In Re: E.M. Chacko

Ramaswami, J.—This is a civil revision petition which is sought to be preferred against the order made by the learned Additional District

Munsif of Coimbatore in E.A. No. 142 of 1954 in E.P. No. 503 of 1953 in O.S. 1116 of 1952. The short facts are : On the foot that he is an

agriculturist and that the decree had been obtained against him for rent, the petitioner before me filed an application or being given the benefits of S.

4 (1) of the Madras Act V of 1934. This application was resisted by the decree-holder on the ground that the applicant was not an agriculturist

and secondly that the decree was for rent payable for a vacant site and therefore the provisions of Act V of 1954 were not applicable. The learned

District Munsif upheld these contentions and dismissed the petition and hence this civil revision petition.

In revision I am of the same opinion as the learned District Munsif and here are my reasons.

In order to attract the operation of Act V of 1954 two conditions must concur, viz., that the applicant must first be an agriculturist within the

meaning of Act V of 1954 and secondly, the debt on the foot of which he claims the benefit under the Act must be a debt as defined in Act V of

1954.

Point (a) : In order to find out the scope of the terms ""agriculturist"" and ""debt"", we must have regard to the title and preamble of the Act which

are intrinsic aids in the interpretation of this statute.

Every Act of legislature commences with a title which consists of the introductory words. ""The Act followed by words briefly describing its

objects."" The title forms part of the Act and a very important part of the Act and it is legitimate to use it for the purpose of interpreting the Act as a

whole and ascertaining its scope. It may tend to show the object of legislature. Therefore, where an Act uses ambiguous language, one is entitled to

look at the title of the Act in order to assist in the interpretation of the Act and thereby give to the doubtful language in the body of the Act a

meaning consistent rather than at variance with the clear title of the Act. But if the language of the Act is plain we cannot refuse to give effect to it

generally because it happened to go beyond the matters mentioned in the title and limit the construction of any particular section because of the title

of the Act. Harroohandra Roy Chowdri v. Shoorodhonse Debia (1868) 9 W. R. 402 (404), Collector of Noakhali v. Paxwell (1873) 20 W. R,

78, Uda Begum v. Imanruddin (1878) 2 All. 74, 90, Khede Mahto v. Budhun Mahto 27 Cal. 508, 514, Empress of India v. Sarmakh Singh 2 All

218 (F.B.), Cally Churn Mallick v. Bhuggo Kutty Churu Mulliok (1878) 19 W.R. 110 (F.B.), Debendra Narain Roy v. Jogendra Narain Dele

1986 Cal. 598, 622.

Modern Acts contain besides the ordinary titles what are called ""Short Titles"" under S. 28 of the General Clauses Act X of 1897. Thus short

titles which are given for the convenience of citation being numbered as sections of the Act are part of the Act.

In this case the title is ""to provide temporary relief to indebted agriculturists"" and therefore the scope of the Act is limited to agriculturists;

secondly, who are indebted; and thirdly, for affording temporary relief for a limited period.

Then turning to the preamble of the Act it runs as follows :

Whereas, after successive years of drought, by the bounty of Nature, there has been adequate rainfall this year and agriculturists are applying

themselves with assiduity to the cultivation of crops;

And whereas agriculturists have borrowed or added to their debts during the years of drought and may, if freed for a time from the pressure of

creditors, be enabled to rehabilitate themselves;

And whereas it is in the interests of the general public that at the present time, agriculturists be spared the distinctions and expenditure involved in

litigation launched by their creditors, in order that the maximum possible advantage may result to the State in the matter of production of food

crops.

The preamble of a statute is a prefatory statement at its beginning following the title and preceding the enacting clauses explaining or declaring

the reasons and motives for, and the object sought to be accomplished by the enactment of the statute. It is the introductory part of the statute

which states the reasons and intent of the law. It serves to portray the intent of the framers and the mischief''s to be remedied . It affords in general

a key to the construction of the statute or an Act, a clue to discover the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act and

often helps to the solution of doubtful points. The terms of the preamble may be resorted to in two classes of cases. The first class of cases is

where the text of the statute is susceptible to different constructions and the second class of cases is where it is clear that the legislature intended

that the very general language used in the enactment must have some limitation to be put upon it : Bhola Prasad v. E.M.P. 1942 S.C. 17, 21, and

the following Madras decisions, Arulai v. Antonimuthu 1945 Mad. 47, Ranga Reddi v. Dasaratharamash 1938 Mad. 441, 445, Krishnan Chettiar

v. Manickammal 1934 Mad. 138, Kesavalu v. Corporation of Madras 1926 Mad. 381, Parameswara v. Valia Mannadiar 1918 Mad. 381,

Kannammal v. Kanakasabai 1931 Mad. 629, S. of S. v. Maharajah of Bobbili 43 Mad. 529 P.C. = 1919 P.C. 52, Thayarammal v. Junnas

Chettiar 1936 Mad. 844, and the Indian Publications which are as good as the standard English and American Text Books of K.S. Banerji Tagore

Law Lectures. Interpretation of Deeds, Wills and Statutes in B. India : A.N. Ghose and S.C. Ghose on the interpretation of statutes; P.

