Tribunals and Commissions

INTERNATIONAL SURGICO INDUSTRIES vs FIRST FLIGHT COURIER PVT. LTD.

National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission · Decided on 23 April 2001 · Citation: 2002 1 CPJ 184 : 2002 2 CPR 322

HON’BLE JUDGES
Lokeshwar Prasad , Rumnita Mittal , S.P.Saberwals J.
RESULT
Appeal dismissed
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Judgment

8 paragraphs · 1,662 words
1.

THE present appeal, filed by the appellants, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 23.3.2000, passed by District Forum (Central), I.S.B.T., Kashmiri Gate, Delhi in Complaint Case No. 1040/1998 - entitled M/s. International Surgico Industries v. M/s. First Flight Courier Pvt. Ltd.

2.

THE facts, relevant for the disposal of the present appeal, briefly stated, are that the appellant had filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Act before the District Forum, averring that the appellant had booked a consignment, addressed to the Medical Superintendent, New Civil Hospital, Surat vide C/N No. D-17139025 dated 4.4.1997 through the respondent. THE grievance of the appellant in the complaint filed in the District Forum was that the respondent failed to deliver the proof of delivery of the consignment to the consignee despite repeated requests and a legal notice. As the proof of delivery regarding the delivery of the consignment to the consignee was not given by the respondent to the appellant, the appellant filed a complaint before the District Forum for the recovery of Rs. 20,280/-, being the price of the goods in question together with interest @ 2% per month. THE appellant also claimed a compensation of Rs. 10,000/-. The claim of the appellant, in the District Forum, was resisted by the respondent. The stand taken by the respondent before the District Forum in its reply/written version was that the consignment, booked by the appellant, on 4.4.1997, from Delhi to Surat, was duly delivered to the consignee at Surat and proof of delivery, in token of the delivery of the consignment to the consignee was given to the appellant. It was also contended on behalf of the respondent that the appellant had not disclosed the value of the goods and the contents of the consignment were also not insured and, therefore, the liability of the respondent in respect of the consignment in question was limited as per the terms and conditions of the consignment note and no claim could be filed after 90 days from the date of booking. It was stated that there was no deficiency in service on the part of the respondent and that the complaint, filed by the appellant, was misconceived, frivolous and false, filed only to extract money from the respondent.

The learned District Forum, placing reliance on a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in case M.G. Ravi Narayana v. Professional Couriers, reported as III (1993) CPJ 364 (NC), has dismissed the complaint, filed by the appellant, vide impugned order.

3.

FEELING aggrieved, the appellant has preferred the present appeal under Section 15 of the Act. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellant at length on the question of admission of the present appeal and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. In terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, a person, aggrieved by an order, made by the District Forum, can prefer an appeal against such order to the State Commission within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to Section 15 of the Act provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the above said period of 30 days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the above said period. The words ''sufficient cause'', occurring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression ''sufficient cause'', though deserves to receive a liberal interpretation, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though, no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again, as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.

4.

ADMITTEDLY, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of 30 days because the order being impugned in the present proceedings was passed by the learned District Forum on 23.3.2000 and the present appeal has been filed in this Commission on 21.8.2000. Therefore, the question requiring consideration at the very threshold is as to whether the appellant has shown ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the appeal, in time, within the meaning of proviso to Section 15 of the Act. The appellant, along with the appeal has filed an application, seeking, condonation of delay in filing the present appeal. The reasons for not filing the present appeal in time have been stated in paras 1, 2 and 3 of the above said application and the same read as under : "1. That the impugned order was passed on 23.3.2000 but despite the efforts made by the appellant through his Counsel the same has been delivered on 8.6.2000 thereby causing automatic delay in filing the appeal. 2. That after 8.6.2000 the Counsel for the appellant delivered the said impugned order to the appellant on 9th day of August, 2000 through his clerk thus the appellant could actually obtain the order on 9.8.2000 and immediately thereafter the present appeal is filed without any further delay. 3. That the delay caused in filing the appeal is bona fide and deserves to be condoned that the ends of justice would meet in condoning the delay caused in filing the appeal."

On a perusal of the contents of the above paras of the application it is apparent that copy of the impugned order was made available to the appellant through Counsel on 8.6.2000. The case of the appellant is that the same was delivered by the Counsel for the appellant through his clerk to the appellant on 9.8.2000. There is no supporting affidavit to the above said application of the appellant or his Counsel or the clerk of the Counsel, who delivered the copy of the impugned order received on 8.6.2000 to the appellant after more than two months on 9.8.2000. In the presence of the above facts, it is some what difficult to believe the version given by the appellant in the above said application for condoning the delay. The delay, in filing the appeal, cannot be condoned as a matter of generosity and proof of ''sufficient cause'' is a condition precedent for the exercise of discretion. In our above views we stand fortified by a decision of the Hon''ble National Commission in case Vice-Chairman, Delhi Development Authority v. O.P. Gauba, reported as III (1995) CPJ 18 (NC)=1986-1996 Consumer 2731 (NS).

5.

IN the presence of the facts already stated and the legal position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'' it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence on the part of the appellant. IN our opinion, in the given facts, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and, therefore, the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal is hereby rejected.

6.

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, besides being barred by limitation is also devoid of substance on merits because in the impugned order it has been held by the learned District Forum that there is nothing on record to indicate that the consignee ever intimated the appellant regarding the non-receipt of the consignment in question and simply because proof of delivery was not given by the respondent no presumption on the above grounds regarding the non-receipt of the consignment by the consignee can be drawn. On 30.8.2000, when the appeal, came up for hearing at the admission stage before this Commission, the learned Counsel for the appellant prayed that the appellant be given time to bring on record document in support of the fact that the consignee did not receive the goods (consignment) in question. On the above request of the learned Counsel for the appellant, the appellant was given the liberty to bring on record such a document, on affidavit, within four weeks and the matter was adjourned to 13.11.2000. On 13.11.2000 none appeared on behalf of the appellant and the appeal was directed to be dismissed in default which was subsequently restored vide order dated 29.11.2000. On 11.1.2001, the learned Counsel for the appellant requested that the appellant be given a last opportunity of four weeks for bringing on record the above said document. In the interest of justice, the prayer was allowed and the appellant was directed to bring on record such document within four weeks from 11.1.2001 and the matter was adjourned to . Even on despite the fact that sufficient opportunities had been given to the appellant no such document has been brought on record by the appellant and the only inference which can be drawn as a result of above default on the part of the appellant is that no such document is in existence. In the presence of the above facts, no fault can be found with the findings of the learned District Forum and the same, in our opinion, suffer from no infirmity so as to call for any interference by this Commission in exercise of its appellate powers. Thus viewed from all angles, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is devoid of substance. THE same merits dismissal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed in limine with no order as to costs. THE appeal stands disposed of in above terms. Appeal dismissed.