AI Structured Summary
Not yet generated for this judgment
Judgment
B. Padmaraj, J.-Heard the arguments of the learned Counsels for the appellant and the learned State Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State at a considerable length and carefully perused the case records with their assistance.
The original accused 1 is the appellant herein. He was tried by the learned Trial Judge for the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, for committing the murder of one Kivuda Madaiah on 16-8-1993 at about 2 p.m. in the paddy field bearing Sy. No. 503 of Bilugali Village by assaulting him with an axe. He has been convicted of the said offence and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and also a fine of Rs. 2,000/- , in default to suffer rigours imprisonment for three months. Aggrieved thereby, he has preferred this appeal.
The original accused 2, the mother of the appellant herein, has however been acquitted of the charges under Section 109 read with Section 302 of the IPC. The State has not preferred any appeal against the order of acquittal made in favour of accused 2.
The facts of the case are as follows.-
The appellant is the son of one Basavaiah. The deceased Kivuda Madaiah and the father of the appellant were brothers. P.W. 2-Manugamma is the wife and P.W. 3-Mahadevaiah is the son of the deceased. P.W. 1-Puttalaxamma is the daughter-in-law of the deceased and wife of P.W. 3. P.W. 4-Mahadevaswamy is a close relative of the deceased (grandson of the deceased), aged about 12 years at the time when he gave evidence in the Court and since his childhood he had been residing in the house of the deceased. The house of the accused and the deceased were separated only by a wall. That is to say their two houses were adjoining to one another and there was only a wall in between their two houses. Similarly the lands of the accused were adjoining to the lands of the deceased. They were neighbours as well as the neighbouring landowners, besides being related to each other. It is not in dispute that there used to be frequent quarrels between the accused and the deceased in connection with or in regard to the taking water to their respective lands and in that regard, a criminal case was also filed prior to the death of the deceased Kivuda Madaiah. The same was still pending for trial in Court when the incident in question took place. All these facts are not in serious dispute and they are even admitted by the appellant in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. While this was so, it appears that on 16-8-1993 in respect of some incident which occurred at about 7 a.m. in the morning wherein the brother of the appellant stated to have assaulted P.W. 2, she had gone to Biligere police out post along with her son P.W. 3 to lodge a complaint in the morning. Thereafter at about 10 or 10.30 a.m., the deceased Kivuda Madaiah left the house to go to his land to feed water to the crops. At that time, the only inmates of the house of the deceased were P.Ws. 1 and 4. That is to say, P.Ws. 1 and 4 were the only two persons who were then present in the house. Then, it is stated that the accused 1 (the appellant herein) went with an axe towards the land. Since P.W. 1 had overheard the accused 2 telling her son the accused 1 to go and kill Kivuda Madaiah, who will be found alone in the land and since the deceased did not return to the house though it was already 1.30 p.m. P.W. 1 stated to have proceeded towards their land to see as to why the deceased had not yet returned home from the land. On reaching the land, P.W. 1 saw the deceased removing the weeds in the land and she also joined him in that work of removing the weeds. At that time, it is stated that the accused 1 came near the deceased and began to quarrel with him. At that relevant time, it is stated that P.W. 1, the deceased and the accused 1 were the only persons present in the land.
A certain Bettamma, P.W. 15 was found removing weeds in her land at a distance of about 100 ft. from them. P.W. 15-Bettamma had however turned hostile to the prosecution and she did not support the case. She would however admit in her evidence that her wetland and the wetlands of the accused and the deceased are situated side by side. She denied her presence in her land at or about the time of the incident. It is the further case of the prosecution that after raking up a quarrel with the deceased and while saying that he would finish off the deceased, the accused 1 stated to have assaulted the deceased with an axe on the legs, hands and other parts of the body of the deceased. The accused 1 inflicted as many as 8 injuries on the person of the deceased. On being so assaulted by the accused 1, the deceased collapsed to the ground while crying in pain. P.W. 1-Puttalakshmamma, who witnessed the incident of assault committed on the deceased, cried out for help to rescue the deceased. But none came to her rescue. In the meanwhile, the accused 1 ran away from the spot along with the axe towards Haropura Village. P.W. 15-Bettamma had also alleged to have witnessed the incident of assault committed on the deceased by the accused but she only raised a cry expressing her astonishment or anguish as to what had happened. But, as we have already stated, she did not support the prosecution case and had been declared as hostile. After seeing such ghastly incident, P.W. 1 got scared and became panicky and hence, she immediately returned to the house weeping and crying. Then, on being enquired by P.W. 4 as to the reason for her crying, she told him about that she saw at the land. Then P.W. 4 left the house to go and inform the said fact to P.Ws. 2 and 3, who had left the house in the morning and had not yet returned to the house. P.W. 4 met them at the bus-stop and informed them of the incident as has been narrated to him by P.W. 1. Thereafter, it is stated that accompanied by a police personnel of the outpost, P.W. 3 came to the spot. Then, the presence of P.W. 1 was secured to the spot and her statement came to be recorded in respect of this incident. P.W. 11 who was then working as the PSI of Koulande Police Station recorded the statement of P.W. 1 at the spot, which is as per Ex. P. 1 and sent the same through a Police Constable to get the case registered at the Police Station.