Narasimham on the Interpretation of Indian statutes (M.L.J. publication); Swarup- The Interpretation of Indian Statutes.

But whilst the preamble of an Act may be consulted whenever the enacting part is open to doubt, it cannot either restrict or extend the enacting

part when the latter is free from doubt : Ganesh Krishnaji v. Krishnaji 14 Bom. 387, per Scott J. on the authority of Maxwell on the Interpretation

of Statutes, pp. 45-49. We very often find that the subsequent provisions of a Statute extend beyond the limits of the preamble: Nga Hoong and

others v. The Queen 7 M.I.A. 72. The enacting words of a statute may be carried beyond the preamble if words be found in the former strong

enough for the purpose: Chinna Aiyar v. Mahomed Fakruddin Sahib 2 Mad. 322. It is an undoubted rule of construction that where the language

of the enacting sections of a statute is clear, the terms of a preamble cannot be called in aid to restrict their operation, or to cut them down. The

purpose for which a preamble is framed to a statute is to indicate what in general terms was the object of the Legislature in passing the Act, but it

may well happen that these general terms will not indicate or cover all the mischief''s which in the enacting portions of the Act itself are found to be

provided for: Queen Empress v. Indarjit 11 All. 262, 266. It is not allowable to cut down the express provisions of a law by consideration of the

supposed intention of the legislature in passing it: Vithu v. Govinda 22 Bom. 321. If the preamble provides for a wider mischief than the bill in its

sections enacts, we are not to give those sections a wider scope than their language properly interpreted justifies: Kadir Baksh and an other v.

Bhawani Prasad 14 All. 145, 154. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. There is no necessity to explain that which requires no explanation.

The office of the Judge is jus dicere and not jus dare, to interpret the law and not to make law.

The preamble in this case can be looked into for both the purposes set out above.

The term ""agriculturist"" has been defined in the Act under S. 2 as meaning a person who owns an interest in land, and who, by reason of such

interest, is in possession of such land or is in receipt of the rents or profits thereof and shall include a lessee; but shall not include a registered

partnership firm or an income tax assesses. The term ""land"" has been defined later as meaning land used for agriculture or horticulture not being

land appurtenant to a residential building.

The term ""agriculture"" has been the subject of a considerable body of judicial decisions revealing considerable divergence''s. The word is

susceptible of a wider and a narrower interpretation. Different statutes contain different definitions of the word. In several of the English statutes,

e.g., Agricultural Holdings Act, Agricultural Rates Act and other similar Acts, the legislature has chosen to enlarge the meaning of the term

agriculture"" as it thought fit. In Wharton''s Law Lexicon the definition of ""agriculture"" is given as including ""horticulture, forestry and use of land for

any purposes of husbandry etc.'''' In several English statutes ""agriculture"" was defined so as to include the use of land as meadow or pasture land

or orchard or osier or woodland or for market gardens, nursery grounds or allotments etc. The Oxford Dictionary gives the definition of

''agriculture'' the science and art of cultivating the soil, including the allied pursuits of gathering in the crops and rearing live stock, tillage, husbandry,

farming (in the widest sense)"". In Bouvier''s Law dictionary ""agriculture"" is defined as the cultivation of soil for food products or any other useful or

valuable growths of the field or garden. According to Webster''s Dictionary ""agriculture"" means ""the act of science of cultivating the ground

including harvesting of crops and rearing and management of live stock, tillage, husbandry, farming in the broadest sense, the science and art of the

production of plants and animals useful to men including to a variable extent the preparation of these products for man''s use.

In this broad use, it includes

farming, horticulture and forestry together with such subjects as butter and cheese making, sugar making etc.

(Webster, New International Dictionary).

In Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi Goundan 24 Mad, 421 which was a case under S. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act, Bhashyam

Aiyangar J. stated that the primary meaning of agriculture is the cultivation of the ground land in its general sense, it is the cultivation of the ground

for the purpose of procuring vegetables and fruits for the use of man and beast including gardening or horticulture and the raising or feeding of

cattle and other stock. The learned judge considered that its less general and more ordinary signification is the cultivation with the plough and in

large areas in order to raise food for man and beast; that horticulture which denotes the cultivation of gardens or orchards, is a species of

agriculture in its primary and more general sense; the word ""agriculture"" is used in the Transfer of Property Act in its more general sense as

comprehending the raising of vegetables, fruits and other garden products as food for man and beast. It was held that a lease of land for the

cultivation of betel is an ""agricultural lease"" within the meaning of S. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act.

In Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Reddi 88 Mad. 798. Sadasiva Aiyar J. said that the ordinary meaning of ""agriculture"" is the raising of annual

or periodical grain crops through the operations of plugging, sowing etc., and thought that it was only by a special definition that agriculture can be

made to include ""horticulture"". It was held that a person holding land for purposes of pasturage does not hold it for purposes of agriculture under

the Estates Land Act. This view was adopted by Sir John Wallis C.J. and Philips J. in Maharajah of Venkatagiri v. Rami Reddi 31 M. L. J. 211.

In Seshayya Garu v. Raja of Pithapuram 31 M. L. J. 214, Sadasiva Aiyar J. again reiterated his views expressed in Raja of Venkatagiri v.

Ayyappa Reddi 31 M. L. J. 211.

In Pavadai Pathan v. Ramaswami Chetti 45 Mad. 710. Spencer J. criticised the above views of Bhashyam Aiyangar J. and Sadasiva Aiyar J.

as being too narrow. Ramesam J. was of the opinion that agriculture connotes the raising of useful or valuable products which derive nutriment

from the soil with the aid of human skill and labor; and thus it will include horticulture, arboriculture and sylviculture in cases where the growth of

trees is effected by the expenditure of human care and Attention in such operations as those of plugging, sowing, planting, managing, watering,

protecting etc. Ramesam, J. who sat with Spencer, J. after referring to the wide meaning of the expression given in English dictionaries and in

English statutes expressed that to give a narrower interpretation to the term and to confine it to the raising of products used as food for man or

beast will exclude all-cultivation of fibrous plants used for dyeing purposes, such as indigo etc., and all timber trees and flowering plants. It was

held in this decision that as the rearing of casuarinas plantation requires some preparation of the ground and subsequent care by watering the

plants, a lease of land granted for growing casuarinas trees is an agricultural lease within the meaning of S. 117 of the Transfer of Property Act.

In a latter case, Chandrasekhara Bharati Swamigal v. Doriaswami Naidu 54 Mad. 900., under the Madras Estates Land Act, the views of

Spencer, J. and Ramesam, J. in turn came to be criticised by Reilly and Anantakrishna Aiyar, JJ. Reilly, J. considered that to use the definition of a

word in one Act, and to apply it, as the definition of that word in another Act, especially when the second Act is in force in another country and

under different conditions is a very dangerous course. Further it was observed that ""agriculture"" cannot be defined by the nature of the products

cultivated, but by the circumstances in which the cultivation is carried on and the cultivation of casuarinas or the planting of timber or firewood

trees, which are to stand on the land for a considerable number of years forming plantations of woods or forests would be opposed to the idea of

agriculture. So far as the Estates Land Act is concerned, it was considered that there are several indications in the Act that the growing of timber

and fuel trees was not regarded as an agricultural purpose. Barua 51 Cal. 504, In Commissioner of income tax, Madras v. Manavedan Tirumalpad

54 Mad. 21 (F.B.), it was held that a person who merely takes a contract in forests for the purpose of felling trees and selling timber is not to be

regarded as deriving agricultural income. The recent decision of the Privy Council in Raja Mustafa Ali Khan v. Commissioner of income tax 75

I.A. 268, has to some extent paved the way to evolve a clearer definition of the expression. In the above case, Lord Simmonds observed :

It is sufficient for the purpose of the present appeal to say (1) that in their opinion no assistance to be got from the meaning ascribed to the word

agriculture"" in other statutes and (2) that, though it must always be difficult to draw the line, yet unless there is some measure of cultivation of the

land, some expenditure of skill and labor upon it, it cannot be said to be used for agricultural purposes within the meaning of the Income Tax Act.

