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Judgment
IN this revision petition there is challenge to order dated 25.1.2012 passed by State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana (for short, State Commission ''). Alongwith present petition, an application seeking condonation of delay has also been filed. However, in the entire application no period of delay has been mentioned for which condonation has been sought.
BRIEF facts are that respondent no.1/complainant filed a complaint under Section 21(b) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (or short Act '') against the Petitioners/O.Ps 1&2 on the averment that he is engaged in the business of transportation and his services were hired by the petitioners, vide agreement dated 25.4.2003. In pursuance to the said agreement, respondent deposited a sum of Rs.50,000/- as security amount with petitioner no.1 which was refundable only after completion of the agreement dated 25.4.2003. Respondent did his work efficienty and there was no complaint regarding his work. Thereafter, when petitioners did not extend the agreement for another year, respondent refused to do the work on the agreement which has already expired. However, petitioners forfeited the security amount of Rs.50,000/- of the respondent. Accordingly, respondent filed a complaint before District Forum. Petitioners contested the complaint alleging that agreement was extended upto 31.3.2005 as requested by the respondent. However, respondent failed to work after June, 2004.
DISTRICT Forum, vide its order dated 15.10.2007, allowed the complaint and directed the petitioners to refund the security amount of Rs.50,000/- alongwith 12% interest from 1.7.2004 till realization and also awarded Rs.3,300/- as cost of litigation.
AGGRIEVED by the order of District Forum, petitioners filed appeal before the State Commission. Vide impugned order, appeal of the petitioner was dismissed in default for want of prosecution. Hence, this revision.
I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and gone through the record.
AS observed above, no period of delay has been mentioned in the application. However, as per Office report, there is delay of 118 days in filing of the present revision petition. Grounds on which condonation of delay has been sought as mentioned in the application are reproduced as under; "(i) That on 25.01.2012, the said appeal was dismissed in default owing to non appearance of the petitioner and its counsel, as a matter of fact, the counsel who was appearing on behalf of the appellant appeared on the date i.e. 24.01.2012 fixed before the ld. State Commission, since nobody was present on behalf of the respondent, the matter got adjourned for 23.08.2012. (ii) That in the second week of August 2012, the counsel for the petitioner received telephonic information from the petitioner that the appeal was dismissed in default on 25.01.2012 by the ld. State Commission and consequently has filed an execution petition before DCDRF, Yamuna Nagar. (iii) That though the counsel for the petitioner appeared on 24.01.2012 and the next date of hearing was fixed for 23.08.2012 and the ld. State Commission, without any intimation to the petitioner preponded the date of hearing for 25.01.2012 and dismissed the petitioner ''s appeal in default, owing to non appearance of the petitioner or his counsel. Thus, the delay is neither intentional nor deliberate. After re-opening of the summer vacation, the counsel for the appellant filed the first appeal with a delay of ______ days before the Hon;ble National Commission, New Delhi. "
AS per above averments, counsel for the petitioners has appeared before the State Commission on 24.1.2012 and none was present on behalf of the respondent and the matter was adjourned to 23.8.2012. These averments made in the application as well as in the grounds of revision are patently false and against the record.
APPEAL of the petitioners pending before the State Commission was dismissed, vide impugned order dated 25.1.2012 which reads as under; "Present: None for the appellant Mr. D.C. Kumar, proxy Adv. for Mr. Rohit Goswami, Adv. for the respondent Case called several times since morning but none has put in appearance on behalf of the appellant. It is already 12.50 PM. Waited sufficiently. Further wait is not justified. Hence, the present appeal is dismissed in default for want of prosecution. 25.01.2012 Sd/- Diwan Singh Chauhan Member "
There is nothing on record to show the matter was ever listed before the State Commission on 24.1.2012. Assuming for the sake of arguments that the matter was listed on 24.1.2012 and as per petitioners '' case, next date of hearing was given as 23.8.2012, then I fail to understand as to what prevented the petitioners from placing on record, the certified copy of the proceedings dated 24.1.2012 of the State Commission. The grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay are absolutely false, frivolous and bogus and that is why petitioners have not mentioned the period of delay in their application of which condonation is being sought.
IT is well settled that "sufficient cause " for condoning the delay in each case is a question of fact.
IN Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, it has been observed; "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. "
Similarly, in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Kailash Devi and Ors., AIR 1994 P and H 45, it has been laid down that; "There is no denying the fact that the expression sufficient cause should normally be construed liberally so as to advance substantial justice but that would be in a case where no negligence or inaction or want of bona fide is imputable to the applicant. The discretion to condone the delay is to be exercised judicially i.e. one of is not to be swayed by sympathy or benevolence. "
IN R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)=I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed: "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition. "
FURTHER , Hon ''ble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation, reported in I (2010) CLT 333 (SC)=II (2010) SLT 205=(2010) 5 SCC 459 as under; "We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate - Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987)2 SCC 107, N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and 10 Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 ".
Apex Court in Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has observed ; "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras ".
RECENTLY , Hon ''ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. and Anr., I (2012) CLT 338 (SC)=II (2012) SLT 312=(2012) 3 SCC 563 has held; "24. After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under; "29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. 30. Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts'' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the landlosers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the landlosers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the landlosers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest. "
The Court further observed; "27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us. 28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government. 29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. 30. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. 31. In view of our conclusion on Issue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of Issues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case. 32. In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs ".
OBSERVATIONS made by Apex Court in the authoritative pronouncements discussed above are fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides is imputable to the petitioners. Accordingly, no sufficient grounds are made out for condoning the long delay of 118 days in filing the present revision petition. The application for condonation of delay under these circumstances is not maintainable and present revision petition being barred by limitation is hereby dismissed with cost of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only).
PETITIONERS are directed to deposit the cost by way of demand draft in the name of ''Consumer Legal Aid Account '', within four weeks from today, failing which, petitioners are liable to pay interest @ 9% per annum till realization.
PENDING applications, if any stand disposed of. List on 7.12.2012 for compliance. Revision Petition dismissed.