Thereafter, by remaining at the spot, he had assisted the CPI in his investigation. P.W. 13, who was then working as Head Constable in Koulande Police Station and being the S.H.O., received the complaint sent by the PSI-P.W. 11 and on the basis of which, he registered the case at the Police Station and sent the case papers to the PSI at the spot. P.W. 18 who was then the CPI of Nanjangud and Koulande Police Station coming under his jurisdiction, received information on 16-8-1993 at about 3.30 p.m. about the murder at Biligere Village from Koulande P.S. and proceeded to the spot. After coming to the spot, he held inquest proceedings over the dead body of the deceased as per the inquest report Ex. P. 6. During the inquest proceedings, he seized the bloodstained mud, sample mud, a pair of chappals and bed sheet from the scene of incident. He also recorded the statements of P.Ws. 1, 2 and 3. He sent the dead body of the deceased for its post-mortem examination and visited Biligere Village where he recorded the statements of P.Ws. 4 and 15. On 20-8-1993, at about 2.30 p.m., P.W. 10 produced the appellant before him and he had caused his arrest. He also interrogated the accused and recorded his voluntary statement as per Ex. P. 16. He found bloodstains on the shirt worn by the appellant and seized the same (M.O. 1) under a panchanama Ex. P. 7. Thereafter, it is stated that the appellant in consequence of his voluntary statement Ex. P. 16 made before the CPI, lead him and the panchas to a land in Biligere Village which was situated nearby the scene of the incident and there, from inside a bush, the appellant took out the axe, M.O. 6 and produced it before the CPI. The same was seized under a panchanama Ex. P. 8. On 21-8-1993, the appellant was produced before the concerned Magistrate and he was remanded to judicial custody. Thereafter, it is stated that since the CPI, P.W 18 fell sick, he made over the further investigation in this case to P.W. 17, who in his turn completed the investigation and filed the charge-sheet into the Court against the accused.
P.W. 1-Puttalakshmamma besides being a complainant is an eye-witness to the incident and she has fully supported the case of the prosecution. Ex. P. 1 is the complaint, which was recorded at the spot on 16-8-1993 at about 5.10 p.m. She is the daughter-in-law of the deceased. She also speaks to the motive aspect of the case.
P.W. 2 is the wife of the deceased. She was informed by P.W. 4 about the occurrence. She also speaks to the motive aspect of the case.
P.W. 3 is the son of the deceased who had accompanied his mother P.W. 2 to the police outpost for the purpose of lodging a complaint in respect of the morning incident and was informed about the incident in question by P.W. 4. He also speaks to the motive aspect of the case.
P.W. 5 is the Doctor who conducted the PM examination on the dead body of the deceased on 17-8-1993 between 9 a.m. and 12 noon and has issued the PM report as per Ex. P. 2. He noticed as many as 8 ante-mortem injuries and they are:
A contusion red in colour 1.5 cm x.5 cm. present on the middle of left clavicle.
An incised injury measuring 5 cm. x 1 cm. x 2 cm. present on the medial aspect, 4 cm. above the left knee joint with clotted blood sticking around the wound. On dissection of the wound, a transverse fracture of the lower end of left femur shaft present with collection of blood all round and lower end of fractured femur.
An incised injury measuring 1 cm. x.5 cm. x.5 cm present on the medial aspect of left knee joint.
An incised injury measuring 1 cm. x.5 cm. x.5 cm. present on the medial aspect of left leg.
An incised injury 2 cm. x 2.5 cm. x 1 cm. present on the medial aspect 4 cm. above the medial molleolus of right leg. A transverse fracture of lower end of right tibia present.
An incised injury 3 cm. x 1 cm. x 1 cm. present on the lateral aspect of right knee joint.
An incised injury 6 cm. x 3 cm. x 3 cm. depth present on the posterior aspect of lower end of upper arm with transverse fracture of lower end of right humerous exposing the muscles and blood vessels.
Fracture of the lower end of left ulna present.
He has opined as to the cause of death of the deceased that it may be due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of multiple injuries to humerus and femur and tibia. He had further examined the axe, M.O. 6 on 17-8-1993 and opined that the injuries found on the dead body of the deceased could be caused with a weapon like M.O. 6. His opinion is at Ex. P. 3. While examining the weapon M.O. 6, he found that it has sharp edge as well as blunt portion. He has also spoken to about the possible posture of the deceased and his assailant at the time of the alleged assault. That apart, in the cross-examination of the doctor-P.W. 5, it is elicited on behalf of the accused that the cumulative effect of all the injuries found in Ex. P. 2 was to cause death and not that any individual injury was able to cause death of a person. He has further stated that the cumulative effect of all the said injuries was due to shock and haemorrhage and the death of the deceased according to the Dr. P.W. 5 was due to shock and haemorrhage.
