J.B. Joe Vilwarayar, President, Singikulam Barathakula Ikkiya Santhai, Valliyoor, Kashmir and Stanley (for themselves and on behalf of Barathakula People in representative capacity) vs Loordhu Ammal (died) and Others

G. Rajasuria, J.—This Civil Revision Petition is focussed as against the Judgment and decree passed in O.S.No.439 of 1994 on the file of

the Principal District Munsif Court, Valliyoor dated 22.09.2003. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners as well as the learned

counsel for the respondent Nos.18,19 and 27 and despite printing the names of respondent Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14,16, 17,20,21,22,24

and 25, no one represents them.

The parties are referred to here under according to the litigative status before the trial Court.

A re ''sume'' of facts absolutely necessary and germane for the disposal of this Civil Revision Petition would run thus:

The revision petitioners herein filed the suit in O.S. 439 of 1994 in the Principal District Munsif Court, Valliyoor as against as many as thirty

persons for declaration that the plaintiff Singikulam Barathakula Ikkiya Sabai Santhai, is the owner of the suit properties described in the schedule

of the plaint and for obtaining vacant possession of the same after demolishing the superstructure put up therein. The actual prayers in the suit are

extracted here under along with the schedule of properties for ready reference:

Prayers:

Schedule of properties:

The suit properties are ryotwari lands assessable to kist and accordingly they valued it as under:

(i) The prayer for declaration of title was valued in a sum of Rs. 300/- u/s 25(b) of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955 and a

Court fee of Rs. 23/- was paid;

(ii) The second prayer was valued in a sum of Rs. 300/- u/s 25(b) of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955 and a Court fee of Rs.

23/-was paid; and

(iii) The third prayer was valued in a sum of Rs. 300/- u/s 25(b) of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955 and a Court fee of Rs.

23/- was paid. Altogether the plaintiffs paid the Court fee of Rs. 69/-.

The defendants after entering appearance filed the written statement, challenging and impugning the allegations/averments in the plaint including

the method and manner of having valued the suit and the payment of Court fee thereon.

The trial Court framed issues and one among the issues is relating to Court fee and valuation. An Advocate/Commissioner was appointed to visit

the suit property and note the physical features and also furnish valuation of certain buildings thereon. The Advocate/Commissioner, who visited the

suit property with the assistance of a engineer surveyor, submitted his report. The last portion of the Advocate/Commissioner''s Report could be

extracted here under for ready reference:

Accordingly, the Advocate/Commissioner assessed the superstructures referred to in his report supra in a sum of Rs. 46,60,643/- (Rupees forty

six lakhs sixty thousand six hundred and forty three only). The trial Court adverted to the fact that there was one earlier suit in O.S.No.1363 of

1988 filed by two persons viz., Leela and Vanaja as against seven persons relating to the same suit site when there were some buildings and in that

suit the finding was to the effect that the suit property should be assessed in a sum of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakhs only), as against which

there was revision to this Court and this Court also confirmed the said order. Thereupon those two persons, who figured as plaintiffs, instead of

proceeding with the matter as per law, dropped it. Subsequently, the present revision petitioners filed O.S.No.439 of 1994 in their capacity as

representatives of the plaintiff Singikulam Barathakula Ikkiya Santhai. Once again as referred to supra, a Commissioner was appointed and in that

the Commissioner assessed the value of the additional buildings, to a tune of Rs. 46,00,000/- (Rupees forty six lakhs only) over and above the sum

of Rs. 50,00,000/- (Rupees fifty lakhs only) which was assessed relating to the site and the then existed buildings thereon. As such, the trial Court

thought that it had no pecuniary jurisdiction over the suit and accordingly ordered the plaintiffs to effect necessary amendments and pay the Court

fee and present the plaint before the appropriate Court.

Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the order of the trial Court, the present revision petition has been filed on the following main grounds

among others:

The order of the trial Court is against law and weight of evidence. The prayer of the plaintiffs is only for recovery of the ryotwari lands alone after

demolishing the superstructures illegally put up thereon by the defendants. There is no prayer for recovery of the buildings also. In the Revenue

Register, still the land is found recorded only an agricultural land and not as house sites or plots. The trial Court ignored the fact that relating to

agricultural land/ryotwari land only kist value should be taken into consideration for paying the Court fee and not the actual market value of the land

as house sites. Simply because certain buildings have been raised by the defendants, the plaintiffs cannot be compelled to pay Court fee after

valuing the suit land as house sites and also on the market value of the superstructures constructed thereon by the defendants.

