Jahur Hasan vs Sham Lal and others

Pritpal Singh, J.

This revision is against the order of the trial Court dated 2nd March, 1985, allowing the plaintiff Sham Lal amendment of the plaint in a suit for preemption.

The factual position is that respondents Nos 9 to 16 sold the land in dispute in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 8. This sale is sought to be preempted by Sham Lal plaintiff as son of Jhangi Ram, respondent No. 10, nephew of the Nihal Chand respondent No. 9, Smt. Bhagwanti, respondent No. 11 and Smt Tara Devi, respondent No. 16, as also due to relationship with the remaining vendors, respondent Nos. 12 to 15, namely Smt. Shakuntla, Shanti Rani, Prem Parkash and Santosh Kumari. The suit was contested by the vendees. During the course of the suit proceedings, the plaintiff filed an application on 25th of January, 1985, for amendment of the plaint. The amendment sought by him was that he may be allowed to plead the application of section 15(2) of the Pre emption Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act), visavis the shares of the female vendors and also be permitted to clarify in the plaint that he is son of the husband''s brother of the vendors Smt. Bhagwanti, respondent No. 11 and Smt. Tara Devi, respondent No. 16 and is brother''s son of Nihal Chand, respondent No. 9. Although this application for amendment was resisted by the vendees, the trial Court allowed the same on payment of Rs. 175/ as costs vide the impugned order.

After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I find no reason to interfere with the impugned order of the trial Court. The law laid down by this Court in Shankar Singh v. Chanan Singh, 1968 P.L.R. 455, still holds good. It is ruled in this judgment that in a suit for preemption the specific ground on which preferential right of preemption is sought must be impleaded in the suit within the period of limitation. In that case the plaintiff only said that vendors were his collaterals. It was observed that in section 15 of the Act such relationship by itself does not give a right of preemption. A particular defined relationship does give a right of pre emption and if on the ground of relationship such a right is claimed then obviously the particular relationship referred to as a ground in section 15 of the Act has to be stated in the plaint within the period of limitation. If after the period of limitation such an attempt is made it cannot be permitted to defeat a right that has accrued to the vendee to defeat the preemptor''s claim as not coming within the statutory provision. In the present case, it is canvassed by the learned petitioner''s counsel that in the plaint particular relationship of the plaintiff with respondents Nos. 9, 11 and 16 has not been defined and an attempt has now been made after the period of limitation to define the relationship which cannot be permitted. I, however, find that this objection has no merit. In the heading of the plaint the plaintiff''s father Jhangi Ram son of Basaya Ram is mentioned as defendant No. 10. Nihal Chand defendant No. 9 is also mentioned as son of the same Basaya Ram. Smt Bhagwanti defendant No. 11 and Smt. Tara Devi defendant No 16 have been described as widows of Mohan Lal and Radha Kishan, respectively, who were also sons of the Same Basaya Ram. Clearly, therefore,the relationship which the plaintiff wants to bring out in the body of the plaint has already been mentioned in the heading of the plaint. The amendment sought by the plaintiff is simply clarificatory in nature. Even if no such application had been made the plaintiff could still have proved his relationship with the said vendors because the necessary data itself had been supplied in the heading of the plaint. It, therefore, cannot be said that the plaintiff had not defined particular relationship with the vendors in the plaint within the period of limitation.

Similar is the case regarding the plaintiff wanting to bring in the plaint that the provisions of section 15(2) of the Act applied to the shares of the female vendors. A Division Bench of this Court in Smt. Ishar Kaur v. Banta Singh and another, 1981 PLJ 509, held that to attract the provisions of section 15(2) the preemptor must allege in the plaint all the necessary facts constituting the ground on which he seeks to enforce his right of preemption under this provision. In the present case it is not denied that all these particulars have been given in the plaint. There is only an inadvertent omission in the plaint that on the facts alleged therein the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act would apply. Since the particulars are already there is the plaint, the claiming of the application of section 15(2) could be justifiably allowed by the trial Court by way of amendment. Had the plaintiff not mentioned the necessary facts constituting the ground on which he seeks to enforce his right of preemption under section 15(2) regarding the shares of the female vendors, it could legitimately be said that after the expiry of the period of limitation those facts could not be brought in the plaint by amendment. However, in the instant case the necessary facts being already there, there is no legal infirmity in the trial Court permitting the plaintiff to plead the application of section 15(2) of the Act.

Consequently, this revision is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 19.8.1985.