P.W. 6 is the Village Accountant of Biligere Village who has issued the RTC extract in respect of the land in question as per Ex. P. 4 which stands in the name of Kivuda Madaiah and others.
P.W. 7 is the Police Constable who had been deputed to guard the dead body of the deceased at the spot and accordingly, he had guarded the dead body of the deceased till its post-mortem examination. M.Os. 2, 3 and 7 are the articles that were found on the dead body of the deceased.
P.W. 8 is a panch witness for the panchanama Ex. P. 6.
P.Ws. 9 and 16 are the panchas for the seizure of the bloodstained shirt M.O. 1 from the person of the accused under Ex. P. 7-panchanama and also they are the panchas for the recovery of the axe, M.O. 6 at the instance of the accused under the panchanama Ex. P. 8. They have both supported the prosecution case.
P.W. 10 was then in-charge of the above said outpost. He had visited the spot along with P.W. 3 and returned back and informed the same to the PSI. He further apprehended the appellant on 20-8-1993 at about 1.30 pm. and produced him before the Investigating Officer.
P.W. 11 is the PSI who had recorded the complaint of P.W. 1 at the spot as per Ex. P. 1 and sent it for registration of the crime to the Police Station.
P.Ws. 12 and 18 are the Investigating Officers.
P.W. 13 is the Head Constable who received the complaint sent by the PSI and registered the case at the Police Station.
P.W. 14 carried the FIR to the jurisdictional Magistrate and also the articles to the FSL.
P.W. 15 was put forth as an eye-witness to the incident but she had turned hostile.
The accused when examined under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., except admitting the frequent quarrels between them and the deceased regarding the taking of water and pendency of a criminal case in Court, has denied all the other incriminating circumstances appearing in the case against him. With respect to his being apprehended by P.W. 10 on 16-8-1993 at about 8 p.m., he pleads his ignorance. So also he pleads his ignorance with respect to his arrest by the I.O., P.W. 18 and his being interrogated by him and furnishing the voluntary statement Ex. P. 16. He also pleaded his ignorance to the recovery of the axe, M.O. 6 at his instance. It is pertinent to note that with respect to the seizure of bloodstained shirt, M.O. 1 and recovery of the axe, M.O. 6 at his instance, the appellant has only pleaded his ignorance and he did not deny the same nor offered any explanation.
The Court below on consideration of the entire evidence on record and after hearing the arguments on both sides, has convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated supra. Hence, this appeal by the convicted accused 1.
In the appeal, the learned Counsel for the appellant has vehemently contended before us that the defence does not dispute the motive but the question is whether P.W. 1 could be believed to convict the accused 1 for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC. He contended that the evidence with regard to the recovery is of no consequence in the case in view of the fact that the shirt was recovered from the person of the accused and hence, it cannot be called a discovery and that further, the axe, M.O. 6 was not identified by P.W. 1 and hence, the recovery of the axe, M.O. 6 at the instance of the accused loses its significance. He contended that the entire case of the prosecution depends on the testimony of P.W. 1, who besides being an interested witness, is also a partisan witness. In that view of the matter, her evidence is to be scrutinised with a greater care and caution. He also contended that P.W. 1 has been disbelieved by the Trial Court on an important aspect of the case viz., the accused 2 instigating the accused 1 to finish off the deceased and handing over the axe to the accused 1 and this according to the learned Counsel being the foundation, it would considerably affect the credibility of the testimony of P.W. 1 in Court. He also contended that it is highly whether P.W. 1 had really left for the land on that day in the morning as alleged by her. While elaborating this submission, he contended that a reason given by P.W. 1 to leave the house for the land is highly unnatural and improbable. He also contended that the deceased not returning to the house at about 1.30 was not unusual because he had left the house for the land only at about 10.30 a.m. or 11 a.m. and this could not have been the reason for P.W. 1 to leave for the land. He also contended that it is very strange to note that after going over to the land, she does not talk to the deceased and on the other hand, she also joins him in the work of removing weeds, which appears to be highly unnatural. According to the learned Counsel, this conduct of P.W. 1 throws a doubt whether she really went to the land on that day. He also contended that P.W. 1 had a child aged about 3 years and that being so, could she leave her child alone in the house and go to the land. He contended that no doubt the Trial Court has sought to get over the said aspect by saying that P.W. 1 was very much in the house to look after the child and hence, she might have left for the land as stated by her, but this is not the case of P.W. 1. He contended that the factum of P.W. 1 coming to the land itself is highly discrepant which creates doubt about her going to the land. He therefore, contended that for all these reasons, it is really doubtful whether P.W. 1 could have been present at the spot when the incident in question took place. He further contended that it is her subsequent conduct which makes her evidence still doubtful because she does not narrate the incident voluntarily to P.W. 4 and on the other hand, it is only when P.W. 4 enquiries with her, she narrates the incident. According to the learned Counsel this could not be the natural conduct of P.W. 1 if she had really witnessed the incident in question. He further contended that it is also doubtful whether P.W. 1 could have told P.W. 4 about the incident. In this context, he also contended that even P.W. 10 at the outpost had not been informed about the incident of the accused killing the deceased. He contended that it is also doubtful whether Ex. P. 1 is really a FIR in view of certain infirmities in the case. According to the learned Counsel, there must be an oral information to the Police, which made them to come to the spot and hence, Ex. P. 1 which was stated to have been recorded at the spot, cannot be treated as the FIR. He contended that this would have some marginal effect in appreciating the evidence of P.W. 1. He therefore, contended that it is highly doubtful that P.W. 1 could be an eye-witness to the incident. He further reiterated his contention that the circumstance regarding recovery is of no consequence in this case. He further contended in the alternative that the case made out by the prosecution, even if the same is accepted as a whole, cannot fall under Section 302 of the IPC but at the most is would fall under Section 304, Part I of the IPC. While elaborating this submission, he contended that all the injuries sustained by the deceased were on the non-vital parts and hence, the intention of the accused or whoever committed the crime was only to cause grievous hurt and not murder. He contended that even the medical evidence in the case does not satisfy the requirements of Section 302 of the IPC. He also contended that looking to the circumstances in which the incident is alleged to have occurred, it could not have been difficult for the killer to inflict the injury on any vital part of the deceased and expedited his death. He therefore contended that the act attributed to the accused 1 by the prosecution would attract an offence under Section 304 of the IPC and not under Section 302 of the IPC.
