Pichai Ammal vs Sankara Muthia Pillai and another

Anantanarayanan, J.—These revision proceedings arose from petitions by a landlord claiming to resume cultivation of his holding to the

permitted extent under S. 4-A(2) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act (Act XXV of 1955). In both these proceedings the Revenue

Divisional Officer, Dindigul, held that S. 4-A(1) of the Act must be considered as qualified by S. 4-A(3) , so that the tenant is entitled to be in

possession of the land under the terms of S. 4-A(3). The only ground canvassed in both the revision petitions was that this view was erroneous,

and that S. 4-A(2) conferred upon the landlord an absolute right to resume, not affected by S. 4-A(3), provided, the other conditions of S. 4-A

were satisfied. The matter came up before Kunhamed Kutti, J. and the learned Judge directed that the proceedings might be placed before my

Lord the Chief Justice for being put before a Bench, in view of the apparent conflict in the decisions in Thayammal. V. Karuppanna Thevar (1961)

2 M.L.J. 505=74 L.W. 456 and C. Rajammal Vs. V.P. Chinnakannu Ambalam, to which decisions I shall presently make reference. It is thus that

the matter now comes up before us.

As far as S. 4-A (1) and S. 4-A(3) are concerned, the apparent conflict between which is the content of the revision proceedings, I shall

presently show that the consensus of view in this Court has been that there is no conflict, and that the sections are perfectly reconcilable with each

other, the right granted under S.4-A(1) is subject to the overriding rights of a cultivating tenant under S. 4-A(3) to continue in possession on

payment of the contractual rent. It is noteworthy that in Thayammal v. Karuppanna Thevar (1961) 2 M.L.J. 505=74 L.W. 456 Kailasam, J. did

not differ from the earlier view adopted by this Court on two relevant occasions, as far as this interpretation is concerned. On the contrary, he

agreed with those views. But he expressed the view that S. 4-A(4) in his opinion, gave a separate right to a landlord to resume cultivation, to the

extent permitted by that sub-section, which was not qualified by the provisions of S. 4-A(3) of the Act. It is this matter which has now to be

determined, in the light of the authorities.

The apparent conflict between S. 4-A(1) and S. 4-A(3) came up for decision before this Court in C. Rajammal Vs. V.P. Chinnakannu

Ambalam, which is a judgment of my Lord, the Chief Justice. This Court had then to deal with the interpretation of these sections, in the light of the

argument advanced that a literal interpretation of S. 4-A(3) of the Act giving the same meaning to the term "" cultivating tenant "" as in Sub-S. (1) of

the section might render nugatory the very provisions of the section and the right conferred on the landlord as well as the machinery set up to

enforce that right. Dealing with this aspect, this Court had occasion to point out that, on the basis of the principles of the interpretation of statutes as

enunciated in several authorities, it was permissible to depart from a literal adherence to the words of the enactment, where such adherence would

result, in absurdity, inconvenience or injustice. After an analysis of the provisions, in the light of those authorities, the conclusions were expressed in

the following form:

If S. 4 A(3) is limited to those cultivating tenants who would be entitled to the benefits of the Fair Rent Act, there will be no conflict between S. 4A

(1) and S.4-A (31 of the Act. On the other hand, there will be a happy correlation of the provisions with less injustice to the landlord and the

greater opportunity to effectively carry out the intention of the legislature, as expressed in S. 4A(1).

If I may be permitted to convey the argument thus expressed by my Lord, the Chief Justice in another form, the point here is that the legislature

was intending to mitigate, as far as the landlord was concerned, the rigors of the law which gave the cultivating tenant the advantage of seeking a

fair rent, which might be far less than the contractual obligation. Where such an advantage might accrue to a cultivating tenant, the legislature

thought it fit to extend the benefit of a resumption of the holding, or its part, to the landlord within the terms of S. 4-A(1): But S. 4-A(3) enacted

that where the tenant was willing to pay rent at the contractual rate itself, without attempting to obtain the benefits of the Fair Rent legislation, the

tenant should be permitted to continue in possession of the holding and to pay that rent, without the right of the landlord to resume for his own

cultivation any part of his holding.

As pointed out by Kailasam J. in Thayammal v. Karuppanna Thevar (1961) 2 M.LJ. 505=74 L.W. 456, upon an almost identical line of

reasoning, the same conclusion was arrived at by Rajagopalan J. in C.R.P. No. 137 of 1959. The relevant part of the judgment is extracted in the

above decision, and the following sentences will be sufficient to indicate the main trend of the argument:

Of course, but for S. 4-A (3) the right conferred by S, 4-A(1) on the landlord would be absolute.........But S 3(7) of the Act XXIV of 1956

specifically saved the operation of Sub S. (3) of S 4-A of the Act XXV of 1955, the scope of which I have already explained. Thus, in return for

the right of receiving the contract rate of rent unaffected by the provisions of Act XXIV of 1956 the landlord''s right of resumption, for which Sub

S.(1) of S 4-A provided, would become unenforceable, if the tenant exercises the right conferred upon him by Sub S. (3) of S. 4A, That was what

happened in this case.

