HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs Bhawnesh Kumar Taneja

BY way of revision petition there is challenge to order dated 23.10.2006, passed by State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. Chandigarh (for short State Commission'') vide which appeal of the petitioner was dismissed.

ALONG with present revision petition, an application for condonation of delay has also been filed.

BRIEF facts are that respondent filed a complaint before District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Jhajjar, Haryana (for short as " District Forum'' ) on the grounds that he was allotted a residential plot No. 546, measuring 250 sq. yds., Urban Estate, Bahadurgarh at a price of Rs. 46.05. 25% amount of the price of the plot was payable initially, while the balance amount was to be paid in six annually instalments with interest @ 10% p.a.

RESPONDENT accepted the offer and paid a sum of Rs. 2,878.15 vide bank draft dated 22.9.1981 to the petitioner. Since, development work on the site was in process as such plot was not fully developed. Accordingly, possession of the same was not given to the respondent. Respondent wrote many letters to the petitioner to deliver the possession but there was no response from the petitioner. It is further stated that petitioner did not deliver the possession or allotment letter due to stay granted by the Hon''ble Supreme Court of India, though respondent was not a party in those proceedings.

PETITIONER defence is that since respondent has not deposited the payment as per schedule nor has paid interest, petitioner rightly refused to give possession of the allotted plot to the respondent.

DISTRICT Forum, vide order dated 11.7.1999 allowed the complaint of the respondent and directed the petitioner to issue the allotment letter and give possession of the same plot, situated in Sector-6. Bahadurgarh @ Rs. 125 per sq. yd.

FEELING aggrieved by the order of District Forum, petitioner filed an appeal before State Commission. Vide impugned order, State Commission dismissed the appeal of petitioner. This is how the matter has reached before this Commission.

EARLIER, vide order dated 22.10.2007, revision petition was dismissed by this Commission on the ground of non-filing of copies of complaint, etc., despite opportunities being given to the petitioner to file the same.

AGAINST that order, petitioner filed SLP (C) 28620 of 2008 which was permitted to be withdrawn by giving liberty to the petitioner to file review application.

REVIEW application filed by petitioner was allowed, vide order dated 9.11.2009 passed by this Commission.

IT is contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that only an offer was made to the respondent but plot was never allotted to him. Hence, question of giving possession does not arise since, respondent was not the allottee of the plot in question.

ON the other hand, it is contended by learned Counsel for the respondent that petitioner was allotted the plot in question by the respondent and that is why petitioner asked him to deposit the money, which the respondent deposited. There is no illegality and infirmity in the impugned order. Moreover, there is delay of 740 days in filing of this revision petition and on account of delay also, present revision petition is liable to be dismissed.

APPARENTLY, there is delay in filing of the revision petition and petitioner has also filed an application seeking condonation of delay.

TAKING up the application of condonation of delay, the grounds mentioned in this application are that, petitioner is a Government entity and there are several departments engaged in contesting the case in coordination with the legal department. It took time to seek approval of competent authority for filing this revision petition. Due to these circumstances, delay should be condoned.

IN the entire application, it is nowhere stated as to when petitioner has received the copy of impugned order and which departments were engaged in contesting this case. Nor it has been explained in which department the delay occurred. Application for condonation of delay is absolutely vague on these aspects. It does not lead us anywhere.

IN Ram Lal and Ors. v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361, it has been observed: "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application of condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

SINCE, no sufficient cause has been mentioned in the application for condonation of delay nor the same has been explained in proper perspective, we find no reason to condone the delay. On this short ground alone, the petition is liable to be dismissed.

NOW coming to the merits of the case, District Forum vide its order has observed: "We are of the opinion that the allotment letter was not issued due to the stay granted by the Supreme Court of India and the complainant was not the party to that appeal and the complainant has demanded the allotment letter and possession of the plot, the complainant has come to the Forum with clean hand. Since the appeal stands disposed of by the Supreme Court of India and respondent should have delivered the possession to the complainant of the same plot which is situated in Sector-6, Bahadurgarh. After consideration of the fact of the case, we hereby allow the complaint and order the respondent to issue the allotment letter and possession of the same plot which is situated in Sector 6, Bahadurgarh at the rate of Rs. 125 per sq. yd. within one month from the dale decision".

