PUSHPA DEVI , S.C. Kumar vs HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY , Chief Administrator

SHRI S. C. Kumar son of Shiv Lal, petitioner No. 2 was the original allottee of plot No. 1961 Sector 2, Faridabad vide draw of lots on 28.12.1999 under the Government Employees Quota. Thereafter, Shri S. C. Kumar sought transfer permission and the plot was re-allotted to Smt. Pushpa Devi, petitioner No. 1. The terms and conditions of the original allotment letter were binding upon Smt. Pushpa Devi. Thereafter, Smt. Pushpa Devi approached Haryana Urban Development Authority to put her in possession of the said premises with full development and further requested Haryana Urban Development Authority to allot her an alternative plot in case they were not going to deliver the possession of the above said plot.

ULTIMATELY, the complaint was filed with the District Forum with the prayer that HUDA be directed to handover the physical possession with full developed surrounding area of the plot and if it is not possible then an alternative plot may be allotted in favour of Pushpa Devi and HUDA be further directed to pay interest @18% p.a. on their deposit and Rs. 1 lakh to the escalation charges and Rs.50,000/- for mental agony, tension and unnecessary harassment and HUDA be directed to not recover any interest on delayed payment or charge any penalty or extension fees and to pay Rs.5500/- as litigation charges. The District Forum allowed the complaint.

IT appears that HUDA issued a letter to Smt. Pushpa Devi demanding enhanced compensation of Rs.54,078/- towards the cost of the plot in question. The grievance of the complainant Smt. Pushpa Devi is that offer of possession without completing the development including providing basic amenities in the area, is contrary to the terms and conditions of the allotment. HUDA issued a letter dated 26.11.2007 to Smt. Pushpa Devi, offering to take possession of the plot. Smt. Pushpa Devi submitted the Conveyance Deed on non-judicial stamp papers for execution of deed of conveyance. On 27.12.2007, the conveyance deed was executed in favour of Smt. Pushpa Devi. On 7.12.2011, HUDA also demanded a sum of Rs.1,17,432/- plus extension fee of Rs.50,986/-.

AGGRIEVED by that order, HUDA filed an appeal before the State Commission. The appeal was delayed by 101 days but the same was condoned. However, the appeal of HUDA was dismissed on the basis of Hon''ble Supreme Court order reported in Haryana Urban Development Authority vs. Raje Ram I(2009) CPJ 56 wherein it was held as under:- "7.Respondents in the three appeals are not the original allottees. They are re-allottees to whom re-allotment was made by the appellant in the years 1994, 1997, and 1996 respectively. They were aware, when the plots were re-allotted to them, that there was delay (either in forming the layout itself or delay in delivering the allotted plot on accountof encroachment, etc.) In spite of it, they took re-allotment. Their cases cannot be compared to cases of original allottees who were made to wait for a decade or more for delivery and thus put to mental agony and harassment. They were aware that time for performance was not stipulated as the essence of the contract and the original allottes had accepted the delay. The appellant offered possession to respondents (re-allottees) and they took possession of the respective plots on 27.6.2002, 21.3.2000, and 13.9.1999 respectively. They approached the District Forum in 1997, within a short period from the dates of re-allotment in their favour. They had not paid the full price when they approached the District Forum. In the circumstances, having regard to the principles laid down by this Court in Ghaziabad Development Authority v. Balbir Singh, II (2004) SPJ12(SC)=III(2004) SLT 161=2004(5) SCC 65, Darsh Kumar (supra) and Bangalore Development Authority v. Syndicate Bank, I(2008) SLT=II(2007)CPJ 17(SC)=2007(6) SCC 711, we are of the view that the award of interest was neither warranted nor justified."

All these facts are squarely covered by Haryana Urban Development Authority vs. Raje Ram (supra).

THERE is delay of 127 days in filing this revision petition. The following averments were made. The petitioner-Smt. Pushpa Devi did not maintain good health and was continuously ill. However no medical certificate was produced on record. In the meantime, Shiv Kumar had gone out of station to sort out some urgent family problems but those family problems find no place in the application. Till December 2011, the petitioner did not get the certified copy of the impugned order though their counsel had informed them that the appeal had been allowed by the State Commission. Mother of Smt. Pushpa Devi died in December, 2011. In January, 2012, she personally visited the advocate. She got the certified copy on 6.1.2012. Her counsel advised her to file a revision petition. Copy of the relevant documents were made available to the counsel on 31.1.2012. It was also pointed out that appeal filed by HUDA before the State Commission was delayed by 101 days and the State Commission condoned the day.

THE grounds set up by the petitioner are not at all satisfactory. The delay of 101 days was condoned by the State Commission. Even then there was 127 days delay in filing this revision petition. A lame explanation which was not supported by cogent, convincing and plausible evidence was presented before this fora. After the delay was condoned by the State Commission the alarm bells should have rung but the petitioner was neither vigilant nor diligent. Her case on merits was also not strong. Under the circumstances, the delay cannot be condoned.

IN Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras".

IN Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

IN Sow Kamalabai, W/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal Vs. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare, 2007 (1) Mh. LJ 807, it was held that the expression ''sufficient cause'' cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such ''sufficient cause'' stated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for.

A bare look at Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act, makes it plain that the material part of the language of proviso appended to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act is in pari materia therewith. Therefore, it would seem settled beyond caisil; that it is incumbent on the appellant to explain each day of default beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation. (State of West Bengal v. Brojesh Chandra Singha Barman, 2005(3) CHN 19 at p.24).

THE case of the petitioner is clear that respondent wants that an amount be paid to it and complainant can get possession of the plot. There lies no rub. She is the second allottee and she cannot change the factual position.

THE revision petition is meritless and therefore, the same is dismissed.