HUDA & ANR. vs SANDEEP KUMAR & ANR.

The present revision petition no. 1446 of 2010 has been filed against the judgment dated 31.07.2009 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula (''the State Commission'') in First Appeal no. 1016 of 2005.

Briefly stated facts relevant for the disposal of the present revision petition are that the complainants/ respondents Sandeep Singla and Satish Singla purchased the SCO Complex no. 42 at Old Judicial Complex, Gurgaon, in an open auction on 20.08.2001 with the condition to pay 75% of the payment in eight half yearly instalments. The respondents took the possession of the plot on 20.09.2001. The allegations of the respondents are that the petitioner/ opposite parties had not provided the basic facilities/ civil amenities like water and electricity at the SCO Complex. They therefore prayed that:

Appropriate orders directing the petitioners to make / refund the payment of interest charged by the petitioner on instalments paid with 18% interest and the interest on balance instalment / future payments be waived with a direction to the petitioner to provide the basic amenities like water, electricity and sewerage connection to the respondent immediately;

Appropriate orders directing the petitioners to pay the loss suffered by the respondents to the tune of Rs.50,000/- with up to date interest;

Rs.20,000/- for general damages, mental tension, harassment, agony and physical suffering; Award pendentlite and future interest;

Rs.5,500/- towards cost of this complaint; and

Any other relief which the District Forum deems fit and proper on the facts and circumstances of this complaint against the petitioner and in favour of the respondent.

The petitioner/ opposite party on notice filed their reply denying the allegations. They admitted that a six storey building no. 42, OJC Gurgaon was allotted by way of open auction to the respondent vide memo no. 1910 dated 20.09.2001. Occupation Certificate was issued on 15.09.2003 after completion of the building.

The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Gurgaon (''the District Forum'') vide its order dated 12.07.2004 had allowed the complaint and gave the following order: " We can only order that the interest paid by the complainant during the period facilities were not provided be adjusted in his account or to refund within one month along with interest 18% per annum over entire deposit from the date of respective deposits till the date of payments. The period of interest shall start from the date of respective deposit till the date of providing such facilities as required. HUDA cannot charge interest over the instalment during the period the area was not developed. No cost. Electricity supply be provided immediately ."

Aggrieved by the order of the District Forum, the petitioner filed an appeal before the State Commission. The appeal was filed with a delay of 283 days. The application for condonation of delay before the State Commission is not on record. The State Commission has observed as under: "There is a delay of 283 days in filing the present appeal. The condonation of which has been sought by the appellants - HUDA by moving an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is stated therein that the appellant - HUDA had filed the appeal on 12.07.2004 but the Registry had raised some objections which were required to be removed by thus, delay of 283 days in re-filing of the appeal has occurred which may kindly be condoned in the interest of justice and under the facts and circumstances of the case".

The State Commission dismissed their appeal on the ground of limitation.

Hence, the present revision petition.

The present revision has been filed with an application for condonation of delay. The said application does not mention the number of days to be condoned, however, as per the Registry, there is delay of 156 days. We have carefully gone through the application for condonation of delay. The reasons given for the delay in the application are as under: "The State Commission announced the order on 31.07.2009 and the copy of the order was issued on 20.08.2009. Copy of the order was received in the order of Estate Officer on 14.09.2009. After receiving the copy of the order the competent authority engaged Shri Parshant Sharma, Advocate vide letter dated 14.09.2009. Vide letter dated 23.11.2009 Shri Parshant Sharma informed that grounds of appeal and certified copy of the order passed by State Commission have not been received. The concerned Estate Officer vide letter dated 31.12.2009 made a request to the L R HUDA to supply the ground of appeal and certified copy so that the same could be handed over to the concerned advocate for filing the revision petition. The LR HUDA vide letter dated 09.02.2010 provided the certified copy of the order passed by the State Commission to the Estate Officer and after that the certified copy was handed over on 25.02.2010 to Shri Parshant Kumar Sharma, Advocate. Vide letter dated 09.03.2010 Shri Parshant Sharma, Advocate intimated that he does not want to defend the HUDA cases due to some personal reasons and accordingly, HUDA withdrawn the cases from Parshant Sharma and issued the new engagement letter no. 2595 dated. 16.03.2010 in favour of Shri R S Badhran, Advocate and made a request to Shri Parshant Sharma, Advocate to return the documents. After receiving the documents from Shri Parshant Sharma, the revision petition was prepared and after verification of the facts etc., from the concerned divisions, the Estate Officer decided to file the same through Shri R S Badhran, Advocate".

We have also heard the learned counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the petitioner has a good case on merits and the delays before the State Commission and in filing the revision petition were inadvertent due to administrative delays.

