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Sukhdev Singh Smagh vs State of Punjab

Punjab And Haryana At Chandigarh · Decided on 17 July 2014 · Citation: (2014) 07 P&H CK 0126

HON’BLE JUDGES
Rameshwar Singh Malik, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226, 227
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
CWP No. 13682 of 2014
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Judgment

12 paragraphs · 1,020 words

Rameshwar Singh Malik, J.—Feeling aggrieved against the alleged inaction on the part of respondent authorities, petitioner has approached this Court by way of instant writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, seeking a writ in the nature of mandamus.

2.

Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that when the grievance of the petitioner was not being redressed, he finally approached the respondent authorities, by way of representation dated 30.5.2014 (Annexure P-2), seeking refixation of his pay w.e.f. 16.8.1983 instead of 26.3.1993. However, when no action was taken on representation, petitioner has approached this Court by way of present writ petition.

3.

He further submits that petitioner was having a continuing cause of action. His case was covered by different orders passed by this Court at Annexures P-4 to P-6. He next submits that in such a situation principle of delay and latches will not be attracted against the petitioner. He finally prays for allowing the present writ petition.

4.

Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioner at considerable length, after careful perusal of the record of the case and giving thoughtful consideration to the contentions raised, this Court is of the considered opinion that the present writ petition suffers from delay and latches, because of which the same is liable to be dismissed. To say so, reasons are more than one, which are being recorded hereinafter.

5.

The undisputed fact on record is that petitioner is seeking refixation of pay-scales from 16.8.1983 instead of 26.3.1993. When a pointed question was put to learned counsel for the petitioner, as to why the petitioner could not avail his remedy, at an earlier point of time during all these 30 long years, he had no answer and rightly so because there is nothing available on record to support his plea. In such a situation, petitioner has no case either on facts or in law.

6.

The above-said view taken by this Court also finds support from the judgments of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in B.S. Bajwa and Another Vs. State of Punjab and Others, ; Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. A. Durairaj (Dead) by L.Rs., ; Londhe Prakash Bhagwan Vs. Dattatraya Eknath Mane and Others, ; Government of India and Anr Vs. George Philip, and Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and Others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu,

7.

The relevant observations made by the Hon''ble Supreme Court, in para 16 of the judgment in T.T. Murali Babu''s case (supra), which can be gainfully followed in the present case, read as under:-

Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant-a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years'' delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others'' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons-who compete with ''Kumbhakarna'' or for that matter ''Rip Van Winkle''. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.

8.

Similar view was taken by this Court in CWP No. 3124 of 2011 (Harnam Singh v. State of Punjab and others) decided on 1.3.2014. Reverting back to the facts of the present case and respectfully following the law laid down by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the cases referred to hereinabove, this Court feels no hesitation to conclude that petitioner has failed to make out any case either on facts or in law. His case has been found to be suffering from delay and latches and the same is liable to be dismissed. It is so said because petitioner has woken up from slumber after 30 long years. There is no explanation forthcoming for this inordinate long delay.

9.

No other argument was raised.

10.

Considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted above, coupled with the reasons aforementioned, this Court is of the considered view that the instant writ petition is misconceived, bereft of merit and without any substance. Thus, it must fail. No case for interference has been made out.

11.

Resultantly, instant writ petition stands dismissed, however, with no order as to costs.