Jawali vs State of Punjab and ors.

M.M. Punchhi, J.

Admitted and disposed of simultaneously.

A piece of agricultural land situated in village Chamaru, fully detailed in the order of the SubDivisional Magistrate, Rajpura, became the subject matter of dispute between the parties under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code. After passing the preliminary order under Section 145(1), Criminal Procedure Code, the learned SubDivisional Magistrate appointed NaibTehsildar, Rajpura as the receiver and ordered him to take possession thereof. The receiver reported that the matter between the parties was pending in the Civil Court. Taking aid of that fact, the learned SubDivisional Magistrate, Rajpura on 13.11.1984 vacated the proceedings and took the view that when the matter was in the Civil Court, he had nothing to do in the matter.

The petitioner herein as a widow. The land in dispute initially belonged to Teja Singh, her husband. Respondents Nos. 2 to 4 claimed themselves to be the nephews of Teja Singh. They have staked claim to the property on the basis of a Will. The widow stakes her claim on the basis of inheritance. Accordingly, she had approached the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rajpura, in order to seek protection of her position, for she was weak and defenceless against a band of people comprising the opposite party.

The respondents, on the other hand, have claimed that they had filed a suit against the widow and had got her injuncted from alienating the land in dispute. Similarly, the widow had filed a suit against them in which the learned SubJudge had ordered maintenance of status quo and that order is said to be still operative.

When the learned SubDivisional Magistrate disposed of the matter it appears that a few precedents of this Court were placed before him but he did not take care to mention them in his order. The learned counsel for the respondents, however, places reliance on Ram Sumer Puri Mahant v. State of U.P. and others, 1985(1) Recent Criminal Reports 278 (SC); AIR 1985 Supreme Court 472 , to contend that when the matter was in the Civil Court, proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, did not lie. It is on that anvil it is sought to oust the petitioner contending that she herself being the plaintiff in the civil suit and having obtained the order of status quo, there is nothing for the criminal Court to decide in the matter, much less under section 145, Criminal Procedure Code.

It seems to me that the judgment of the Supreme Court aforequoted does not lay down any universal principal, as has been sought to be spelled out. Board facts, there in were that a possessory and injunction suit had initially been filed in a Civil Court and the said suit had been dismissed. An appeal had been taken against that decision. It was pending disposal before the appellate Court. Obviously by the dismissal of the suit, one Court had adjudicated upon the matter. Technically speaking, an appeal, being a continuation of the original suit, in a sense it would be said that civil proceedings were pending final adjudication. The impact of the judgment of the first Court, however, was that it settled matters regarding possession. The Supreme Court in those peculiar circumstances considered that parallel proceedings under Section 145, Criminal Procedure code, should not continue and thus quashed the order of the Magistrate. No such foundation is available in the instant case. The order of the status qua, and that too ex parte, only shows that the Civil Court is not yet certain as to which party is in possession, that step does not mean that the Civil Court has at any point of time decided the question of possession. No universal principle can be spelled out, as said before, that in every case when a matter has gone to the civil Court, criminal proceedings must automatically end, or be not allowed to go on, for if this were to happen, it would be putting premium over civil Courts than criminal Courts. That is an undesirable result. Multiplicity of litigation is not be encouraged as there should be no public wastage of time over meaningless and parallel litigation. It is thus the essence of the matter which is to be seen and not the form. Thus, I am of the considered view that in the instant case, the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Rajpura unnecessarily and illegally shed of his jurisdiction in a case where his jurisdiction ought to have been exercised. Accordingly, this petition succeeds and the impugned order is quashed. The proceedings are restored to his file at the stage at which they were shut out. They are ordered to be continued therefrom. Parties through their counsel are directed to put in appearance before the Sub Divisional Magistrate on 14th August, 1985.