Harikrishnan vs State Of Kerala

P.B.Suresh Kumar, J.

This writ petition is instituted challenging Ext.P4 order issued under Section 15(1)(a) Kerala Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (the Act), restraining the petitioner from entering the limits of Thrissur Revenue District for a period of one year.

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner as also the learned Government Pleader.

Ext.P4 order refers to various prejudicial activities committed by the petitioner. The last prejudicial activity referred to in Ext.P4 order is the involvement of the petitioner in Crime No.98 of 2022 of Valappad Police Station. The said crime was reported on 03.02.2022. The petitioner secured anticipatory bail in the case on 02.03.2022 and pursuant to the condition imposed in the order granting anticipatory bail, the petitioner appeared before the police on 06.03.2022. The final report in the case was filed on 30.03.2022. It is thereafter on 09.07.2022, the concerned Station House Officer recommended to the sponsoring authority under the Act for initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15 of the Act. An additional report was also filed by the Station House Officer to the sponsoring authority in this regard on 11.07.2022. Pursuant to the reports aforesaid, on 20.07.2022, the sponsoring authority recommended to the competent authority for initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15 of the Act in order to prevent him from entering the limits of Thrissur Revenue District. Acting upon the recommendation, after giving to the petitioner an opportunity of hearing, the impugned order was passed on 01.09.2022 and the same was served on the petitioner on 06.09.2022.

The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that inasmuch as the last prejudicial activity referred to in the order being one that took place on 02.02.2022, there is inordinate delay in initiating proceedings, and in the absence of any satisfactory explanation for the delay, it can be presumed that there is no application of mind on the aspect of the live link required to be maintained between the prejudicial activity and the initiation of proceedings. According to the learned counsel, the impugned order is liable to be set aside on that sole ground.

Per contra, the learned Government Pleader contended that there is satisfactory explanation for the delay in the order and it cannot, therefore, be contended that there was no application of mind on the aspect of the live link required to be maintained between the prejudicial activity and the initiation of proceedings. The learned Government Pleader has brought to our notice the relevant portions of the impugned order and also the relevant paragraph in the counter affidavit filed by the competent authority dealing with the aspect of delay. The learned Government Pleader also submitted that the petitioner got himself involved in another prejudicial activity on 14.12.2022, viz, Crime No.903 of 2022 of Valappad Police Station after the impugned order was served on him. According to the learned Government Pleader, the involvement of the petitioner in a prejudicial activity even after receipt of the impugned order fortifies the subjective satisfaction rendered by the competent authority as to the live link between the prejudicial activity and initiation of proceedings as also the need to pass the impugned order so as to prevent the petitioner from indulging in further anti-social activities.

In reply to the submissions made by the learned Government Pleader, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the involvement of the petitioner in a prejudicial activity after the impugned order has been passed, cannot be a reason to justify the said order. According to the learned counsel, the legality or otherwise of the order needs to be examined with reference to the facts and circumstances existing as on the date of the order, for, if the order is an illegal one, merely for the reason that the petitioner got himself involved in a prejudicial activity after the order, it cannot be treated as legal.

We have examined the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties on either side.

No doubt, there has to be a live link between the prejudicial activities and the decision of the competent authority to initiate proceedings under Section 15 of the Act. If there is a long delay between the last prejudicial activity and the initiation of the proceedings, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation for the delay, it can be presumed that the live link between the prejudicial activity and initiation of proceedings is snapped.

As noted, the last prejudicial activity of the petitioner referred to in the impugned order is the involvement of the petitioner in Crime No.98 of 2022 of Valappad Police Station. The occurrence, which is the subject matter of the said case took place on 02.02.2022. The sponsoring authority recommended for initiation of proceedings against the petitioner under Section 15 of the Act only on 20.07.2022. In other words, there is a delay of 5 months and 18 days in initiating the proceedings from the date of the last prejudicial activity. As noted, the argument advanced by the learned Government Pleader in this regard is that the impugned order would indicate beyond doubt that there was due application of mind on the part of the competent authority as regards the need to pass an order against the petitioner under Section 15 of the Act to prevent the petitioner from indulging in further prejudicial activities and as regards the live link between the last prejudicial activity and initiation of proceedings, to justify the initiation of proceedings. Paragraphs 11 and 13 of the impugned order, which were brought to our notice by the learned Government Pleader in support of the said argument read thus:

“11.ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരി അവസാനമായി ഉൾപ്പെട്ട വലപ്പാട് പാലീസ് സ്റ്റേഷൻ ക്രൈം 98/2022 U/s 341, 323,324, 427, 308, r/w 34 IPC പ­സിന്റെ കുറ്റകൃത്യം സംഭവിച്ചത് 02-02-2022 തിയ്യതിയിലും റിപ്പാർട്ടായത് 03-02-2022 തീയതിയിലുമാണ്. ഈ പ­സിൽ അന്വേഷണം പൂർത്തിയാക്കി ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിയെ മൂന്നാം പ്രതി പ5ർത്ത് പ്പെ­ാടുങ്ങല്ലൂർ JFCM പ­ാടതി മുമ്പാപ്പെ­ 30-03-2022 തിയ്യതി കുറ്റപത്രം സമർപ്പിച്ചിരുന്നതും ആയത് CP 40/2022 ആയി പ­ാടതിയുടെ പരിഗണയിലുമാണ്. ഈ പ­സിലേക്ക് വേണ്ടി ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിക്ക് ബഹു.തൃശ്ശൂർ ജില്ലാ സെഷൻസ് പ­ാടതിയിൽ നിന്ന് CrlMC 242/2022 dtd 02/03/2022 നമ്പറായി ലഭിച്ച മുൻകൂർ ജാമ്യ ഉത്തരവിന്റെ അടിസ്ഥാനത്തിൽ 06.03.2022 തിയ്യതി സ്റ്റേഷനിൽ ഹാജരായ ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിയെ അറസ്റ്റ് പ്പെ5യ്തിരുന്നതും തുടർന്ന് നിയമാനുസരണം ജാമ്യത്തിൽ വിട്ടയച്ചിട്ടുള്ളതുമാണ്. ഇപ്ര­ാരം ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരി സാമൂഹ്യവിരുദ്ധ പ്രവർത്തി­ളിൽ ഏർപ്പെട്ട് സ്ഥലത്തെ പാതുസമാധാനത്തിന് ഭീഷണിയാവുന്ന സാഹ5ര്യത്തിലും തുടർച്ചയായ പാതുജനസമാധാന ലംഘനപ്രവർത്തി­ളിൽ ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരി ഉൾപ്പെട്ടതിനെ തുടർന്ന് ആയതു­ളിൽ നിന്ന് ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിയെ പിന്തിരിപ്പിക്കാൻ ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിക്കെതിരെ 107 CrPC പ്ര­ാരം നടപടി സ്വീ­രിച്ചും ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിയുടെ ഇത്തരം പ്രവർത്തി­ൾ നിരീക്ഷിക്കുന്നതിന് റൗഡി ഹിസ്റ്ററി ഷീറ്റ് ആരംഭിച്ചും നടപടി­ൾ സ്വീ­രിച്ചുവെങ്കിലും ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരി വീണ്ടും പാതുജന സമാധാനലംഘന പ്രവർത്തി­ളിൽ ഏർപ്പെട്ട് വരുന്നതായും ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിയെ സ്വതന്ത്രമായി തൃശ്ശൂർ ജില്ലയിൽ സഞ്ചരിക്കാൻ അനുവദിച്ചാൽ ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിയുമായി ഒത്തുപ5ർന്ന് കുറ്റകൃത്യങ്ങളിൽ ഏർപ്പെട്ട് വരുന്നവരുമായി സഹവസിച്ച് തുടർന്നും പാതുസമാധാനത്തിന് ഭീഷണിയാകുന്ന സാമൂഹ്യ വിരുദ്ധ പ്രവർത്തി­ൾ ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരി തുടരുമെന്നും എനിക്ക് ബാധ്യപ്പെട്ടിട്ടുള്ളതിനാൽ ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിയെ പാതുസമാധാന ലംഘനപ്രവർത്തി­ളിൽ നിന്നും പിന്തിരിപ്പിക്കുന്നതിന് പ­രള സാമൂഹ്യവിരുദ്ധ പ്രവർത്തനങ്ങൾ (തടയൽ) നിയമം 2007 വകുപ്പ് 15(1)(a) പ്ര­ാരം നടപടി സ്വീ­രിക്കേണ്ടത് അനിവാര്യമാണെന്ന് വെളിവാകുന്നുണ്ട്.

x x x x x x x x x

ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരിക്കെതിരെ പ­രള സാമൂഹ്യ വിരുദ്ധ പ്രവർത്തനങ്ങൾ (തടയൽ) നിയമത്തിലെ വകുപ്പ് 15(1)(a) പ്ര­ാരം നടപടി സ്വീ­രിക്കുന്നതിനായി ഹരികൃഷ്ണൻ@ഹരി ഉൾപ്പെട്ട പ­സു­ളുടെ വിവരങ്ങളും രേഖ­ളും പgഖരിച്ച് പ്രാഥമി­ റിപ്പാർട്ട് തയ്യാറാക്കി സമർപ്പിക്കുന്നതിൽ തൃശ്ശൂർ റൂറൽ പാലീസ് ജില്ലാ മേധാവിയുടെ ഭാഗത്തുനിന്നും നീതീ­രിക്കാനാവാത്ത ­ാലതാമസം ഉണ്ടായിട്ടില്ലെന്ന് ബാധ്യപ്പെട്ടിട്ടുള്ളതാണ്.”