STATE Commission while upholding the findings of District Forum, has held: "4. A perusal of letter Annexure-P-I shows that plot bearing No. 546 measuring 250 sq. yards situated in Sector 6, Urban Estate, Bahadurgharh was allotted to the complainant vide memo No. 2145 dated 17.9.1981 at a price of Rs. 46.05 per square yard(wrongly printed as Rs. 460.05 per square yard in C2). 25% amount i.e. Rs. 2,878.15 were to be deposited immediately while balance amount was to be paid in six annual instalments with interest @ 10%. 5. After going through the evidence, District Consumer Forum vide order dated 11.7.1999 directed the appellant and Estate Officer to allot plot to the complainant at a price of Rs. 125 per square yard situated in Sector 6, in Bahadurgarh within one month from the date of decision. The price at which the plot was originally allotted is Rs. 46.05P per square yard. This price has also been mentioned in para-2 of the complaint. Our view is further strengthened from the copy of the order passed by Haryana State Commission in first appeal No. 1172 of 2000 decided on 3.10.2000 titled as Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Shobha Kathuria daughter of Sh. A. C. Kathuiia, which also relates to residential plot No. 294 situated in Sector-6, Urban Estate, Bahadurgarh and was allotted at the tentative price of Rs. 46.05 per square yard. In the said appeal, Haryana State Commission had ultimately dismissed the appeal in limine by holding that Hon''ble Supreme Court on 6.12.1995 had issued directions to HUDA to develop the sector fully within a period of six months and further Hon''ble Supreme Court exonerated the allottees from the liability to pay any interest whatsoever. Thus, it was held that District Consumer Forum had committed no error in directing HUDA to issue allotment letter and possession at the rate of Rs. 125 per square yard. In the present case also, District Forum had directed the appellant to issue allotment letter @ Rs. 125 per square yard. 6. There is another authority of Hon''ble High Court of Punjab and Haryana on the file which shows that one Dhian Singh filed CWP No. 4353 of 1996 against State of Haryana etc. including HUDA and vide order dated 19 9.1996 it was observed by the Division Bench that Chief Administrator had decided to allot measuring 250 sq. yards in Sector-1, Bahadurgarh at a price of Rs. 125 per square yard. Therefore, the plot had been rightly allotted at a price of Rs. 125 per square yard. Consequently, there is no force in the appeal and the same is dismissed."

WE find no reason to disagree with the concurrent findings of the Fora below. Admittedly, respondent was allotted the plot in question by the petitioner and in pursuance thereof, respondent has deposited 25% amount of the price of the plot. Under these circumstances, "there was no occasion for petitioner '' not to allot the plot in question to the respondent.

PRESENT revision petition has been filed under Section. 21(b) of the Consumer Protection Act, 1956.(for short ''Act")

IT is well settled that the powers of this Commission as a Revisional Court are very limited and have to be exercised only, if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error in the impugned order.

RECENTLY, Hon''ble Supreme Court in Mrs. Rubi (Chandra) Dutta v. M/s. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., II (2011) CPJ 19 (SC)=IV (2011) SLT 303=2011 (3) Scale 654, has observed: "Also, it is to be noted that the revisional powers of the National Commission are derived from Section 21(b) of the Act, under which the said power can be exercised only if there is some prima facie jurisdictional error appearing in the impugned order, and only then, may the same be set aside. In our considered opinion there was no jurisdictional error or miscarriage of justice, which could have warranted the National Commission to have taken a different view than what was taken by the two Forums. The decision of the National Commission rests not on the basis of some legal principle that was ignored by the Courts below, but on a different (and in our opinion, an erroneous) interpretation of the same set of facts. This is not the manner in which revisional powers should be invoked. In this view of the matter, we are of the considered opinion that the jurisdiction, conferred on the National Commission under Section 21(b) of the Act has been transgressed. It was not a case where such a view could have been taken by setting aside the concurrent findings of two Fora."

EVEN after getting two adverse findings, petitioner has chosen not to settle the claim, but has dragged the respondent/complainant to this highest Fora under the Act.

IN the present petition, no jurisdictional or legal error has been shown to us to call for interference in the exercise of power under Section 21(b) of the Act. since, two Fora below have given cogent reasons in their order, which does not call for any interference nor they suffer from any infirmity or revisional exercise of jurisdiction.

IT is not that every order passed by fora below is to be challenged by a litigant even when the same are based on sound reasoning.

IT is a well-known fact that Courts across the country are saddled with large number of cases. Public Sector Undertaking indulgences further burden them. Time and again, Courts have been expressing their displeasure at the Government/Public sector Undertakings compulsive litigation habit but a solution to this alarming trend is distant dream. The judiciary is now imposing costs upon Government/Public Sector Undertaking not only when it pursues cases which can be avoided but also when it forces the public to do so.

PUBLIC Sector Undertakings spent more money on contesting cases than the amount they might have to pay to the claimant. In addition thereto, precious time, effort and other resources go down the drain in vain. Public Sector Undertaking are possibly an apt example of being penny wise, pound-foolish. Rise in frivolous litigation is also due to the fact that Public Sector Undertakings though having large number of legal personnel under their employment, do not examine the cases properly and force poor litigants to approach the Court.