As against this, the learned State Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State has contended that the evidence of P.W. 1 is convincing and her presence at the spot at the time of this incident cannot at all be doubted. He contended that even in the cross-examination done on behalf of the accused, it is elicited that after seeing the accused 2 giving the axe to accused 1, she was going towards their land to inform her father-in-law about the same. According to the learned State Public Prosecutor, this was the real reason for P.W. 1 to go to the land. He also contended that though the Trial Court might have acquitted the accused 2 of the offences under Section 109 read with Section 302 of the IPC, that by itself will not discredit the evidence of P.W. 1. He further contended that on the facts and circumstances of the case, it is very clear that the act attributed to the accused 1 was a premeditated one. He also contended that the accused 1 was actually going ahead of P.W. 1 and no sooner they reached the land, the incident in question took place in the very present of P.W. 1 and hence, the presence of P.W. 1 at the spot at the time of this incident is quite natural and probable. He also contended that merely because the injuries were inflicted on non-vital parts of the body of the deceased, it will not take away the offence from Sections 302 to 304 of the IPC especially when the intention of the accused 1 was to liquidate the deceased. He contended that the reasonings of the Trial Court for acquitting the accused 2 may not be correct but the ultimate conclusion reached by the Trial Court for convicting the accused 1 under Section 302 of the IPC is sound and proper and hence it cannot be interfered with by this Court in the appeal. He therefore contended that there is absolutely no merit in this appeal filed by the appellant.
Having heard the arguments on both sides and having carefully gone through the entire evidence on record with their assistance, the only question that would arise for consideration in this appeal is whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC can be sustained in law.
The prosecution sought to prove its case against the appellant/accused 1 by adducing evidence relating to the motive of the crime, eye-witness to the occurrence and seizure of the bloodstained shirt from the person of the appellant at the time of his arrest and the recovery of the bloodstained axe-M.O. 6, by which death had been caused, in consequence of the voluntary statement made by the accused 1.
In the light of the submissions made on both sides, we shall now proceed to examine the materials on record qua each of the aforesaid pieces of evidence relied upon by the prosecution in order to find out whether the prosecution case as against the appellant has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
Motive.-The present is not a case of complete dearth of motive. In the instant case, the appellant himself when examined under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C., would admit the fact that since about two years prior to the incident in question, there used to be frequent quarrels between P.W. 3 and the members of his family on one side and himself (accused 1) on the other side in connection with taking water to their respective lands and in that regard, a case is also pending in Nanjangud Court. Thus, the above admission made by the accused 1 himself would confirm the evidence of P.Ws. 1, 2, 3 and 4 with regard to the motive aspect of the case. All these witnesses have consistently spoken to the fact that there used to be frequent quarrels between the family of the deceased and the family of the accused 1 in connection with taking of water to their respective wetlands and that a case has also been pending in the Court at Nanjangud with regard to the incident of such quarrel. This is confirmed by the admission made by the accused himself in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Cr. P.C. In fact, even on the date of the alleged occurrence also, there was an earlier incident at about 7 a.m. in the morning, wherein the wife of the deceased was alleged to have been assaulted by the accused 2 and her another son Mahadeva and in respect of which, both P.Ws. 2 and 3 had gone to the Police Outpost at Biligere to lodge a complaint. When the prosecution has thus succeeded in showing the possibility of some ire of the accused towards the deceased, the inability to further place on record, the manner in which, such ire would have swelled up in the mind of the accused to such a degree as to impel him to commit the offence cannot be construed as a fatal weakness of the prosecution case. It is hardly required to be stated that it is almost an impossibility for the prosecution to unravel the full dimension of the mental disposition of an accused towards the deceased. We cannot fathom the mental disposition of the accused nor could we rule out the possibility of some cause of immediate provocation for the accused 1. It would be known only to the deceased and his assailant. The deceased is not alive to tell what was that provocation. The accused did not disclose it to use. Be that as it may, this is a case where the prosecution has succeeded in showing that the accused had some score to settle with the deceased. If there used to be constant and frequent quarrels between the accused and the deceased, though they happen to the neighbours and close relatives, with regard to the drawing of water to irrigate their respective lands and a case being already filed and another proposed to be launched against some of the members of the family of the accused on the date of the incident, it could be that the accused would have thought of getting rid of deceased once and for all to put an end to such quarrels. Therefore, in our view, the prosecution has been able to establish the motive for the accused 1 to commit the crime. In fact, the learned Counsel for the appellant also fairly conceded that this is not a case where it could be said that there was no enmity between the accused and the deceased.
