Iqbal Singh vs Presiding Officer and Others

G.S. Sandhawalia, J.—The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the award dated 20.7.1999 (Annexure P-2) whereby the claim of the petitioner had been declined. A perusal of the award would go on to show that the petitioner claimed that he served the Management since March, 1994 till July, 1996 and allegedly his services were terminated without any notice or compensation. The defence of the management was that the workman had not completed 240 days in any of the calendar year. The workman failed to appear and substantiate his claim and was proceeded ex-parte. In pursuance of that reference was answered in favour of the Management. It is settled principle of law that the workman has to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a calendar year and the onus is upon the workman. Once the workman had chosen not to appear before the Labour Court, the submission of the counsel that muster roll itself shows that the workman had completed 240 days is without any basis.

Another factor which goes against the petitioner is that the order dated 20.7.1999 has been challenged after a delay of more than 14 years which was not explained in any manner as to what was the reason for not approaching this Court for a such a long period.

It is settled principle that law protects the ones who are vigilant and agitate their rights within reasonable period of limitation. The Apex Court in City and Industrial Development Corporation Vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala and Others, while discussing the issue of delay and laches recognised the principle that while exercising the discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary power if there is any negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right within a reasonable period of time and without any justifiable circumstances. The relevant observations read as under:--

It is well-settled and needs no restatement at our hands that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a High Court to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of Mandamus is highly discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed as of right. One of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a Writ is an adequate ground for refusing a writ. The principle is that courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the interregnum.

Similarly the Apex Court in State of Orissa and Another Vs. Mamata Mohanty, held as under:--

In the very first appeal, the respondent filed Writ Petition on 11.11.2005 claiming relief under the Notification dated 6.10.1989 w.e.f. 1.1.1986 without furnishing any explanation for such inordinate delay and on laches on her part. Section 3 of the Limitation Act, 1963, makes it obligatory on the part of the court to dismiss the Suit or appeal if made after the prescribed period even though the limitation is not set up as a defence and there is no plea to raise the issue of limitation even at appellate stage because in some of the cases it may go to the root of the matter. (See: AIR 1944 24 (Privy Council) and Kamlesh Babu and Others Vs. Lajpat Rai Sharma and Others,

Needless to say that Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply in writ jurisdiction. However, the doctrine of limitation being based on public policy, the principles enshrined therein are applicable and writ petitions are dismissed at initial stage on the ground of delay and laches. In a case like at hand, getting a particular pay scale may give rise to a recurring cause of action. In such an eventuality, the petition may be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and the court may refuse to grant relief for the initial period in case of an unexplained and inordinate delay. In the instant case, the respondent claimed the relief from 1.1.1986 by filing a petition on 11.11.2005 but the High Court for some unexplained reason granted the relief w.e.f. 1.6.1984, though even the Notification dated 6.10.1989 makes it applicable w.e.f. 1.1.1986.

This Court has consistently rejected the contention that a petition should be considered ignoring the delay and laches in case the petitioner approaches the Court after coming to know of the relief granted by the Court in a similar case as the same cannot furnish a proper explanation for delay and laches. A litigant cannot wake up from deep slumber and claim impetus from the judgment in cases where some diligent person had approached the Court within a reasonable time. (See: Rup Diamonds and Others Vs. Union of India and Others, State of Karnataka and Others Vs. S.M. Kotrayya and Others, and Jagdish Lal and others Vs. State of Haryana and others,

This Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India will not allow the matter which had been settled inter se the parties to be re-opened after a period of 14 years. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.