HARYANA URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs SURINDER PAUL

THE present revision petition has been filed by Haryana Urban Development Authority ( hereinafter referred as ''HUDA ''). THEre is delay of 332 days. It is explained that the final order was passed by the State Commission on 30.6.2011. THEreafter, the petitioner got in touch with the relevant field officers in Ambala, to confirm from the spot, as to whether an IOC pipeline was passing underneath the respondent-complainant ''s plot. It is averred that petitioner being a government department, the case file had to pass through many channels before the approval could be granted before filing the present revision petition. It is pertinent to note that the petitioner does not mention the delay of how many days should be condoned. In para 7 of the application, the place where number was to be mentioned has been left blank. Learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated the above said submissions.

WE have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and gone through the record. Delay of 332 days does not constitute a sufficient ground. The petitioner has failed to explain day to day delay. It is surprising that the department is not interested in setting the system in order. The orders by the Commission, Hon ''ble High Court and Hon ''ble Supreme Court leave no impact upon the department. Nobody is ever held responsible for such an inordinate delay. The case is hopelessly barred by time. In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority, IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras ".

In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari, I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed that "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Appeal Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition ".

In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ''sufficient cause '' is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ''sufficient cause '' is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. " In Sow Kamalabai, W/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal Vs. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare, 2007 (1) Mh. LJ 807, it was held that "the expression ''sufficient cause '' cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such ''sufficient cause '' stated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for ".

AGAIN in Housing Board, Haryana, Vs. Dr. S.L. Chaudhary, (1991) 1, CPJ 140 at pp 142, 144 (Haryana SCDRC, Chandigarh) it was observed that Section 5, Limitation Act and proviso to Section 15, Consumer Protection Act is in pari material. A bare look at Sec.5 of the Limitation Act, makes it plain that the material part of the language of the proviso to Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act is in pari materia therewith. Therefore, it would seem settled beyond caisil; that it is incumbent on the appellant to explain each day of default beyond the terminus line of the prescribed period of limitation. In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh and Ors., (Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held: "The party should show that besides acting bona fide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005] "

The Hon ''ble Supreme Court in case Bikram Dass Vs. Financial Commissioner and others AIR 1977 Supreme Court 1221 has held that: "Section 5 of the Limitation Act is a hard task-master and judicial interpretation has encased it within a narrow compass. A large measure of case-law has grown around S.5, its highlights being that one ought not easily to take away a right which has accrued to a party by lapse of time and that therefore a litigant who is not vigilant about his rights must explain every days delay. "

IN another authority reported in Office of the Chief Post Master General and Ors. Vs. Living Media INdia Ltd. and Anr. 2012 STPL(Web) 132 (SC), Hon ''ble Supreme Court was pleased to hold: "13. IN our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few. Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay. Accordingly, the appeals are liable to be dismissed on the ground of delay. "

Recently, this Commission presided over by Hon ''ble Mr. Justice Ashok Bhan has dismissed the revision petition on the ground of delay and the delay of 104 days was not condoned, vide reference in case "Mahindra Holidays and Resorts India Ltd. Versus Vasantkumar H. Khandelwal and Anr. " [Revision petition No. 1848 of 2012 decided on 21.05.2012]. In view of the above discussion, the revision petition is dismissed as barred by time.