Kanta Prosad Singh and Others vs State Transport Authority and Others

Sarjoo Prosad, C.J.—These are ten applications presented under Article 226 of the Constitution. In all these cases, the Petitioners have applied for a writ of certiorari or any other writ of the like nature praying to quash the orders of the Regional Transport Authority, refusing to grant or renew permits to these Petitioners in respect of their Stage Carriages, and in consequence to quash also the orders of the Appellate Authority affirming those of the former Authority.

The facts in most of these applications are common and that is why they were directed to be heard together. In nine of these petitions, one of the main allegations on which the applications are founded is that five of the members of the Regional Transport Authority were guilty of corrupt practices; they had thereby rendered them-selves incompetent to sit as members of that Body to decide those cases for grant of permit to the various Applicants. In one of the cases, Civil Rule No. 14 of 1954 in which the Petitioner is represented by Mr. F.A. Ahmed, there is no such allegation. The other allegations which are also common to Civil Rule No. 14 of 1954 relate to the merits of the various orders. Their complaint on that score is that both the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Board took extraneous matters into consideration in passing their orders which were illegal and not warranted by the Motor Vehicles Act.

The Petitioners happened to be holders of permits standing in their names for plying Stage Carriage buses on different routes. The permits according to the case of the Petitioners were due to expire in August, 1953 and the Petitioners, therefore, applied for renewal of their permits. All such applications were admittedly placed for hearing by the Regional Transport Authority between the 24th and 28th of August, 1953. The case of the Petitioners is that their applications were actually heard on 27-8-1953 when they learnt that five of the members had already been influenced by extraneous considerations and had taken bribes. They had thus become incompetent to hear those cases. The Petitioners therefore filed an application on that very day making definite allegations against these members about the charges of bribery.

They had at first lodged a verbal complaint but at the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, they followed it up with a written petition. A counter-affidavit has been filed by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority and in the affidavit, it has been stated that the cases of the Petitioners were actually heard on the 26th August and not on the 27th as alleged by them and it was only when adverse orders came to be passed against them that they came out with allegations of bribery or corrupt practices against some of the members of the Regional Transport Authority.

It would have been very desirable to maintain minutes of the proceedings of the Regional Transport Authority in order to show when these cases were actually taken up by that body; but we see no adequate reason to discard the statement on affidavit made by the Secretary against whom there is no specific adverse allegation levelled by the Petitioners. We accordingly hold that these cases were actually heard on 26-8-1953 while the petition containing allegations of corruption was filed day alter on the 27th. As one would have expected, the allegations made by the Petitioners were referred for enquiry to the Criminal Investigation Department.

In the meantime, the Petitioners also filed an application before the Chairman, State Transport Authority for stay of the operation of the orders of the Regional Transport Authority. The Chairman, who is also the Minister in charge, on 9-9-1953 directed stay of proceedings. He also called for a report from the Criminal Investigation Department and the Anti-Corruption Department on the allegations made in the petition after due investigation. Some other petitions to the same effect were filed on 16-9-1953 and, 5-11-53 asking that the appeals preferred in the meantime before the Appellate Authority should be kept pending until the investigation of those charges.

On 23-11-1953, the Chairman of the State Transport Authority ultimately passed orders discharging the interim stay which had been granted earlier and directing the appeals to be heard and disposed of by the Appellate Authority. The order shows that the Chairman duly considered the allegations made in the various petitions, the report of the Deputy Commissioner, Lakhimpur, and also the report of the Inspector (C.I.D.) which contained also the statement of the witnesses examined by the latter and also the report of the Deputy Superintendent of Police, in charge of the Anti-Corruption Branch, dated 18-11-53. After considering all these materials, the Chairman held that the complaints had not been substantiated, the witnesses were interested in the grant of permits and such persons as were unsuccessful in that attempt put forward charges of bribery against some of the members. He, therefore, felt that the evidence was of an interested character and he could not act upon that evidence alone. In his opinion, no further action on those petitions was called for and he therefore discharged the stay order and directed the appeals to be heard. Prima facie, the order is a well-considered one.

The Petitioners complain that the entire copy of the order was not issued to them and therefore, they had no knowledge of its contents. This in our opinion should have been done. Indeed, a mere copy of the ultimate order given to the Petitioners in a cryptic form without the reasons in support thereof would throw no light on the question whether the Chairman had taken into consideration all the materials before him, the more so, where the allegations made by the Petitioners were of a serious character. It was quite necessary that the entire copy of the order should have been given to them in order to satisfy them that the Chairman had not acted arbitrarily but had applied his mind to the matter before coming to his decision.

