Ishwar Chandra Harijan vs State of U.P. and Others

D.K. Arora, J.—Heard learned Counsel for the parties.

By means of present writ petition, the petitioner is seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the impugned ex-parte termination order dated 14.07.1975.

The submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner was appointed as Tractor Operator in Agriculture Department on 11.08.1972 and he continued to work till 13.07.1975. The appointment of the petitioner was on a substantive post and, as such, the provisions of U.P. Temporary Government Servant Termination Rules, 1975 does not apply in the case of petitioner, who even then all of sudden has been terminated from services by the respondents vide ex-parte order dated 14.07.1995 treating him temporary government servant (Annexure-2 to the writ petition).

The further submission of the counsel for the petitioner is that after 14.07.1975 the petitioner continuously approaching the authorities and given various applications. The petitioner submitted applications on 30.06.2007, 15.07.2007, 13.09.2007 and lastly on 25.07.2009 for restoration of his services but in vain. It is also submitted by the counsel for the petitioner that respondents are required either to allow the applications of the petitioner or to reject the same showing some reasonable cause, but till date nothing has been done by the authorities, hence, he was constrained to file the present writ petition.

In para-8 of the writ petition, while explaining the delay, it is submitted that the petitioner is rustic very low educated and very much poor Harijan having no knowledge of law at all and on account of which he could not approach before any Court of law till date.

In the present case, the petitioner after passing of the order dated 14.07.1975 by the respondent No. 5 approached this Court after lapse of more than 34 years seeking a writ of certiorari for quashing the ex-parte order dated 14.07.1975 without any satisfactory explanation of delay.

The Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case reported in S.S. Balu and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, pleased to observe as under:

It is also well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". The Government Order was issued on 15.01.2002.

The appellants did not file any writ application questioning the legality and validity thereof. Only after the writ petitions filed by others were allowed and the State of Kerala preferred an appeal thereagainst, they impleaded themselves as party-respondents. It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment. It is, thus, not possible for us to issue any direction to the State of Kerala or the Commission to appoint the appellants at this stage.

Similarly, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the matter of Yunus (Baboobhai) A Hamid Padvekar Vs. State of Maharashtra through its Secretary and Others, held:

Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.

In the matter of State of M.P v. Nandlal Jaiswal reported in (1986) 4 SCC 556 it is observed:

The High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weights with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.

In view of the above, the present writ petition does not warrant any interference by this Court and deserves to be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed.