Karunakaran vs State of Tamil Nadu and Another

K.M. Natarajan, J.—This writ petition has been filed by the detenu seeking for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus to quash the order of

detention dated 21-4-1987 passed by the second respondent.

The order of detention was passed by the second respondent in exercise of the power conferred under S. 3(1) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of

Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of

1982) hereinafter referred to as the Act, with a view to preventing the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public

order.

The detenu came to the adverse notice of the authority concerned as a goonda and on the basis of the ground case, which took place on 2-4-

1987, he was detained under the said Act.

Though the learned counsel for the petitioner raised several contentions attacking the order of the detention passed against the detenu, the

petitioner, herein, he has confined his argument only to the question that the acts attributed to the detenu would not constitute acting prejudicial to

the maintenance of public order, so as to enable the authority concerned to invoke the powers under S. 3(1) of the Act, and the ground case

would at best constitute only law and order problem and would not constitute an act endangering the public safety and public order.

The ground case on which the order of detention has been passed is that on 2-4-1987 one Sekar came to Moore market by bus to buy old iron

box. He searched for the iron box and thereafter he was proceeding through Park Road to go to Elephant gate with a rexine cash bag, in which he

was having cash of Rs. 103/-. When he reached the Allikulam, the detenu and one Karna alias Raja, who were coming on the opposite direction,

acting as goondas dashed Sekar and snatched the rexine cash bag from him. After so snatching, both of them tried to run away from the scene

place. Raising hue and cry the victim Sekar chased the culprits (the detenu and Karnan). In that process Arjunan and Thiruvengadam also tried to

secure the culprit. Thereafter, the detenu took out a cycle chain from his waist and waved it on all sides and threatened them and others saying that

he would beat them. On seeing this Arjunan and Thiruvengadam got panicky. At that time the Sub-Inspector of Police P. Purali and Murugan

along with their party came to the scene place and tried to secure the culprit. Thereafter Karnan picked up the jelly stones kept at the road side

and threw them on the police party and the detenu brandished the cycle chain threatening the police party. Apprehending danger the people who

were nearby ran away from the scene place, the movement of traffic was dislocated and the cycle rickshaw men abandoned their vehicles and ran

out of fear of danger, when the culprits tried to escape from the scene place, and attempted to attack the police party, the police arrested the

detenu and Karnan and recovered the rexine bag snatched from Sekar. Thereafter, they were taken to G. 2 Periamet Police station and on the

complaint given by Sekar, a case was registered against the detenu and Karnan in Cr.No. 83/87 under Ss. 379, 324, 446 and 506(II) I.P.C. the

culprits were examined and their statements were recorded. Thereafter they were sent for remand. Thereafter all the relevant papers were placed

before the detaining authority and on its subjective satisfaction the impugned order was passed.

The question that arises for our consideration is whether the acts of the detenu, referred to above, would amount to acting prejudicial to the

maintenance of public order or they would amount to law and order problem.

In this connection, it is worthwhile to quote the observation of the Supreme Court in Ram Ranjan Chatterjee Vs. The State of West Bengal, :-

.......... The distinction between the areas of ''law and order'' and ''Public order'' is one of degree and extent of the reach of the act in question on

society. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public

order. If the contravention in its effect is confined only to a few individuals directly involved as distinguished from a wide spectrum of the public, it

would raise a problem of law and order only. These concentric concepts of ''law and order'' and ''public order'' may have a common ''epicentre'',

but it is the length, magnitude and intensity of the terror-wave unlashed by particular exception of disorder that helps distinguish it as an act affecting

''public order'' from that concerning ''law and order''.

In Dipak Bose alias Naripada Vs. State of West Bengal, it has been observed by the Supreme Court that (at p. 2688) :-

......... every assault in a public place like a public road and terminating in the death of a victim is likely to cause horror and even panic and terror

in those who are the spectators. But that does not mean that all of such incidents do necessarily cause disturbance or dislocation of the community

life of the localities in which they are committed. There is nothing in the two incidents set out in the grounds in the present case to suggest that either

of them was of that kind and gravity which would jeopardise the maintenance of public order No doubt bombs were said to have been carried by

those who are alleged to have committed the two acts stated in the grounds. Possibly that was done to terrify the respective victims and prevent

them from offering resistance.

Our attention was also drawn to Ganesan alias Venkata Ganesan v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1985 MLW (Cri) 187. In that case, when a police

party engaged in conducting prohibition raids noticed the petitioner and tried to apprehend him the petitioner is said to have pulled out a knife and

brandished it and uttered threats to the members of the police party to refrain from arresting him if they cared for their lives. Not with standing the

threats uttered by him, he is said to have been over-powered. In the scuffle that followed, two policemen are said to have sustained simple injuries.

Therein it was held as follows :-

Merely because the petitioner tried to resist his apprehension and uttered some words of threat or adopted a menacing attitude it cannot be said

that he had intended to disturb the even tempo of public life. At best his action could only amount to preventing the public servants from

discharging their duty and attempting to cause hurt to them. Such acts cannot be equated with acts of perverse nature which would have an

adverse impact on the maintenance of public order. In this case the specific act leading to the passing of the impugned order is not of such a nature

which can be classified as an act intended to disturb the maintenance of public order.

In the instant case, it is clear from the allegations in respect of ground case leading to the passing of the impugned order that when the detenu

and his associate Karnan were chased by the victim and two other persons, the detenu took out a cycle chain from his waist and waved it on all

sides threatening them by saying that he would beat them, if they came near to him and try to catch him. So also when the police party tried to

arrest the detenu and his associate Karnan the said Karnan took jelly stones kept on the roadside and threw them on the police party. On seeing

this the nearby people, apprehending danger to their life ran away from the scene place, the movement of traffic was dislocated and cycle rickshaw

men abandoned their vehicles and ran out of fear of danger. There is absolutely nothing to show that because of the said act by the detenu, there

was panic and terror. As observed in the above decisions, the mere fact that some policemen sustained injuries while they tried to apprehend the

detenu and his associate Karnan, it would not constitute ''public order''. At the worst, the detenu will be liable for the injuries caused to the

policemen and for preventing the public servants from discharging their duty. Under such circumstances, we are of the view that the acts attributed

to the detenu in the instant case would not constitute acts prejudicial to the maintenance of ''public order'' so as to attract the provisions of S. 3(1)

of the Act and in our view it would constitute only law and order. As such, the order of detention passed against the detenu is not sustainable and

is liable to be quashed.

In result the writ petition is allowed and the order of detention is quashed. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith, if he is not

otherwise required in connection with any other case.

Petition allowed.