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Judgment
11 paragraphs · 1,170 wordsRajiv Sharma, J.—Heard Counsel for the petitioner and the Standing Counsel.
Brief facts of the case, as averred in the writ petition, are that the Deputy Director, Information and Public Relations Department required the petitioner to appear for interview on 2.6.1987 for selection and appointment on the post of Peon. The petitioner appeared before the Interview Committee with all the required documents. According to the petitioner''s Counsel, the petitioner was selected but on a wrong premise, the appointment letter was issued to another Chhotey Lal son of Darshan- opposite party, who never appeared before the Selection Committee and the petitioner came to know this fact only in the year 1997. The petitioner was engaged as daily wager and worked from 1.9.1987 till 10.5.1988 with artificial break. In the background of the aforesaid facts, the petitioner has claimed for a writ of mandamus commanding the opposite parties to issue appointment letter to the petitioner.
During the course of arguments, Counsel for the petitioner was asked as to why he came late and filed the instant writ petition only in the year 2003 i.e. after 26 years. The simple answer of the petitioner''s Counsel was that against the unjustified action, the petitioner continued to make representation to the higher authorities. It is now well settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is correct that no period of limitation is provided to invoke writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution but the same does not mean that the machinery of writ jurisdiction can be set in motion at any time at the whims and fancies of a party. It is also settled that there may be cases where even the delay of shorter period would be considered sufficient to decline relief under Article 226 of the Constitution while in certain cases the Court may be persuaded to condone the long delay if sufficient reasons are disclosed by such party.
In various legal pronouncements the Supreme Court has taken the limitation period which is prescribed for filing a civil suit as a guiding factor even for filing the writ petitions. A reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar and Another Vs. Shah Hyder Beig and Others, The same is as under:
The High Court has thus misplaced the factual details and misread the same. It is now a well-settled principle of law and we need not dilate on this score to the effect that while no period of limitation is fixed but in the normal course of events, the period the party is required for filing a civil proceeding ought to be the guiding factor. While it is true that this extraordinary jurisdiction is available to mitigate the sufferings of the people in general but it is not out of place to mention that this extraordinary jurisdiction has been conferred on to the law Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution on a very sound equitable principle. Hence, the equitable doctrine, namely, " delay defeats equity" has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary relief can be had provided one has not by his act or conduct given a goby to his rights. Equity favours a vigilant rather than an indolent litigation and this being the basic tenet of law, the question of grant of an order as has been passed in the matter as regards restoration of possession upon cancellation of the notification does not and cannot arise.
The Hon''ble Delhi High Court in the case of Smt. Krishna Chaubey v. Government of NCT of Delhi III AD (Delhi) 576, has held that if no satisfactory explanation given by the party for delay in approaching the Court, the remedy of invoking writ jurisdiction would not be available on the ground of delay and laches. Para 23 of the said judgment is reproduced below:
A conspectus of the aforesaid judgments would show that ordinarily the period of limitation prescribed for filing a civil suit would be a guiding factor. This period was over long time ago in case the appellant would have preferred a civil suit. Even assuming that the petition ought to be entertained after that period of time, there has to be satisfactory explanation for the period of delay. Leave aside any satisfactory explanation, there is no explanation whatsoever other than saying that the appellant was approaching the Department from time to time and orally representing the matter. This is hardly a satisfactory explanation.
While exercising discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Court has ample power to refuse the grant of writ of certiorari when it is found that there was delay due to negligence or omission by the petitioner to assert his right at a time where there was acquiescence in order on his part. By a catena of decisions, it has been settled that delay defeats equity and Court helps only those who are vigilant and do not slumber over their rights. The writ petition suffers from inordinate, unexplained delay. Therefore, there is no averments as to why the petitioner remained idle for about 26 years. Mere making of representations to the authority concerned cannot justify a belated approach and would not be a good ground to condone the delay and laches in filing the writ petition.
The doctrine of "delay defeats equity" is applicable in the matter of grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The relief under Article 226 is discretionary in nature and can be granted subject to a person has not by his act or conduct given a go-by to his rights. In the present case by allowing considerable time to lapse, it can be easily inferred that the petitioner was not serious in agitating his grievance.
Even otherwise, in the counter affidavit the opposite parties have clearly stated that in the year 1985 a merit list was prepared after the interview and Chhotey Lal son of Darshan was at serial No. 18 of the merit list. After the recruitment upto serial No. 17, the post of Helper at S. No. 1 fell vacant and therefore, recruitment order was issued in favour of Chhotey Lal son of Darshan. Thereafter in the year 1991, a merit list of 26 candidates of Class IV was published. One Chhotey Lal Srivastava other than the petitioner was at serial No. 24. At that time four vacancies were filled in on the basis of merit. Thereafter, no candidate was given appointment as the life of the select list has come to an end. It has also been clarified that the name of the petitioner was never received from the Employment Exchange.
For the reasons aforesaid, I find no good ground to show interference under Article 226 of the Constitution and the writ petition is dismissed.