We are not convinced with the reasons given for the delay before the State Commission as also in filing the revision petition. The petitioner has failed to give any reasons for the day to day delay of 156 days and we also find no reasons to disagree with the order of the State Commission that there was "sufficient cause" to condone the delay of 283 days. This view is further supported by the following judgment: In Anshul Aggarwal v. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority , IV (2011) CPJ 63 (SC), it has been held that "It is also apposite to observe that while deciding an application filed in such cases for condonation of delay, the Court has to keep in mind that the special period of limitation has been prescribed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 for filing appeals and revisions in consumer matters and the object of expeditious adjudication of the consumer disputes will get defeated if this Court was to entertain highly belated petitions filed against the orders of the Consumer Foras".

In R.B. Ramlingam v. R.B. Bhavaneshwari , I (2009) CLT 188 (SC)= I (2009) SLT 701=2009 (2) Scale 108, it has been observed that "We hold that in each and every case the Court has to examine whether delay in filing the Special Appeal Leave Petitions stands properly explained. This is the basic test which needs to be applied. The true guide is whether the petitioner has acted with reasonable diligence in the prosecution of his appeal/petition".

In Ram Lal and Others v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd ., AIR 1962 Supreme Court 361, it has been observed that "It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by Section 5. If ''sufficient cause'' is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condonation has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If ''sufficient cause'' is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bonafides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the inquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant."

In Sow Kamalabai, W/o Narasaiyya Shrimal and Narsaiyya, S/o Sayanna Shrimal Vs. Ganpat Vithalroa Gavare , 2007 (1) Mh. LJ 807, it was held that "the expression ''sufficient cause'' cannot be erased from Section 5 of the Limitation Act by adopting excessive liberal approach which would defeat the very purpose of Section 5 of Limitation Act. There must be some cause which can be termed as a sufficient one for the purpose of delay condonation. I do not find any such ''sufficient cause'' stated in the application and no such interference in the impugned order is called for".

In Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors ., ( Civil Appeal no. 1166 of 2006 ), decided by the Apex Court on 08.07.2010 it was held:

"The party should show that besides acting bonafide, it had taken all possible steps within its power and control and had approached the Court without any unnecessary delay. The test is whether or not a cause is sufficient to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. [Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyar, 3rd Edition, 2005]".

Hon''ble Supreme Court in Post Master General and others vs. Living Media India Ltd. and another (2012) 3 Supreme Court Cases 563 has held ;

" After referring various earlier decisions, taking very lenient view in condoning the delay, particularly, on the part of the Government and Government Undertaking, this Court observed as under ;

" It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time-limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.

Public interest undoubtedly is a paramount consideration in exercising the courts'' discretion wherever conferred upon it by the relevant statutes. Pursuing stale claims and multiplicity of proceedings in no manner subserves public interest. Prompt and timely payment of compensation to the land losers facilitating their rehabilitation /resettlement is equally an integral part of public policy. Public interest demands that the State or the beneficiary of acquisition, as the case may be, should not be allowed to indulge in any act to unsettle the settled legal rights accrued in law by resorting to avoidable litigation unless the claimants are guilty of deriving benefit to which they are otherwise not entitled, in any fraudulent manner. One should not forget the basic fact that what is acquired is not the land but the livelihood of the land losers. These public interest parameters ought to be kept in mind by the courts while exercising the discretion dealing with the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Dragging the land losers to courts of law years after the termination of legal proceedings would not serve any public interest. Settled rights cannot be lightly interfered with by condoning inordinate delay without there being any proper explanation of such delay on the ground of involvement of public revenue. It serves no public interest."

The Court further observed;

" It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafide, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody including the Government.

In our view, it is the right time to inform all the government bodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they have reasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and there was bonafide effort, there is no need to accept the usual explanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red-tape in the process. The government departments are under a special obligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligence and commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception and should not be used as an anticipated benefit for government departments. The law shelters everyone under the same light and should not be swirled for the benefit of a few.

Considering the fact that there was no proper explanation offered by the Department for the delay except mentioning of various dates, according to us, the Department has miserably failed to give any acceptable and cogent reasons sufficient to condone such a huge delay.

In view of our conclusion on I ssue (a), there is no need to go into the merits of I ssues (b) and (c). The question of law raised is left open to be decided in an appropriate case.

In the light of the above discussion, the appeals fail and are dismissed on the ground of delay. No order as to costs ".

Accordingly, we find that there is no ''sufficient cause'' to condone the delay of 156 days in filing the present revision petition. The application for condonation of delay is without any merit as well as having no legal basis and is not maintainable. Consequently, the present revision petition being time barred by limitation is dismissed with no order as to cost.