Eye-witnesses.-Out of the two eye-witnesses examined by the prosecution, one witness, viz., P.W. 15-Bettamma, a neighbouring land-owner, had turned hostile and the other eye-witness, P.W. 1-Puttalakshamma, who is the daughter-in-law of the deceased, has fully supported the prosecution case with regard to the occurrence. It has to be stated at the outset that there is no general rule that the evidence of the relations of the deceased must be corroborated for securing conviction. Each case depends on its own facts and circumstances. A close relative of the deceased, who is a very natural witness, cannot be regarded as an interested witness. In the instant case, the material placed on record would show that both P.Ws. 2 and 3 had gone to the Police Station for the purpose of lodging a complaint in respect of an earlier incident which took place in the morning at about 7 o''clock and that further the deceased Kivuda Madaiah having gone for work to the land, the only other 2 inmates in the house of the deceased were P.W. 1 and P.W. 4. Of the two persons who had remained in the house, P.W. 4 was a boy hardly aged about 10 to 12 years at the time of the incident. It is not in dispute that the appellant was an immediate neighbour of the deceased. That being so, having heard something vicious and accused 1, viz., the appellant herein, was seen going towards the land holding an axe in his hand, naturally P.W. 1 grew suspicious and more so when the deceased did not return home from the land though it was already 1.30 p.m. and it is in that context or situation, the complainant P.W. 1 went towards the land and saw the deceased engaged in removing the weeds and on seeing the same she also joined hand with him in removing the weeds. It is no doubt true that she did not talk to him at that time.
It is quite likely that having seen the deceased safe in the land, she did not think it proper to disclose anything to him at that time. While she was present in the land, it is stated that the appellant herein came near the deceased and began to quarrel with the deceased unnecessarily. She has further stated that after raking up quarrel with the deceased, the appellant committed assault on the deceased with the axe while saying that he would finish him. The accused assaulted the deceased with the axe on his legs, hands and knee and in all he caused as many as 8 injuries to the deceased. On receiving such blows, the deceased fell down to the ground crying in pain. On seeing such an incident of assault committed by the accused on the deceased, she cried out for help and in the meanwhile accused 1, viz., the appellant herein, ran away from the spot along with the axe towards Haropura Village. She has further stated in her evidence that except P.W. 15, who was engaged in removing the weeds in her land, no other person was present in the vicinity of the place of incident except the accused, the deceased and herself. P.W. 15 has turned hostile to the prosecution and the only other person who could speak to the incident are P.W. 1, the accused and the deceased. The deceased being no alive, he could not speak to the incident. The accused did not say as to how the incident in question had occurred. Then, in that event, we have only the evidence of the sole eye-witness P.W. 1. She has clearly stated as to how the incident in question took place in the land and how accused 1 had assaulted the deceased. Her evidence is quite natural and it inspires the confidence. The presence of P.W. 1 at the time of the incident at the spot cannot be doubted on the facts and circumstances of this case especially when it is elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 by the accused himself that, after seeing accused 2 giving an axe to accused 1, she was going towards their land to inform her father-in-law and that further accused 1 was going ahead of her when she was going towards the land. It is further elicited in the cross-examination of P.W. 1 on behalf of the accused that she does not know whether Accused 1 saw her following him. In the face of these answers obtained on behalf of the accused himself, the learned State Public Prosecutor was justified in his submission that the real reason for P.W. 1 to go to the land was that he felt something untoward to happen in the land and, in fact, her expectation came true when she witnessed the incident in the land. She has further stated that on seeing such ghastly incident, she got scared or frightened and returned to the house while crying. There is nothing unnatural about it. As we have already stated that P.W. 4 was a boy aged about 10 or 12 years at that time and that being so it is quite likely that P.W. 1 did not feel like disclosing the incident on her own to P.W. 4, but on being enquired by P.W. 4, she narrated the incident to him. It is not in dispute that P.W. 4 had been residing in the house of the deceased ever since his childhood. That being so, on seeing P.W. 1 returning to the house crying, it was quite natural for P.W. 4 to ask the reason of her crying and P.W. 1 to tell him what she saw in the land. The evidence of P.W. 4 in our view substantially corroborates the evidence of P.W. 1 on the material aspect of the case. It gets further corroboration from the evidence of P.Ws. 2 and 3. Their evidence would show that P.W. 4 came and informed to them about the incident in question. It was sought to be argued by the learned Counsel for the appellant that P.W. 4 at that time did not disclose the name of the appellant to P.Ws. 2 and 3. It is to be stated that it has come out even in the cross-examination of P.W. 4 that he knew as to who was the assailant when he had disclosed the incident as has been informed to him by P.W. 1, to P.Ws. 2 and 3. It is not as if the name of the assailant was not known to P.W. 4. But, it may be that he might not have given the entire description of the incident at that time to P.Ws. 2 and 3. The evidence of the complainant P.W. 1 besides being in conformity with the FIR, Exhibit P. 1, is amply corroborated from the medical evidence on record. There is nothing on record to show that some other persons were found present in the vicinity of the scene of incident. The only person who was then present in the neighbouring land was P.W. 15-Bettamma and she has turned hostile.