The points for consideration are (i) whether the trial Court adopted the correct procedure in arriving at its conclusion that no kist value is

attracted but only the actual house site value? and whether the plaintiffs are bound to pay the Court fee for the superstructures also?

On point:

Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioners as well as the learned counsel for the respondent Nos.18,19 and 27.

The learned counsel for the revision petitioners/plaintiffs reiterating the grounds of revision petition would develop his arguments to the effect

that the averments in the plaint alone would be the governing factor and not the contentions in the written statement. He would also submit that

once in the revenue records, the suit properties are referred to only as ryotwari lands and the plaintiffs wanted declaration and recovery of

possession only regarding the suit site as ryotwari land and for recovery of vacant possession after demolishing the superstructures thereon, the

question of directing the plaintiffs to value the suit land as house sites and also the superstructures thereon and to pay Court fee would not arise.

In this connection, the learned counsel for the revisions petitioners/ plaintiff would cite the decision of this Court in Soma Pandi Nadar v.

Sivasubramania Nadar reported in 1976-TLNJ-1969. The perusal of the said decision would show that the facts involved in that case were to the

effect that the revenue records would refer to the suit property as a ryotwari land, whereas it was being used as salt pan and in such circumstances

in a suit for partition, the plaintiff was permitted to value the suit property as ryotwari land and he was allowed to pay Court fee accordingly. But,

here it is obvious that the factual position is entirely different.

The Court on two occassions on perusal of the Commissioner''s Report clearly held that virtually the said suit land was converted into a big

plot area and several buildings cropped up. I am of the considered opinion that the plaintiffs having kept quiet, when the land was converted into

plot area and the buildings have been constructed by the defendants, cannot now veer round and contend ignoring of all those developments that

the plaintiffs want only the erstwhile ryotwari land and that they could value as agricultural land and could pay Court fee on kist value of such land.

The perusal of Sections 7 and 25 of Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955 would amply make the point clear that the physical

feature as it exists on the date of filing of the suit should be the dominant factor for valuation as well as for payment of Court fee. No plaintiff is

having the right to call upon the Court to visualise notionally ignoring the existing physical features presently on the land, by relying on the reference

in the revenue records, for the purpose of valuation and Court fee.

It is a trite proposition of law that the provision of a statute have to be interpreted by adhering to its grammatical plain meaning and one cannot

read anything into the provisions under the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955. I could see nowhere in the said Act anything

specified that the plaintiff could call upon the Court to ignore the present developments and visualise the suit property as it ought to have existed a

few years ago for the purpose of valuation and Court fees.

The learned counsel for the revisions petitioners/plaintiffs also cited the following decisions of this Court:

(i) Suseela & 4 others v. A.S.L. Rajan reported in 1999-2-L.W.772; and

(ii) Raman v. Rahmathunnisa and 2 others reported in 1999(III) CTC 88.

Perused the aforesaid two decisions also. In view of my discussion supra, I am of the considered opinion that those decisions are not germane

for the purpose of deciding this matter as the factual position in this case is different from the ones involved in those decisions.

The learned counsel for the respondent No. 18, 19 and 27 would cite the decision of this Court in D. Pattammal v. K. Kaliyanasundaram

reported in 1988-2-L.W.162. Certain excerpts from it would run thus:

S.7(v) of the old Act, related to suits for possession of land, houses and gardens. It was prescribed that in such cases, the court fee should be

paid according to the value of the subject-matter. The section provided for the computation of such value differently in the case of different kinds of

lands. It is significant to note that even under the old Act, when the subject matter was a house, or garden, the value was to be calculated

according to the market value of the house or garden as per S 7(v) (e). S.7 (ic)(c) of the old Act pertained to suits for declaratory decree or

orders with prayers for consequential reliefs under the old Act, the value was to be computed according to the amount at which the relief sought

was valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. Thus, in suits for declaration with consequential reliefs, the plaintiff had the option to value the

relief as he chose and court fee was payable only on such value. Once the Bench took the view that the suit was really one for declaration, it fell

under S.7(iv)(c) of the old Act. That decision cannot be invoked by the petitioner herein as the present suit is one for possession and there is no

prayer for declaration. As stated already, there is an application for amendment of the plaint to convert the suit into one for declaration and

consequential relief and if that amendment is allowed, it will fall under S.25(a) of the Act. In that event, under that Section, court fee has to be

computed on the market value of the property. Thus, there is no difference with regard to the computation of court fee whether the suit falls under

S.30 or under S.25. Under the old Court Fees Act, the computation of the court fee for suits falling under S.7(IV)(C) was entirely on a different

basis from the suits which fell under S.7(v)(e) of the old Act. Even assuming that the decision relied on by learned counsel for the petitioner applies

to the facts of the case, it would not make any difference as under the present Court Fees Act, the petitioner will have to pay the Court fees on the

market value of the property even if the suit is treated as one for declaration and consequential relief.

I agree with the statement of law found in the text book. Learned authors have also pointed out that there is great hardship in directing the

plaintiff to value the property as such even in case where the party claims only an interest which is lesser than that of a fee simple. But unfortunately

the legislature has chosen to make the provisions of the Act more stringent than what they were under the old Act. Under the old Act, there was a

possibility of granting relief from payment of heavy court fee by construing the plaint as was done by the Bench in Mazumdar Sobhanadri Rao

Panthulu Garu and others, because, the court-fee- payable under that sub-section was according to the amount at which the relief sought for was

valued in the plaint by the plaintiff. But under S.25(a) of the present Act which corresponds to S.7(iv)(c) of the old Act, the court fee is payable on

the market value of the property. The change which has been brought about by the Legislature in the new Act would only indicate that the

Legislature did not want to mitigate the hardship, if any, of the litigant. It has burden whether he claims a restricted interest or an absolute interest in

the property which, is the subject matter of the suit. However, it is a matter for the Legislature to consider again and decide whether court-fee

should be paid on the market value of the property as such even in cases where the plaintiff does not claim the absolute ownership thereof. This is

necessary, particularly, in view of the fact that on the Original Side of the High Court, the situation has been eased by making a provision for

payment of Court fee on the basis of slab system. But under the Court Fees Act of 1995, court-fee is to be paid on ad valorem basis. In my view,

the matter requires a second look by the Legislature"".

The perusal of the aforesaid extracts would clearly demonstrate that the market value of the suit properties should be assessed taking into

consideration the existing features as on the date of filing of the suit. As such, I am of the considered opinion that the trial Court was right in in

considering the fact that the suit property comprised of various buildings and accordingly the site should be treated only as house site and on that

basis it proceeded to determine the value together with the superstructures thereon. While upholding the approach of the trial Court, I would like to

disagree with the portion of the order of the trial Court, which is to the effect that the plaintiffs should amend the plaint and pay the Court fee as

assessed by the lower Court. After coming to the conclusion that the Principal District Munsif Court, Valliyoor was having no pecuniary jurisdiction

to entertain the suit, it ought to have returned the plaint by making an endorsement as contemplated under Order VII, Rule 10 of C.P.C. and

thereupon the Court to which the plaint would be presented, should assess the actual Court fee payable and thereupon the plaintiffs should be

compelled to pay the Court fee. With this slight modification, I would dispose of this Civil Revision Petition. The trial Court is directed to return the

plaint as per order VII, Rule 10 of C.P.C. by making necessary endorsements and accordingly the matter shall be processed. The learned counsel

for the revision petitioners/plaintiffs made an extempore submission to the effect that even though the Commissioner assessed the land as house site

and also the superstructures, yet it had not taken into account the actual market value as it prevailed as on the date of filing of the suit. According to

him placing reliance on the guideline register would not be proper, but the valuation should reflect the actual market value. I am of the considered

opinion that it is for the transferee Court to consider such submissions on merits. With the above observations, the Civil Revision Petition is

disposed of. No costs.