 9/2, 10/1 while they have thought it fit to acquire a part of the Nohra situate in Killa Nos. 11/1, 12/1, 12/2. Besides this, about 7 acres of agricultural land of the petitioner is under impugned acquisition. According to the petitioner, land measuring 22217 kanals was to be acquired for the same purpose but subsequently the acquisition was reduced to 21318 kanals in order to favour the highly placed persons in the Government machinery. It is alleged by the petitioner that the entire acquisition is discriminatory and against the principles of natural justice. The object of reduction in acquisition was to favour Shri Surjan Singh, Smt. Shanti Devi, Col. Ram Singh, Speaker Haryana Vidhan Sabha and Devi Sahai Jat etc. According to the petitioner, deletion of this area under Section 6 of the Act tantamounts to discrimination and misuse of power as envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is further alleged by the petitioner that he filed objections under Section 5 of the Act but the same have not been decided by the respondents so far. It is further alleged that apparently there is no system which appears to have been followed in releasing/acquiring the houses/plots except that the houses/plots belonging to important influential persons like Smt. Sharda Devi wife of Col. Ram Singh, Speaker Haryana Vidhan Sabha and those belonging to close relations of Bansi Lal, MLA have been released. This action of the respondents is contrary to the canons of justice.

The respondents contested the petition and controverted the allegations made therein. It is admitted that the land in dispute is Gair Mumkin and Chahi as per the revenue record. However, the respondents have controverted the averment of the petitioner that reduction of area under Section 6 was to favour Shri Surjan Singh, Smt. Shanti Devi and Col. Ram Singh. They have pleaded that Col. Ram Singh does not own any land in the area under acquisition. It was further pleaded that a part of the Nohra situated in Killa Nos. 9/2, 10/1 was left out in the notification under section 6 of the Act due to a clerical mistake and a corrigendum will be published to acquire the part of the left out Nohra. It was also pleaded that the petitioner was afforded an opportunity to file objections under Section 5A of the Act and the same were duly considered by the Land Acquisition Collector. The averment of the petitioner that the land has been released to please the favourites of Col. Ram Singh and Rao Bansi Lal, has also been controverted.

At the outset, the learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that the petitioner had constructed a pucca Nohra and got an electric connection in the year 1971 and is residing with his family members in this Nohra since 1970 i.e. before the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act. The Nohra was liable to be released from the acquisition proceedings especially when the plots of other persons (mentioned in the petition) who had constructed houses, have been released from acquisition. According to the learned counsel, the action of the respondents in not releasing the Nohra of the petitioner from acquisition, is malafide, discriminatory and arbitrary and as such, the notification under Section 4 of the Act, is liable to be quashed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel relied upon the decision rendered in Mohinder Singh Sharma and anr. v. State of Haryana, 1988(2) R.R.R. 502 : 1988 PLJ 525and Sukhdev Sharma etc. v. State of Haryana, 1993 LACC 86 : 1993(2) RRR 28 (P&H).

On the other hand, the learned State counsel has submitted that there was a Nohra situated in the land of the petitioner and a part of this Nohra was left out in the notification under Section 6 of the Act due to a clerical mistake for which a corrigendum was to be published. According to the learned State counsel, no part of the Nohra was to be left out from the acquisition. According to the learned counsel, only those plots wherein construction had been raised prior to the issuance of notification under section 4 of the Act, have been released and that no favour was shown to any person. The action of the respondents in not releasing the Nohra was not discriminatory or mala fide.

After giving my thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions, I do not feel inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner. The case law relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner will not come to the rescue of the petitioner in the instant case. In Mohinder Singh Sharma''s case (supra), it was fond as a matter of fact that as a policy of the Government, all built up area at the time of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, was to be left out of acquisition and the petitioners had raised construction on the acquired land and as such, it was also liable to be exempted. Similar view was taken in Sukhdev Sharma''s case (supra), wherein it was found that some constructed areas were left out from the purview of acquisition whereas the land belonging to the petitioners was acquired over which construction had been raised and this amounted to discrimination and the notification was struck down on the ground that the policy of pick and choose adopted by the Government was not proper.

In the instant case, about 7 acres of land alongwith Nohra belonging to the petitioner has been acquired. The existence of Nohra is not denied by the respondents but is pleaded that the entire Nohra has been acquired though due to clerical mistake a part of the Nohra situated in Killa No. 9/2, 10/1, was left out in the notification under Section 6 of the Act and a corrigendum was to be published to acquire the left out Nohra. It has been specifically pleaded by the respondents that only the plots wherein construction had been raised prior to the issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act, were released and that the objections filed by the petitioner were declined after due consideration. It has further been pleaded that no favour was shown to any person as alleged by the petitioner while releasing the plots wherein the construction had been raised prior to the notification under Section 4 of the Act. The stand taken by the respondent in the written statement has not been controverted by the petitioner by way of filing replication, meaning thereby that whatever is stated by the respondents, in the written statement is to be taken as correct. Further, it has not been shown by the petitioner that Nohra belonging to any other land owner whose land had been acquired, was released. No material whatsoever has been brought on record to prove or suggest that any favour was shown by the respondents while releasing the land of other persons wherein pucca houses had been constructed. From the mere averments in the petition, without any further material on record, the action of the respondents in not releasing the land of the petitioner, cannot be said to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide or against the principles of natural justice.

In view of what has been stated above, the writ petition is dismissed with no order as to costs.