Then we are left with the evidence of P.W. 1 only regarding the occurrence, which is corroborated from the other circumstances appearing in the case. Hence, we find no good reason to discard the evidence of P.W. 1. Her evidence would clearly indicate that it is the appellant who is the perpetrator of the crime. In our view, P.W. 1 is not a witness to be disbelieved. Her presence at the spot at the time of the incident, on the facts and circumstances of this case, cannot be doubted and on the other hand it appears to be natural and probable. Further, as we have already stated, the evidence of P.W. 1 finds corroboration from the finding of the autopsy surgeon. This apart, her evidence that the appellant had killed the deceased by assaulting him with an axe is also corroborated from the recovery of the axe at the instance of accused 1, to which aspect we shall deal later, coupled with the evidence of the Doctor, P.W. 5 that the weapon, M.O. 6 is capable of causing such injuries. It is to be pointed out that the incident in question took place when there was sufficient day light. The credibility of a witness has to be decided by referring to the evidence of other witnesses as to how he or she is fair in the cross-examination and what impression is created by his or her evidence in the context of the case. Entering into a realm of conjecture or surmise cannot be restored. No doubt, the other eye-witness, P.W. 15 having turned hostile the evidence of P.W. 1 is uncorroborated with regard to the occurrence. Evidentiary value of P.W. 1 is not just wiped out merely because the other eye-witness P.W. 15 has turned hostile and no other eye-witness is available. Even in the absence of corroboration, the deposition of P.W. 1 for its quality may be safely accepted to be correct. It will be unfortunate, if, on account of over emphasis for corroboration, etc., a crime goes unpunished by not giving due weight to the evidence of P.W. 1 which is otherwise reliable. As we have already stated, the evidence of P.W. 1 is corroborated by the FIR lodged promptly without undue delay and also by the medical evidence. Minor discrepancies in her evidence is of no consequence. Merely because P.W. 1 is a close relative of the deceased, she cannot be regarded as an interested witness. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that P.W. 1 is a woman and that the fate of the accused hangs on her testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that she is closely related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases. A witness is normally considered as an independent unless he or she springs from sources which are likely to be tainted and that usually means unless the witness has cause, such as enmity against the accused, to wish to implicate him falsely. Ordinarily, a close relative would be the last to screen the real culprit and falsely implicate an innocent person. It is true when feelings run high and there is personal cause for enmity that there is a tendency to drag in an innocent person against whom a witness has a grudge along with the guilty, but foundation must be laid for such a criticism and the mere fact of relationship far from being a foundation is often sure guarantee of truth. For these reasons, therefore, we are unable to reject the evidence of P.W. 1 merely on the ground that she is the relatives of the deceased. We have ourselves carefully gone through the entire evidence of P.W. 1 and we find that shorn of a few embellishments here and there, her testimony as a whole has a ring of truth, colour of consistency and a sense of straightforwardness, as a result of which her evidence inspires great confidence. She has given a graphic description of what she had seen at the land.