This Court had also held that the word ""agriculture"" implied something which is achieved with the aid of human agency : See Sri Rajah Ravu

Venkata Mahipathi Gangadhara Rama Rao Bahadur, Yuvarajah of Pithapuram and Another Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, and this

decision was approved by the Privy Council. Following the Privy Council decision this Court held in Commissioner of income tax v. Sundara

Mudaliar 1950 ITR 269, that irrespective of the nature of the produce or product of the land, whatever is grown on land aided by human labour

and effort, whatever does not grow wild or spontaneously on the soil without human labor or effort would be an agricultural product.

The Madras Debt Conciliation Act XI of 1936 contains a definition of the word ""agriculture."" It is as follows :

agriculture includes horticulture, the use of land for any purpose of husbandry inclusive of the keeping or breeding of livestock, poultry or bees,

sericulture and the growing of fruits, vegetables and the like.

This definition is wider than the definition in S. 61 of the English Small Holding and Allotment Act, 1908 (8) Edw. 7 Ch. 36. 21. In Madras,

the General Sales Tax Act, S. 2 says that agricultural or horticultural produce shall not be deemed to include tea. The word ""agriculture"" denotes

the raising of valuable or useful products deriving nutriment or sustenance from the soil with the aid of human labor or skill. Irrespective of the

nature of the produce or product of land, whatever is grown aided by human labor and effort, whatever does not grow spontaneously on the soil

without human labor or, effort, would be an agricultural product and the process of producing it would be agriculture within the meaning of that

expression. Applying this test, tea will be an agricultural produce, but the Legislature in the definition of ""agriculture"" excludes it by the use of the

words shall not be deemed to include tea."" But for the exception of tea from the definition, the expression ""agriculture"" would include growing of

tea as it would include ""horticulture"" and sylviculture where human care and attention are expended on the growth of plants or trees. Grass grown

in this manner will be agricultural produce. Betel leaves which will fall within the definition of goods may also come under the term ""agricultural

produce"" mentioned in S. 2 (a) of the Madras General Sales Tax Act.

The following have been held to be agricultural products :

Betel Leaves Murugesa Chetti v. Chinnathambi G. nandan 24 Mad. 421.

Cardamom Kadirvelsami Naicker v. Sultan Ahmed ILR 1947 Mad. 466.

Coconut Venhayya v. Ramaswami 22 Mad. 39.

Narayana v. Subramaniam ILR 1987 Mad. 364.

Milk Venkalaswami Naidu v. Commissioner of income tax 1952 I.T.C. 486

Commissioner of income tax v. Kokine Dairy Co. AIR 1938 Rang. 260.

Mango Sarojini Devi v. Subramaniam 1944 (1) M.L.J. 361

Producers Co-operative Distributing Society Ltd. v. Commissioner of Taxation 1943 A.C. 911 .

The above does not, however, represent an exhaustive list.

The use of the word ""horticulture"" in juxtaposition with the word ""agriculture"" cannot be construed to mean, that the word ""agriculture"" is used

in a narrow sense. The decisions of this Court under the Madras Estates Land Act in Raja of Venkatagiri v. Ayyappa Beddi 38 Mad. 788 and

Seshayya v. Rajah of Pithapur 31 M.L.J. 214 cannot be pressed into service in construing the Madras General Sales Tax Act as in those cases the

report of the Select Committee omitting the words ""sylviculture"" and ""pasturing"" from the bill was taken to show that the legislature contemplated

only a restricted interpretation of the word. [For an interesting and lucid discussion, see N.R. Raghavachariar Sales Tax in Madras (a Law Weekly

Publication, page 46 etc.)].

Applying these principles laid down in these judicial decisions to the scope of the definitions under consideration and construing them along

with the title and the preamble, we are able to deduce that the terms ""agriculture"" and ""horticulture"" are intended to cover the raising of food

products and garden products for man and beast and cannot be extended any further.

Having defined ""agriculture"" and turning to the word ""debt"" it has been defined as meaning any sum of money which a person is liable to pay

under a contract (express or implied) for consideration received and including rent in cash or kind which a person is liable to pay or deliver in

respect of the lawful use and occupation of land. In other words, the debt must relate to contracts relating to the lawful use and occupation of land

used for agricultural or horticultural purposes, viz., raising of food and garden products for man and beast. This definition will exclude vacant sites

which are not used for agriculture or horticulture. In the result, the learned District Munsif found that the two conditions contemplated for the

attracting of application of the Madras Act V of 1954 were not existent in this case. The learned District Munsif found as a question of fact that this

petitioner is not an agriculturist and that finding of fact is binding on me. Secondly, he found that the decree obtained for rent for use of a vacant site

is not a decree for debt in respect of lawful use and occupation of land used for agriculture or horticulture. Therefore, no point of law arises and

this revision petition is dismissed.