THE Apex Court in Bikaner Urban Improvement Trust v. Mohal Lal, I (2010) CPJ 1 (SC)=2010 CTJ 121 (SC) (CP), has made significant observations which have material bearing, namely- "4. It is a matter of concern that such frivolous and unjust litigation by Governments and statutory authorities are on the increase, Statutory Authorities exist to discharge statutory functions in public interest. They should be responsible litigants. They cannot raise frivolous and unjust objections, nor act in a callous and highhanded manner. They cannot behave like some private litigants with profiteering motives. Nor can they resort to unjust enrichment. They are expected to show remorse or regret when their officers act negligently or in an overbearing manner. When glaring wrong acts by their officers, is brought to their notice, for which there is no explanation or excuse, the least that is expected is restitution/restoration to the extent possible with appropriate compensation. Their harsh attitude in regard to genuine grievances of the public and their indulgence in unwarranted litigation requires to the corrected. 5. This Court has repeatedly expressed the view that the Governments and statutory authorities should be model for ideal litigants and should not put forth false, frivolous, vexatious, technical (but unjust) contentions to obstruct the path of justice. We may refer to some of the decisions in this behalf. 5.1 In Dilbagh Rai Jarry v. Unicr. of India, 1973 (3) SCC 554, where this Court extracted with approval, the following statement (from an earlier decision of the Kerala High Court.): "The State, under our Constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But it must be remembered that the State is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or crook; for the State''s interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such a opportunity. The State is a virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak. Government shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations, which move private parties to fight in Court. The lay-out on litigation costs and execution time by the State and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic showdowns where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceedings on just terms, giving the legal mentors of Government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on State litigation evolved at a Conference of Law Ministers of India way back in 1957". 5.2 In Madras Port Trust v. Humanshu International by its Proprietor V. Venkatadri (Dead) by L.Rs., ( 1979) 4 SCC 176, held: ''2. It is high time that Governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a Government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the Court has to decide it and if the plea is well founded, it has to be upheld by the Court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a Government or a public authority, unless of course the claim is not well founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable.'' 5.3 In a three-Judge Bench judgment of Bhag Singh and Ors. v. Union Territory of Chandigarh through LAC Chandigarh, (1985) 3 SCC 737, the Court held: "3. The State Government must do what is fair and just to the citizen and should not. as far as possible, except in cases where tax or revenue is received or recovered without protest or where the State Government would otherwise be irretrievably be prejudiced, take up a technical plea to defeat the legitimate and just claim of the citizen. "6. Unwarranted litigation by Governments and statutory authorities basically stem from the two general baseless assumptions by their officers. They are: (i) All claims against the Government /statutory authorities should be viewed as illegal and should be resisted and fought up to the highest Court of the land. (ii) It taking a decision on an issue could be avoided, then it is prudent not to decide the issue and let the aggrieved party approach the Court and secure a decision. The reluctance to take decisions, or tendency to challenge all orders against them, is not the policy of the Governments or statutory authorities, but is attributable to some officers who are responsible for taking decisions and/or officer-in-charge of litigation. Their reluctance arises from an instinctive tendency to protect themselves against any future accusations of wrong decision making, or worse of improper motives for any decision-making. Unless their insecurity and fear is addressed, officers will continue to pass on the responsibility of decision making to Courts and Tribunals. The Central Government is now attempting to deal with this issue by formulating realistic and practical norms for defending cases filed against the Government and for filing appeals and revisions against adverse decisions, thereby, eliminating unnecessary litigation. But. it is not sufficient if the Central Government alone undertakes such an exercise. The State Governments and the statutory authorities, who have more litigations than the Central Government, should also make genuine efforts to eliminate unnecessary litigation. Vexatious and unnecessary litigations have been clogging the wheels of justice, for too long making it difficult for Courts and Tribunals to provide easy and speedy access to justice to bona fide and needy litigants. 7. In this case, what is granted by the State Commission is the minimum relief in the facts and circumstances, that is to direct allotment of an alternative plot with a nominal compensation of Rs. 5,000. But instead of remedying the wrong, by complying with the decision of the Consumer Fora, the Improvement Trust is trying to brazen out its illegal act by contending that the allottee should have protested when it illegally laid the road in his plot. It has persisted with its unreasonable and unjust stand by indulging in unnecessary litigation by approaching the National Commission and then this Court. The Trust should sensitize its officers to serve the public rather than justify their dictatorial acts. It should avoid such an unnecessary litigation''.

IN Ravinder Kaur v. Ashok Kumar, VI (2003) SLT 505=AIR 2004 SC 904, Apex Court observed: "Courts of law should be careful enough to see through such diabolical plans of the judgment debtor to deny the decree holders the fruits of the decree obtained by them. These type of errors on the part of the Judicial Forum only encourage frivolous and cantankerous litigations causing law''s delay and bringing bad name to the judicial system."

SINCE two Fora below have given detailed and reasoned order which does not call for any interference nor they suffer from any infirmity or erroneous exercise of jurisdiction, the present petition is hereby, dismissed with cost of Rs. 50,000 (Rs. fifty thousand only). Out of this Rs. 25,000 shall be deposited in '' Consumer Legal Aid Account'' and the balance amount of Rs. 25,000 of cost be paid to the respondent.

PETITIONER is directed to deposit the cost by way of cross-cheques, one in the name of ''Consumer Legal Aid Account'' and other in the name of the respondent, within four weeks from today.

MEANWHILE, petitioner shall recover the cost amount from the salaries of the delinquent officers who have been pursuing this meritless and frivolous litigation, with the sole aim of wasting the public exchequer. The affidavit giving the details of the officers from whose salaries the cost has been recovered, be also filed within four weeks.

HOWEVER, the cheque for the sum of Rs. 25,000 in the name of respondent, shall be paid to him only after the expiry of the period of appeal or revision preferred, if any.

LIST for compliance on 30.9.2011 Revision Petition dismissed.