As evident from the recitals in the extracted paragraphs, what is stated by the competent authority is that the delay has occasioned on account of the time taken for collecting the documents pertaining to the prejudicial activities committed by the petitioner and other relevant documents. The question whether the order reflects due application of mind on the part of the competent authority as regards the live link, is a question of fact to be ascertained having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

Before delving into the question aforesaid, we find it appropriate to refer to the decision in Stalin C.V. v. State of Kerala and Others, 2011 (1) KHC 852, wherein a Division Bench of this court had occasion to consider the delay on the part of the competent authority in initiating proceedings under Section 15 of the Act and its impact on the live link required for the purpose of initiating action, in comparison with the delay in initiating proceedings for detention under Section 3 of the Act. Paragraph 12, and the relevant portion of paragraph 13 of the judgment read thus:

“12. The next question which we must consider is the effect of the last crime which was considered by the Officer being allegedly committed on 23/03/2010, but the order of restriction under S.15 being passed on 25/09/2010. We must, first of all, remind ourselves that we are not dealing with an order of detention. An order of detention under S.3 is a grave deprivation of the personal liberty of the person detained. An order under S.15 also visits the person concerned with an incursion into his personal liberty within the meaning of Art.21. This is for the reason that every citizen has a right to travel in any part of India, subject to any law which may provide otherwise. In fact, as held in Smt. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another, 1978 KHC 477 : AIR 1978 SC 597 : 1978 (1) SCC 248 : 1978 (2) SCR 621, the right to travel abroad itself was treated as part of Art.21 of the Constitution. Proceeding on the basis, therefore, that the order under S.15 of the Act also visits the person with the lesser deprivation of liberty in comparison with S.3, we must consider whether the principle of delay in passing an order of detention in relation to the last crime allegedly committed results in snapping of the link is as such applicable in the case of an order of restriction under S.15 and also whether, in the facts, much store can be laid by the petitioner based on the said principle.

xxxxxxx Therefore, the proceedings was commenced in June, 2010 itself. Unlike an order of detention under Section 3, in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15, it is mandatory that the principles of natural justice be observed. In other words, it is necessary that the Officer must issue a show cause notice and afford an opportunity of being heard. Necessarily, this consumes time. Therefore, the nature of the proceedings under Section 3 and Section 15 are inherently different. Still further more, we must also remind ourselves that in Section 15, as pointed out by the learned Senior Government Pleader, the Authority can act in a matter where the known goonda or known rowdy is indulging or about to indulge or is likely to indulge in anti-social activities and it is to prevent the concerned person from so acting in any place within his jurisdiction that an order could be passed. This language is to be contrasted with the phraseology in Section 3 where it is provided as follows:

“3. Power to make orders for detaining Known Goondas and Known Rowdies.- (1) The Government or an Officer authorised under sub-section (2), may, if satisfied on information received from a Police Officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police with regard to the activities of any Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, that with a view to prevent such person from committing any anti-social activity within the State of Kerala in any manner, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.”

Thus, in the case of Section 3(1) of the Act, there is an indication that the legislature intended a sense of immediacy and, therefore, a proximate nexus between the act or acts and the order of detention is inevitable. We must reiterate that Section 15, apart from allowing the Officer to delve into the past, it permits him to hypothesise about what the known goonda or known rowdy, is likely to do in the immediate future, having regard to the use of the words “about to indulge”. What is more, it also permits the Officer to glean out the likelihood of such a person indulging in anti-social activities. We must also immediately remind ourselves that certainly in comparison to the order of detention, an order of restriction under Section 15, is lighter in its impact on the personal liberty of the person concerned. In fact, the learned Senior Government Pleader would point out that it is almost like the conditions attached to bail granted by the Courts. We are not, for a moment, saying that if the act/acts which are complained of have completely lost their relevance by the passage of time, giving rise to a total absence of any nexus, still an order of restriction can be passed under Section 15. But, we do not think, in the facts of this case, that it is a case of the said nature. Accordingly, we repel the said contention.”

As evident from the extracted passages of the judgment, the question considered by this Court in the said case was whether the principle of delay snapping the live link with reference to the involvement of the person concerned in the last prejudicial activity, for passing the order of detention, would apply as such in the case of an order of restriction under Section 15 of the Act. Although this Court observed that an order of restriction cannot be passed under Section 15 of the Act if the act/acts which are complained of have completely lost their relevance by the passage of time, giving rise to a total absence of any nexus, it was held that an order of restriction under Section 15 is lighter in its impact on the personal liberty of the person concerned and that its effect is only in the nature of a condition attached to a bail order. When we examine the facts of the case on hand, in the light of the ratio in Stalin C.V., (supra), we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order on the ground of delay, for the passage of time in the case on hand does not give rise to total absence of any nexus. The conduct on the part of the petitioner in getting himself involved in another prejudicial activity immediately after serving the impugned order fortifies the subjective satisfaction rendered by the competent authority in this regard.

The writ petition(Crl), in the circumstances, is devoid of merits and the same is, accordingly, dismissed.