I may here add that Kailasam J. has observed after setting forth this extract;

I most respectfully agree with the observations of the learned Judge.........

Thus, there it a consensus of view in this Court that the right conferred by S. 4-A(1) is questioned by S. 4-A(3), and is not an absolute right,

independent of the offer of the cultivating tenant to pay at the contractual rate and not seek the benefits of the Fair Rent legislation.

That would really conclude the content of these revision petitions. I find that the Court below has been somewhat concerned with the language

of S. 4-A(1). ""Notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act "", and that this is also one of the grounds urged in revision. But

this argument really gives us no difficulty for, obviously that language refers to other contexts and other provisions of the Act formulating the right of

the cultivating tenant to remain in possession of the holding without eviction by the landlord; obviously, the words do not apply to other sub-

sections of S. 4-A Itself. It could be shown that a contrary argument is manifestly untenable. For, if a contrary view is to be adopted, the right of

the landlord to resume cultivation would be un effected not merely by S. 4-A.(3), but by the specific ceilings and exceptions enacted in S. 4-A(4),

and that is clearly against the statute. But the problem still remains whether S. 4-A (4) enacts a separate right of the landlord to resume cultivation

of his holding, within the terms of that sub-section, which is not affected by S. 4-A(3) at all.

In giving his view that S. 4-A (4) did enact such a separate right, Kailasam, J. indicated two main grounds in support of his interpretation. The

first was that the intention of the framers of the Act could not have been to exclude the landlord, and particularly the landlord who might be justly

termed a very small proprietor, from cultivating even one cent of land. The learned Judge observed that that would be the result of S. 4-A(3) and is

held to qualify S. 4-A(4). The learned Judge also thought that the numerical order of the sub-sections was not wholly without significance; he

pointed out that S. 4 A(3) came after S. 4-A(1) and before S. 4-A(4).

A careful study of S. 4-A(4) of the Act no doubt shows that certain ceilings are specified and certain exceptions enacted, with regard to the

right of landlord to resume cultivation of any part of his holding. Finally, S. 4-A(4) enacts that nothing in Sub-S. (1) Should be deemed to confer

on the landlord a right to resume possession of a greater extent than that which, along with the extent he is already in possession of ""Both would

make up an extent of five acres of wet land"". But there is nothing in this sub-section to show that the legislature intended thereby either to enact a

separate right of resumption of cultivation, apart from S. 4-A(1), or to enact a right which is not qualified by the right given to the cultivating tenant

under S. 4-A(3) to remain undisturbed in possession of the holding, so lung as he pays rent at the contractual rate. It must be observed that the

initial situation is not one wherein the small proprietor is in possession of his entire holding, and some enactment compels him to carve out a lease in

favour of the tenant or some one else; but the initial situation is one in which there is already a lease under the Common law, and, the object of the

legislation (Madras Act XXV of 1955) being to protect cultivating tenants from eviction, the question is whether a restricted right of resumption for

cultivation should not be given to small proprietors, as the law permits such cultivating tenants not merely to remain unevicted but also to have the

fair rent fixed, which might be far less than the contract rate. In this view of the law, we are unable to see anything strange or anything which calls

for comment in the face that S. 4-A(3) qualifies not merely S. 4-A(1) but also S.4-A(4), both of which obviously have to be read together for this

purpose. Nor can any significance be seen in the numerical order of the sub-sections. On the contrary, there is much to be said for the view that a

mere elegant drafting of S. 4-A itself, would have been to place S. 4-A(4) below S. 4-A (1) and not below S. 4-A(3) of the Act. Hence, we are

of the view that the right of a landlord to resume cultivation of a part of his holding has to be gleaned from both S. 4-A(1) and S. 4-A(4). When

these are read together, and subject to the exceptions enunciated in S. 4-A(4), that right is qualified by the right of the cultivating tenant to remain in

possession of the entire holding, so long as he is willing to pay the rent at the contract rate under the common law, without attempting to avail

himself of the advantages of the fair rent legislation for half the property S. 4-A (3). With regard to the other half, of course, the cultivating tenant

cannot be prevented from obtaining redress under the special enactment with regard to the rent payable by him. In this interpretation of the

intendment of the legislature in enacting the several sub-sections, there is nothing which is against the declared policy of the Act itself, or against any

principle of natural justice. We are hence constrained to hold that the view adopted by Kailasam, J., in Thayammal. v. Karuppanna Thevar (1),

with regard to the effect of S. 4-A(4) cannot be upheld. It follows that the revision petitions fail and they are dismissed. But there will be no order

as to costs.