The learned Counsel on behalf of the Petitioners contends that the decision at which the Chairman arrived should not be held to be correct and that we should re-examine for ourselves the allegations made and the report submitted by the officers of the Criminal Investigation Department or of the Anti-Corruption Department. On the whole, it appears to us, even on an examination of those reports, that in an application under Article 226 of the Constitution, it is difficult for us to take a different view of the matter from what the Chairman of the State Transport Authority appears to have done. In case of disputed facts, it is impossible for us to adjudicate at this stage whether the allegations were actually correct or unfounded. The persons accused appear to have denied them. We quite appreciate that the Regional Transport Authority or the State Transport Authority are quasi-judicial bodies and in the interest of maintaining the confidence of the public, the members of these bodies should conduct themselves with absolute fairness and impartiality. It would have been far more desirable to constitute another Regional Transport Authority to decide these cases when serious allegations or charges had been made against some members of that body. Even if some of the members of such bodies carry with them an ill repute that should be enough to disqualify them from sitting on such bodies.

But it appears that here, the allegations were made after the decision had been given and therefore possibly the authorities had no occasion to take steps to supersede that body which had already decided the matter. These observations, therefore, have been made by us merely for guidance in future, if necessary. The position then is that we cannot at this stage say that the opinion of the Chairman of the State Transport Authority was altogether illegal or erroneous. Howsoever wide our powers under Article 226 may be, we should not constitute ourselves as an appellate Court here and sit on judgment over the decision given by him. For the purpose of the decision of these cases, we have to assume for the time being that the view which has been taken by him was the correct view. If the Petitioners are so advised, they may take legal steps to prosecute the persons concerned on the allegations made against them.

The next question which arises is whether on merits, the decision could be justified. Here again, we would like to point out that we are not sitting to decide these eases as an appellate Court. We have only to see whether the Authorities concerned have acted in accordance with law; and according to the principles of natural justice; and that there was no want of jurisdiction in those bodies in making the orders now impugned. We cannot interfere with the merits of their orders or the reasons given by them in refusing to grant permits to these Petitioners.

The orders reveal that the grounds affecting the merits of these cases could be classified mainly under two heads. One is that the Regional Transport Authority or the Appellate Authority have taken into consideration the fact of the imposition of composite fines over some of these Petitioners who were permit-holders as an element disqualifying them from getting renewal of their permits. The contention is that there is nothing in the law to authorise the imposition of composite fines on the Petitioners and particularly by the Secretary of the Regional Transport Authority. Indeed, this Court in its decision in -- Labanya Chandra and Another Vs. The State of Assam and Others, pointed out that such an imposition of fine was illegal.

The imposition of fine may be illegal but the authority granting the permit can certainly take into account the fact that there was overloading of buses beyond the maximum capacity on various occasions by these Petitioners. In some cases, of course, there were several violations of this direction in the permit. In other cases, the violations were not so numerous but none the less, it was open to the Authorities to take into consideration the fact that there had been a broach of the conditions of the permit. Section 60(1)(a), Motor Vehicles Act, provides for such a contingency. It says that the Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit on the breach of any condition specified in sub-section (3) of Section 59, or of any condition contained in the permit. The objectionable feature here is that there were instances of overloading by these permit-holders beyond the permissible capacity of the buses plied by them. The practice was evidently to the detriment of public interest.

It was also argued that u/s 58, Motor Vehicles Act, a permit-holder was entitled to renewal as a matter of course and provided the other conditions'' were equal, he was to be given preference over the new Applicants. The learned Advocate-General in reply contends that in these cases, Section 58 had no application, firstly, because these Petitioners were merely temporary permit-holders and secondly because the other conditions were not equal. In other words, according to the Advocate-General, none of the requisites of Section 58 are present. So far as the first contention is concerned, the learned Advocate-General relies upon the circumstance that by virtue of the order passed by the Chairman of the State Transport Authority on 9-9-1953, the status quo was directed to be maintained and these people were allowed to ply their buses on the routes concerned until the disposal of their appeals. Mr. Lahiri therefore argues that this means that in effect, temporary permits had been given to these Petitioners and consequently, Section 58 had no application at all.

I am afraid, this argument cannot be entertained for the obvious reason that the permits of these Petitioners were not of a temporary character. Even according to the counter-affidavit filed by the Secretary, these permits were for three years from 1-9-50 to 31-8-53 and before they were to expire, applications for renewal of permits had already been made by these Petitioners. The fact that the Chairman of the State Transport Authority by an order allowed them to ply their buses on these routes during the course of the proceedings in spite of the refusal to renew their permits by the Regional Transport Authority does not mean that these people were merely temporary permit-holders.

