SIPANI AUTOMOBILES LTD. vs VIPIN BEHARI SHARMA

THE present appeal, filed by the appellant, under Section 15 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') is directed against order dated 21st January, 1998, passed in Complaint Case No. 685/97 - entitled Dr. Vipin Behari Sharma v. THE Managing Director, M/s. Sipani Automobiles Ltd., and subsequent order dated 19.11.1999, passed by the learned District Forum on an application, filed by the appellant.

IN terms of the provisions contained in Section 15 of the Act, the present appeal should have been filed within a period of 30 days from the date of the order. However, proviso to the above section provides that the State Commission may entertain an appeal even after the expiry of the abovesaid period of thirty days, if it is satisfied that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within the abovesaid period. Admittedly, the present appeal has not been filed by the appellant within the prescribed period of thirty days. The same has been filed on 23.2.2000. Alongwith the appeal, the appellant has also filed an application seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal. From the contents of the abovesaid application, it is apparent that the appellant came to know of the orders, being impugned in the present appeal on 19th November, 1999. Even a certified copy of both the orders, being impugned in the present proceedings, as per the case of the appellant, were received on 17.12.1999. The reason for not filing the appeal in time has been stated in Para-5 of the abovesaid application which reads as under : "That the delay in filing the appeal before this Hon''ble Commission is neither wilful nor intentional but due to the reason for want of knowledge which only occured as mentioned above and the appellants were waiting for the certified copy of the order."

As already stated, there is a statutory provision enabling the Commission to entertain the appeal even after the expiry of the statutory period prescribed for filing an appeal, provided the appellant satisfies that there was ''sufficient cause'' for not filing the same within time. The words ''sufficient cause'', occuring in proviso to Section 15 of the Act, are of utmost significance. As per settled law, culled out from various judicial decisions, the above expression, ''sufficient cause'' though deserves to receive a liberal construction, yet, a just and equitable balance has to be maintained between the right secured by the respondent as a result of the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation and the injustice of depriving the appellant of adjudication of his grievances on the merits of his appeal for causes beyond his reasonable control, which means the cause is bona fide and beyond the control of the appellant. Though no hard and fast line can be drawn as to what affords ''sufficient cause'' in a given case, yet, again as per settled law, any cause which prevents a person from approaching the Court within time is ''sufficient cause''. In doing so, it is the test of a reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied.

If the above criterion is applied to the present case, it is noticed that the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, miserably fails to meet the above requirement, because as per the appellant''s own case, the appellant came to know about both the orders on 19.11.1999 itself. Not only this, even a certified copy of both the above mentioned orders were received by the appellant, as per the appellant''s own case, on 17.12.1999. The appellant even after the receipt of the certified copies on 17.12.1999 has not cared to file the appeal within the prescribed period of thirty days and has filed the same much afterwards i.e. 23.2.2000. As a matter of fact, there is no satisfactory explanation for the delay caused in the matter except a bald statement made in para-5 of the application, which, in the given facts, in no way helps the cause of the appellant in so far as condonation of delay in filing the present appeal is concerned.

IN the presence of the above facts and the position explained above, in our opinion, whatever liberal interpretation might be put on the words ''sufficient cause'', it would be impossible for us to hold that there was no negligence or want of bona fide on the part of the appellant. IN our opinion, the appellant has miserably failed to show ''sufficient cause'' for condoning the delay and, therefore, the application seeking condonation of delay in filing the present appeal is hereby rejected. With the rejection of the application, seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal, the present appeal, filed by the appellant, is also rejected being barred by time, with no order as to costs. A copy of this order, as per the statutory requirements, be forwarded to the parties free of costs and thereafter the file be consigned to Record Room. Appeal dismissed.