Kalyani vs Rajammal

N.S. Ramaswami, J.—This Civil Revision Petition arises out of an application under S.4-A(1) of Act 25 of 1955, hereinafter referred to as

the Act. The landlord filed the said application for the resumption on the ground that he wanted the lands for his own cultivation. The tenant offered

to pay the contractual rent which was payable before 27th September, 1955, as per sub-S.(3) of S.4-A. In spite of such an offer, the resumption

has been ordered. Hence, this revision petition filed by the tenant. The Revenue Court, in allowing the resumption under S.4-A (1) of the Act, has

relied upon the judgment of a Bench of this court in C.R.P. No. 2607 of 1971. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner (tenant) is

that the above said decision of the Division Bench goes counter to the decision of another Bench in Pitchai Ammal v. Sankara Muthiah Pillai 1963-

2-M.L.J. 361 : 76 L.W. 135, and that the Revenue court ought to have followed the earlier Division Bench decision. Learned counsel invited me

to follow the earlier decision in preference to the latter decision in (Palanisami Gounder v. Komaraswami Gounder) C.R.P. No. 2607 of 1971.

In S.4-A(1) it is slated that notwithstanding anything contained In any other provision of the Act, a landlord shall be entitled to resume

possession from any cultivating tenant possession for purposes of personal cultivation of lands not exceeding one-half of the extent of lands leased

out to the cultivating tenant. Sub-S.(3) of the said section is as follows:�

Any cultivating tenant from whom any land is sought to be resumed by the landlord for purposes of personal cultivation, may offer to pay to the

landlord in respect of the extent of the land which the landlord is entitled to resume for personal cultivation the rent at the rate which was payable to

him before the 27th September, 1955 and the Revenue Divisional Officer shall thereupon pass an order permitting him to continue in possession on

payment of such rent. The cultivating tenant shall, as long as he continues to cultivate the land, be bound to pay rent accordingly

The question is whether sub-S.(1) overrides sub-S.(3). As already seen, sub-S.(1) starts with the words ""Notwithstanding anything contained in

any other provisions of this. Act."" The Division Bench which decided the case of Pitchai Ammal v. Sankara Muthiah Pillai 1963-2-M.L.J. 361 : 76

L.W. 135, seems to hold that the above said words occurring in sub-S.(1) apply only to the other provisions of the Act except the said subsection

of S.4-A itself. But, the Division Bench which decided C.R.P. No. 2607 of 1971 has held as follows:--

The sub-section starts with the words notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act. It follows that the effect of the Section

is overriding. In other words, the right of the landlord to resume as provided for in sub-S. (1) is absolute and is not controlled by any other

provision of the Act, We are of the view, that this overriding effect cannot be lost sight of. That being the case, sub-S. (3) which neutralizes the

landlord''s right and allows the tenant to continue in possession on his offer to pay the contractual rent at the rate which was payable before 27th

September, 1955, cannot override and negate the absolute right already created. Sub-S.(3) does not say that notwithstanding what is stated in

sub-S. (1), the direction under that provision will prevail. We are, therefore, of the view that sub-S.(3) cannot be given effect in such a way as to

take away the right of the landlord under S.4-A (1).

This Division Bench specifically dealt with the question as to whether the clause ''notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of

this Act,'' occurring in sub-S.(1) controls only the other provisions of the Act barring the other sub-section of S.4-A itself and holds that it is not

so. It has been clearly held that sub-S.(3) cannot override sub-S.(1) and take away the right of the landlord conferred by the said sub-S.(1)

Further, it is a matter for consideration whether sub-S.(3) would have any relevance in the present context. When the Act came into force, the

contract rent prevailing prior to the commencement of the Act would have been, in every case, more than the fair rent to which the landlord would

be entitled under the provisions of the Act. The fair rent under the provisions of the Act is 40 percent of the gross produce. The value of 40

percent of gross produce in 1955 and that at present are, certainly, not the same. The court can, undoubtedly, take judicial note of the fact that the

prices of all commodities, particularly commercial crops, have enormously increased between 1955 and the present date. Therefore, I am quite

sure that the value of 40 percent of gross produce which the landlord would be entitled to even under the provisions of the Act, as on date, would

be far higher than the contract rent which had been prevailing prior to 27th September, 1955, if it had been fixed in cash. If the tenant is allowed to

lake advantage of sub-S. (3) as if it can override the effect of sub-S. (1) of S.4-A, it would mean that he can pay far less than what he would

otherwise be bound to pay under the provisions of the Act as rent, and, still, would have the advantage of retaining the lands without the landlord

getting the right of resumption. That could not be the intention of the Legislature. Under the above circumstances, following the decision of the

Division Bench in C.R.P. No. 2607 of 1971, (Palanisami Gounder v. Komaraswami Gounder), this Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No costs.