There is, however, more substance in the other contention of the learned Advocate-General, because if the Authorities cancerned were entitled to take into consideration the fact that there had been breaches of rules or conditions of the permit by the Petitioners on account of which their permits could not be renewed, then obviously, conditions were adverse, to them and no question of any preference arose at all.

It has also been suggested that the Authorities concerned erred in law in considering matters beyond the factors laid down in Section 48, Motor Vehicles Act, in order to come to their decision whether to refuse or to renew the permits in question. This contention is not quite sound because Section 48 does not prevent these bodies from taking notice of other relevant and comprehensive details. If any authority is necessary, reference may be made to the decision in -- M. Ramayya Vs. The State of Madras and Another, It is well esta-blished that no one is entitled as a matter of right to the grant of a permit under the Motor Vehicles Act. Even if all the legal conditions are fulfilled, the Authorities have the power to reject an application for permit: (See -- Veerappa Pillai Vs. Raman and Raman Ltd. and Others, and under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court would not be justified in interfering with the decision of these bodies which is based on relevant facts and surrounding circumstances, though I agree that if it had been found that their orders were based on illegal factors and considerations) not warranted by the law, it would have been open to us to interfere.

On the other head, the point which had been argued on behalf of the Petitioners is that in some cases the permits have been issued to non-existent-persons. The question here is not to whom permit has been granted, but whether the Transport Authorities were justified in refusing to renew the permits in favour of these Petitioners. On a closer examination of the matter, it appears to us, however, that there is no substance in the complaint either. What has actually happened is that in some cases, the permits have been granted to two or more Applicants jointly. It is not that these persons had not made any application for issue of permits; but in making the orders, the Transport Authority observed that the permits were granted to these Applicants on their forming a company. The word ''company'' as a matter of fact is a misnomer. All that it means is that those persons were jointly granted the permits in question and were entitled to carry on transport as such. There is nothing illegal about it. As I have said, the question really does not arise before us because the point which we are to consider is whether the renewal of permits has been rightly refused to these Petitioners or it has been done on grounds which are illegal or ultra vires.

We find here that it is not that the Appellate Authority has simply adopted, as a matter of course, the orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority. We noticed in several cases that it did not accept the recommendations of the Regional Transport Authority and came to its own decision on the point. For instance, in Civil Rule No. 5 of 1954, we found that the person to whom the permit had been granted was refused by the Appellate Authority because in the opinion of the Appellate Authority, that person was also held to be a habitual offender u/s 59, Motor Vehicles Act. The Authorities have also in various cases given other reasons for holding that permits could not be renewed to some of the Petitioners: the reasons for instance are that some of them also carried on the transport business benami in the names of others; and that some of them had already permits on different routes in the names of their relations and it was undesirable that one family should have a monopoly of the transport business. It cannot be said that these considerations were illegal.

Public interest may require that there should be no monopoly of transport systems converging in the hands of a few families. It is also desirable on principle that benami transactions in a matter like this should not be encouraged as in such a case disqualified and unscrupulous persons may obtain permits in the names of others. For these reasons'', we are satisfied that there has been no miscarriage of justice in these cases and there was no want of jurisdiction in the Transport Authorities in making the orders which they have done in refusing to renew or grant permit to these Petitioners. It may be that some of the members of that body may have become disqualified from acting as members of the Regional Transport Authority in view of the allegations made by the Petitioners. But at this stage, we are unable to say one way or the other.

On the other hand, the decision of that body has been tested in due course by the Appellate Authority. This Authority has given its reasons for coming to its decision. It appears that actually in the grounds of appeal presented to the Appellate Authority, it was not even urged that the orders under appeal were illegal or ultra vires on account of the fact that some of the members had accepted illegal gratification in coming to their decision. There were undoubtedly petitions filed earlier which were dealt with by the Chairman of the State Transport Authority but before the Appellate Authority itself, these grounds do not appear to have been urged. No allegations have been made against the members of the appellate body. It has considered the questions on merits and no illegality or irregularity has been disclosed so far as the proceedings before the Appellate Authority are concerned. In these circumstances, we see no reason to interfere with its order.

The applications are accordingly rejected and the rules discharged. The stay order stands vacated. But we do not feel in the circumstances that we should make any order for costs.

Deka, J.

I agree.