In these circumstances, we do not see any reason to discard the evidence of P.W 1 as an eye-witness to the occurrence. Thus, once the evidence of P.W. 1 is believed, the prosecution case stands proved apart from anything else. It will, however, appear that in this case the prosecution had led circumstantial evidence to support the intrinsic evidence given by P.W. 1. In the instant case, P.W. 1 watched the occurrence from a close distance in a broad day light. The assault was so dastardly and gruesome that it must have made a definite and lasting impact on the memory of the witness P.W. 1 that made her to remember the assault with its grotesque details. Human memory is like a camera which takes snap shots of striking incidents and then transmit the same through words of mouth faithfully and with absolute accuracy and precision. Moreover, it is not a question of giving photographic detail at all, but the witness P.W. 1 has merely described what she actually saw at the land. There is no rule of law that, if the Court acquits some accused on the evidence of a witness finding it to be open to some doubt with regard to them for definite reason, any other accused against whom there is absolute certainty about his complicity in the crime based on the remaining credible part of the evidence of that witness should also be acquitted. It will however call for a closer scrutiny of the evidence and the Court must feel assured that it is safe to rely upon the evidence for conviction of the remaining accused. In this case having applied that test, we are satisfied that the evidence of P.W. 1 is both reliable and convincing. The conduct of P.W. 1 in the circumstances of the case cannot be said to be unnatural. The first reaction of P.W. 1 was to remain stunned for a while particularly after seeing the blood thirsty accused acting like a devil holding a lethal weapon. If she did not dare to go near him, then how can that act or conduct be dubbed as unnatural. The Court should have regard to the reality that for P.W. 1, it was her father-in-law who was butchered right in front of her eye. If she had taken a couple of hours to regain her composure to return to her house and then going to the spot, it only shows as a normal conduct in the aforesaid circumstances. There is no justification for denouncing the core of the prosecution story merely becasue there is a short delay in lodging the complaint. With regard to the post event conduct of P.W. 1, it is to be stated that it varies from person to person as different people react differently to what they witness. In this connection, a reference may be made to a decision of the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Rammi alias Rameshwar v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2000 SCC (Cri.) 26, regarding an occurrence taken place in a bus and the witness (a passenger) not informing the family members of the deceased nor bringing the matter to the notice of the police, the Hon''ble Supreme Court held in the circumstances that the conduct of the witness cannot be regarded as abnormal. It is to be pointed out, therefore, that different witnesses react differently and there cannot be any set pattern of role of human reaction on the basis of which a piece of evidence may be discarded. The Court cannot expect a set of reactions from any eye-witness on seeing an incident like murder and hence the reaction not improbable or inconceivable from any human being in similar situation cannot be dubbed as unnatural. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that the conduct of the eye-witness, P.W. 1 is highly unnatural. It is no doubt true that the axe said to have been recovered from the accused was not identified by P.W. 1 in Court; but the same has been identified by the Investigating Officer and the other panch witnesses and hence we find no reason to doubt the circumstances regarding the recovery merely because P.W. 1 did not identify the weapon. That by itself does not introduce any infirmity in the evidence furnished on the recovery which at best is only a corroborative price of evidence. Therefore, we find no good ground to discard the evidence of P.W. 1.
Recovery of Axe M.O. 6.-The Investigating Officer, P.W. 18 has stated that on 20-8-1993 at about 2.30 p.m. accused 1, viz., the appellant herein, was produced before him by P.W. 10. The evidence of P.W. 10, in turn, would disclose that on 20-8-1993 at about 1.30 p.m. he receive an information about accused 1 being present at Sattur Village and accordingly he went there and apprehended accused 1 who was then present behind a temple and brought him to Biligere Police outpost and kept him there and thereafter he informed the said matter to the Circle Inspector of Police over phone and the Circle Inspector of Police came over there and accused 1 was produced before him. The evidence of these two witnesses would clearly indicate that the appellant was arrested only on 20-8-1993. P.W. 18 has further stated in his evidence that he caused the arrest of the appellant and interrogated him. During the course of interrogation the appellant made a disclosure statement as per Exhibit P. 16. Thereafter the appellant led him and the panchas to the land of one Rangamma in Bilugali Village, which was adjacent to the scene of the incident and there the appellant took out the axe, M.O. 6 which was to be bloodstained from a bush and produced before him. It was seized under panchanama, Exhibit P. 8. Under the cross-examination it is elicited by the defence that his investigation discloses that accused 1 ran towards Haropura and he further says that the bush from where the axe was produced was situate on the way to Haropura. It is further elicited in the cross-examination on behalf of the accused that it is a fact that snakes well in such bushes, but inspite of that he had allowed accused 1 to go near the bush and pick up weapon as volunteered by him. Both the panch witnesses P.Ws. 9 and 16 have supported the recovery of the axe, M.O. 6 at the instance of accused 1. The bloodstained shirt M.O. 1 had also been recovered or seized from the person of the appellant after his arrest. Therefore, the recovery of the axe, M.O. 6, which was found to be bloodstained and the seizure of the shirt, M.O. 1 from the person of the accused stands proved from the above evidence of the Investigating Officer, P.W. 18 and the panchas.
The evidence of the autopsy surgeon would reveal that the axe, M.O. 6 is capable of causing the injury found sustained by the deceased. The axe, M.O. 6 was recovered from the place where it was exclusively known to the appellant in consequence with the statement made by the appellant. That being so, it clearly implicates the appellant in the commission of the offence especially in view of the acceptance evidence of the eye-witness, P.W. 1. It is no doubt true that the prosecution has not been able to place on record the report of the Chemical Examiner to show the nature of the bloodstain found on the axe, M.O. 6 and the shirt, M.O. 1. But, that by itself will not discredit the recovery effected at the instance of accused 1. As we have already stated, merely because P.W. 1 did not identify the weapon M.O. 6 as the one with which the deceased had been assaulted, that by itself does not introduce any serious infirmity in the evidence furnished by the recovery which at the best is only a corroborative piece of evidence. The incriminating circumstances enumerated above including the evidence of the eye-witness, P.W. 1 unmistakably and inevitably lead to the guilt of the appellant and nothing has been highlighted or brought on record to make the facts proved to be in any manner in consonance with the innocence at any rate of the appellant.
