Inder vs Kundan Lal and Others

Rajendra Nath Mittal, J.—This second appeal has been filed by the Defendant against the judgment and decree of the Senior Subordinate Judge, RohtaK, dated 31st May, 1975.

Briefly, the facts are that Smt. Shanti was the owner of land measuring 14 Kanals 12 Marias comprised in Killa Nos. 13/16 and 14/ 20 situated in Village Simili. She sold that land to Balbir Singh etc., vide sale-deed dated 12th November, 1970. Balbir Singh, etc. subsequently sold it to Kundal Lal etc. Plaintiffs vide sale-deed dated 6th October, 1972, Exhibit P-l. Inder Defendant was a tenant on the land under Suit. Shanti. Before selling the property, she had filed an application against the Defendant for ejectment under the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act, and obtained the order of ejectment on 15th Jane, 1970. The Plaintiffs executed that decree end took possession of Killa No. 14/20 but could not get possession of the other Killa as crops were standing thereon. Later, it is averred that the Defendant forcibly took possession of Killa No. \\4j20 also. Consequently, the Plaintiffs instituted a suit for possession of the land and for recovery of Rs, 200/- as mesne profits.

The suit was contested by the Defendant who inter alia pleaded that the Plaintiffs were not the owners of the land and that he was not a trespasser but a tenant. He also took other objections but they do not survive now.

The trial Court held that the Plaintiffs became owners by purchase and the amount of Rs. 200/- claimed by them as mesne profits was reasonable. It further held that the status of the Defendant was that of a tenant. In view of the. said finding, the suit was dismissed by it. On appeal by the Plaintiffs, it was held by the Senior Subordinate Judge that the Defendant had lost the status of a tenant after an order of ejectment had been passed against him. He also held that the Plaintiffs could not recover the mesne profits in view of the provisions of Section 14 read with Section 77(3) (n) of the Punjab Tenancy Act. Consequently, he partly accepted the appeal and decreed the suit of the Plaintiffs for possession of the land. The Defendant has come up in second appeal to this Court.

The only question that arises for determination is whether an order of ejectment obtained by a landlord against a tenant, although

not executed, puts an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant between, them. It is not necessary to go into the question in detail as the same has been decided by this Court in Hans Raj and Ors. v. Smt. Brahmi Devi 1960 P.L.J. 71, Banarsi Dass v. Devi Doyal (1967) 69 P.L.R. 887. In Hans Raj''s case (supra), the relevant observations of D.K. Mahajan, J., as he then was,

are as follows:

........the moment the Court on the landlord''s petition passes a decree or order for ejectment, it clearly does no more than to declare that henceforth the parties cease to be landlord and tenant. The fact that the decree or order has to be executed in order to dispossess the tenant and put the landlord in physical possession does not and cannot mean that till the decree or order is not executed and status of the parties qua one another has not been determined. The decree or order determines the rights of the parties inter se and the execution of that decree or order merely gives effect to that determination. Thus on first principles it cannot but be held that the final order of ejectment in the instant cases put an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant and the tenants cannot after the date of the order beheld to be occupancy tenants on the ground that they were illegally dispossessed in execution of the order.

The same view was taken by a Division Bench of this Court in Banarsi Dass''s case (supra). The learned Bench observed that once a decree for eviction is passed u/s 13 of the East Punjab Urban Kent Restriction Act, there is an end of the relationship of landlord and tenant and the tenant, who is awaiting eviction in execution, is merely in possession without authority of law. It has been further held that he has no right after eviction decree, to continue in possession and it cannot be said in these circumstances that his possession is that of a tenant. The above cases were followed by P.C. Pandit, J. in Umrao''s case (supra) I, therefore, hold that an order of ejectment obtained by a landlord against a tenant, although not executed, puts an end to the relationship of landlord and tenant.

Faced with that situation, the Learned Counsel for the Appellant sought to urge that the Appellant has been in possession of the property after the passing of the decree and, therefore, it will be presumed that he has not ceased to be a tenant.

I regret my inability to accept the contention. No such plea was taken and no evidence was led by the Appellant that the landlord, after the passing of the decree, agreed to nullify the operation of the decree and treat him as a tenant. Consequently, I reject the submission.

For the aforesaid reasons, I do not find any merit in the appeal and dismiss the same. No costs.