High CourtsDivision Bench

H.V. Srinivas vs State of Karnataka

Karnataka High Court · Decided on 25 August 2014 · Citation: (2014) 6 KarLJ 292

HON’BLE JUDGES
N.K. Patil, J · B. Sreenivas Gowda, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 — Section 48A(1)
CASE NUMBER
Writ Appeal No. 6237 of 2013 (LR)
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Judgment

9 paragraphs · 1,055 words

N.K. Patil, J.—The appellant, questioning the correctness or otherwise of the order impugned passed by the learned Single Judge, in Writ Petition No. 28376 of 2013 (LR), dated 25th July, 2013, has presented this writ appeal. Along with the appeal, learned Counsel appearing for appellant has also filed I.A. No. 1 of 2014, seeking condonation of delay of 49 days in filing the appeal.

2.

The delay of 49 days in filing the appeal has been explained at paragraphs 1 and 2 of the affidavit filed in support of the application, I.A. No. 1 of 2014. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the said affidavit read thus:

"1. It is submitted that the being aggrieved by the order passed by the 2nd respondent dated 17-5-2013, the appellant had filed the writ petition before this Hon''ble Court in W.P. No. 28376 of 2013, this Hon''ble Court was pleased to dismiss the writ petition on 25-7-2013 on the ground that the appellant claims to have filed an application on 3-11-1998 beyond period of prescribed for filing of Form 7-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Rules, 1974 on or before 1-11-1978. The time extended for filing Form 7-A who have not filed Form 7 was 1-11-1998. Hence being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge has preferred the above appeal.

2.

It is submitted that the appellant had approached the present Counsel to file the above appeal, the Counsel instructed the appellant to bring some of the documents pertaining the above case. The appellant took sometime to ascertain the documents and he could not contact his Counsel at the earliest point of time. Hence delay is caused in filing the above appeal. The delay in filing the above appeal is only a bona fide mistake and not intentional one. Under these circumstances it is just and necessary to condone the delay of 49 days in filing the above appeal. Otherwise appellant will be put to great hardship and inconvenience".

3.

We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for appellant and perused the statements made in the affidavit, accompanying the application, I.A. No. 1 of 2014.

4.

After going through the statements made in the affidavit filed in support of the application, we are of the considered view that the delay of 49 days in filing the appeal has not been explained satisfactorily by assigning valid and cogent reasons. The explanation offered at paragraphs 1 and 2 is in a very casual mariner. Except making bald statements, no credible or trustworthy reasons are assigned for explaining the delay of 49 days in filing the appeal. Whenever there is delay, the party is bound to explain each day''s delay in filing the appeal by setting out the dates and events. In the absence of the clear dates and events in the explanation offered, no credibility can be given to the statements made in the affidavit. Hence, in view of non-explanation of delay in filing the appeal, in a satisfactory manner, we are of the view that delay cannot be condoned nor the appellant has made out a good case to condone the delay. Hence, for the foregoing reasons, I.A. No. 1 of 2014 is dismissed as misconceived. Consequently, the appeal filed by appellant is liable to be dismissed.

5.

However, in the interest of justice and equity, we have gone through the grounds urged in the memorandum of appeal as also the order impugned dated 25th July, 2013, passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 28376 of 2013 to find out whether there is any scope for interference in the impugned order.

6.

After perusal of the impugned order passed by learned Single Judge, it is seen that the grievance of the appellant is that he has filed Form 7 on 3-11-1998 in respect of the land bearing Sy. No. 50, measuring an extent of 4 acres 3 guntas situate at Gudibanda Village, Gudibanda Taluk before the second respondent-Land Tribunal, Gudibanda Taluk. The said application had come up for consideration before the Land Tribunal and the Land Tribunal, in turn, after going through the material available on file and after hearing the appellant, dismissed his claim made in Form 7 under Section 48-A(1) of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 for registration of occupancy rights, holding that as on the date of commencement of the statute, the appellant was a minor, which proves that he was not cultivating the land as tenant. The Land Tribunal held that, as on 14-11-1998, the date when the appellant submitted his Form 7, his age was mentioned as 35 years and as on the date of commencement of the statute, i.e. as on 1-3-1974, he was a minor, which proves that he was not a cultivator as on the relevant date. Thus, the Land Tribunal rejected the claim of the appellant. Being aggrieved by the rejection of the claim made in Form 7, the appellant filed a writ petition before the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 28376 of 2013. The said matter had come up for consideration before the learned Single Judge on 25-7-2013 and the learned Single Judge, after hearing both sides, disposed of the writ petition, holding that in the event of non-filing of an application in respect of a tenanted land on or before 1-3-1974, the land vests with the Government and then, it is permissible for the appellant or his predecessors who are tenants in occupation of the property to file Form 7-A for grant of occupancy rights, on or before 1-11-1978. In the instant case, the appellant claims to have filed the application on 3-11-1998, much beyond the period prescribed and hence, the question of holding an enquiry on the time barred application does not arise. The said reasoning given by learned Single Judge is just and proper and we do not find any good ground to interfere in the well-considered order passed by the learned Single Judge nor the appellant has made out a good case for interference.

7.

Further, in view of concurrent finding of fact recorded by the Land Tribunal as well as the learned Single Judge, interference is uncalled for. Having regard to the totality of the case on hand, the writ appeal filed by appellant is dismissed on the ground of delay and laches as also on merits.