@BODY-LSP = 12. In the instant case, the deceased had sustained several injuries which were sufficient to cause death. It cannot, therefore, be said that the accused had no intention to commit murder. There is no evidence that the accused caused death in a sudden fight in heat and passion. On the other hand, the nature, the number of injuries as well as the situs of the injuries would show that accused 1 in causing death acted in a cruel manner. That being so, it is the case one of murder and the exception is not at all attracted. When the post-mortem was conducted by the Doctor, he had noted the following ante-mortem injuries:
A contusion red in colour 1.5 cm. x.5 cm. present on the middle of left clavicle.
An incised injury measuring 5 cm. x 1 cm. x 2 cm. present on the medial aspect, 4 cm. above the left knee joint with clotted blood sticking around the wound. On dissection of the wound, a transverse fracture of the lower end of left femur shaft present with collection of blood all round the lower end of fractured femur.
An incised injury measuring 1 cm. x.5 cm. x.5 cm present on the medial aspect of left knee joint.
An incised injury measuring 1 cm. x.5 cm. x.5 cm. present on the medial aspect of left leg.
An incised injury 2 cm. x 2.5 cm. x 1 cm. present on the medial aspect 4 cm. above the medial malleolus of right leg. A transverse fracture of lower end of right tibia present.
An incised injury 3 cm. x 1 cm. x 1 cm. present on the lateral aspect of right knee joint.
An incised injury 6 cm. x 3 cm. x 3 cm. depth present on the posterior aspect of lower end of upper arm with transverse fracture of lower end of right humerus exposing the muscles and blood vessels.
Fracture of the lower end of left ulna present. @BODY-LSP = 13. As to the cause of death he has clearly stated that it was due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of the multiple injuries to humerus and femur and also tibia. He has further stated in the cross-examination that the cumulative effect of all the injuries mentioned in the Post-mortem Report, Exhibit P. 2 was to cause death. It is no doubt true that he has stated that any individual injury was not sufficient to cause death, but the cumulative effect of all the said injuries was sufficient to cause shock and haemorrhage which led to the death of the deceased. Therefore, this is a case where the death became the consequence because of the injuries sustained by the deceased collectively. On the facts and circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the injuries sustained by the deceased were implicated without any premeditation. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellant has not taken undue advantage or not acted in a cruel or unusual manner. The question with regard to the nature of the offence has to be determined on the facts and circumstances of each case. Nature of the injuries, whether they are on the vital or non-vital parts of the body, the weapon used, the circumstances in which the injuries were caused and the manner in which the injuries were inflicted are all relevant factors which may go to determine the required intention or knowledge of the accused and the offence committed by him. Even where the medical witness does not say anything about the sufficiency or otherwise of the injuries to cause death in the ordinary course of nature or whether the medical witness make a positive statement one way or the other, the Court cannot be relieved of its duty. Where the Medical Officer fail to depose that any of the injuries on the person of the deceased was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the Court can deduce the same from the nature of the injuries. The injuries individually may not be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death, but, cumulatively they may be sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause the death.
@BODY-LSP = This is exactly what the Doctor, who conducted the post-mortem examination, has stated in his cross-examination. It is no doubt true that the injuries sustained by the deceased were on the non-vital parts of the body. But then, it is not a requirement of Section 302 of the IPC that the injuries must be to a vital part of the body. The first Part of Section 300 of the IPC takes any act done with the intention of causing death. The Third Part of Section 300 of the IPC brings within the definition of murder all acts done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person, when the bodily injury actually found on the person of the deceased was the one that was intended to be inflicted and was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is not the requirement of the section that the injury should be intended to be serious. The expression ''bodily injury'' in clause 3rdly of Section 300 of the IPC includes also its plurality so that the clause would cover a case where all the injuries intentionally caused by the accused are cumulatively sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, even if none of those injuries individually measures upto such sufficiency. The sufficiency spoken to in this clause is the high probability of death in the ordinary course of nature and, if such sufficiency exists and death is caused and the injuries causing it are intentional, the case would fall under clause 3rdly of Section 300 of the IPC. The mere fact that the assault by the accused is confined to the legs and arms or that none of the multiple injuries inflicted was individually sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death would not exclude the application of clause 3rdly of Section 300 of the IPC. In the instant case, the material placed on record would show that the accused had acted in a cruel manner. The facts here would clearly establish that the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased and with that intention only he had inflicted the multiple injuries on the person of the deceased with a deadly weapon like axe. In any event, the appellant can safely be attributed with the intention or knowledge that the axe blows given by him indiscriminately were so dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the appellant had rightly been convicted and sentenced for the offence under Section 302 of the IPC by the Trial Court.
In the face of the above materials on record, we have no hesitation to agree with the finding of the Trial Court holding the appellant guilty of the offence under Section 302 of the IPC for committing the murder of the deceased by assaulting him with an axe.
Hence, we find no merit in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the appellant.
In the result, therefore, this criminal appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed as devoid of merits.