KRISHAN vs ESTATE OFFICER HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

PETITIONER /Complainant being aggrieved by order dated 5.4.2011 passed by State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Haryana, Panchkula (for short, ''State Commission '') in First Appeal No.2403 of 2005, has filed the present revision petition under Section 21(b) of Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (for short ''Act ''). Alongwith it, an application seeking condonation of delay of 310 days has also been filed.

PETITIONER had filed a consumer complaint against the Respondent/Opposite Party on the allegation that Plot No.875 Sector -46 Urban Estate Faridabad was originally allotted to Sh. Anil Kumar Daver, vide allotment letter dated 10.5.1990. Said Anil Kumar sold the plot in question to Harinder Singh on 24.4.2004. The petitioner has purchased the said plot from Harinder Singh, vide re -allotment letter No.14882 dated 19.4.2005. As per version of the petitioner, he had deposited the entire amount as demanded by respondent but the respondent failed to deliver the physical possession of the plot in question. It is further the grievance of the petitioner that the basic amenities in the area were not completed. The petitioner approached the respondent to deliver him physical possession and to develop the area, but respondent did not pay any heed to his request. Thus, alleging deficiency of service and unfair trade practice, petitioner filed a consumer complaint. District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Faridabad (for short, ''District Forum ''), vide order dated 13.9.2005 allowed the complaint of the petitioner and directed the Respondent to allot an alternative plot in the same sector in lieu of originally allotted plot on the similar price and not charge any kind of interest, penalty etc. It further directed the respondent to pay Rs.1,00,000/ - to the petitioner on account of escalation of the construction price and also to pay Rs.20,000/ - on account of mental agony and Rs.2,000/ - as litigation expenses.

AGGRIEVED by the order of District Forum, respondent filed appeal before the State Commission which was dismissed vide the impugned order.

HENCE , this revision. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record.

THE main grounds on which condonation of delay have been sought are reproduced as under; ''''2. That the delay of 310 days has occurred in filing the revision petition and delay has occurred due non service of the notice because the address of the petitioner was changed and the intimation was duly given to the respondent vide application no.4318 dated 11.3.2008. It was not in the knowledge of the petitioner that if there was any appeal was filed by the respondent. The order of the case was also not received to petitioner as it was not sent at proper and new address. It was only brought to the knowledge of the petitioner at the time when application for transfer of the plot/decree was filed. Then petitioner applied for the copy of the order and which was received on 24.4.2012. Thus due to aforesaid reason matter could not be filed within limitation. 3. That, therefore, the delay in filing is not deliberate or intentional and the delay is bonafide and genuine. The petitioner case is likely to succeed on merits.

IT is an admitted fact that petitioner was ex parte before the State Commission and that is why petitioner has taken a plea to the effect in its application for condonation of delay that he was not in the knowledge of the fact that any appeal was filed by the respondent before the State Commission nor the order passed by the State Commission was received by the petitioner as it was not sent at proper and new address. Further, it is the case of the petitioner that it was only brought to his knowledge, at the time when application for transfer of plot/decree was filed. In the entire application, petitioner has nowhere stated the date on which he got the knowledge of passing of the impugned order. Further, petitioner has nowhere mentioned the date on which he filed application for transfer of the plot. The other plea taken by petitioner is, that he applied for the copy of order of State Commission which was received by him only on 24.4.2012.

THE impugned order was passed by the State Commission on 5.4.2011. On the certified copy of the same, there is an endorsement that; ''''Certified copy of the order supplied free of cost to the parties/counsel on 3.5.2011. ''''

THUS , it is apparent from the record that free copy of the impugned order had been supplied to the petitioner, as early as on 3.5.2011. However, the certified copy of the order filed alongwith present petition, was issued only on 24.4.2012. It goes on to show that it is the second copy of the order which was obtained by the petitioner.

THEREFORE , it stand established from the record, that petitioner had received the free copy of order, as early as on 3.5.2011. Under these circumstances, the limitation period shall start from that date only. Under these circumstances, the revision petition filed before this Commission is hopelessly barred by limitation.

IT is well settled that ''sufficient cause '' with regard to condonation of delay in each case, is a question of fact. In Ram Lal and others Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed; ''''It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S.5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. ''''

IN R.B. Ramlingam Vs. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, 2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed; ''''We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the special appeal leave petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal /petition ''''.

HON ''ble Supreme Court after exhaustively considering the case law on the aspect of condonation of delay observed in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Ltd. Vs. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation reported in (2010) 5 SCC 459 as under; ''''We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. '''' Now, Apex Courtin AnshulAggarwal Vs. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC) has observed ; ''''It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the consumer foras ''''.

THE observations made by Apex Court in the authoritative pronouncements discussed above are fully attracted to the facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, gross negligence, deliberate inaction and lack of bonafides is imputable to the petitioner. Accordingly, no sufficient ground is made out for condoning the long delay of 310 days. Application for condonation of delay is therefore not maintainable.

EVEN on merits, the State Commission has rightly held that ''''a re -allottee cannot be treated as ''''Consumer '''' and therefore cannot take the plea that the area was not developed. '''' We find no reason to disagree with the reasoning given by the State Commission. There is no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order passed by State Commission. Accordingly, present revision petition being barred by limitation as well as on merit, stand dismissed with cost of Rs.5,000/ - (Rupees Five Thousand only) to be deposited in the name of ''Consumer Legal Aid Account '' of this Commission, within four weeks.

IN case, petitioner fails to deposit the cost within the prescribed period, he shall be liable to pay interest @ 9% p.a., till realization.

LIST on 11.4.2014 for compliance.