High CourtsDivision Bench

Mohan vs State of Tamilnadu

Madras High Court · Decided on 15 March 1988 · Citation: (1988) 03 MAD CK 0005

HON’BLE JUDGES
S.A. Kader, J · K.M. Natarajan, J
ACTS & SECTIONS REFERRED
Constitution of India, 1950 — Article 226 · Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) — Section 323, 336, 379, 506(ii) · Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum-Grabbers, Act, 1982 — Section 3(l)
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Writ Petition No. 9560 of 1987

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Judgment

36 paragraphs · 805 words

S.A. Kader, J.—This petition has been filed by the detenu himself under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing the order of

detention passed against him by the second Respondent, commissioner of police, Madras City'' u/s 3(l) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of

Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Goondas Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 14 of 1982, with a view to

preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

2.

Mrs.R. Subadradevi, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, canvassed before us that the facts of the ground case attributed to the Petitioner do not

constitute acts prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, they are only acts detrimental to the maintenance of law and order and hence the

provisions of Section 3(l) of the Act have no application.

3.

The facts of the ground case are thus: On 16.6.1987 at 6.00 p.m. Thiru Govidarajulu, a resident of No. 4, Pidariyar Koil Street, Madras, was

proceeding at the junction of Govindappa Naicken Street and Anna Pillai Street, the Petitioner came towards him and asked him to stop. On

Govindarajulu stopping, the Petitioner asked him to come near him and to deliver his belonging in the pocket. Govindarajulu became panicky and

stood speechless. The Petitioner shouted at him: and so saying thrust his hand into the shirt pocket of Govindarajulu and took out his money purse.

After thrusting the money purse inside his banian, the Petitioner started going northwards. When Govindarajulu cried for help, three other persons,

namely, Sundaram, Dhanapal, and Mani, who were coming from the opposite direction stopped the culprit. Immediately the Petitioner removed his

belt and threatened the people with dire consequences. He created terror and panic in the scene. Passers-by ran away; cyclists turned back; shop-

keepers closed their shops and the movement of traffic was also disrupted. However, the Petitioner lost balance and fell down and was

apprehended by Govindarajulu, Sundaram, Dhanapal and Mani. On a complaint given by Govindarajulu. a case was registered in ine C-5

Kothawalchavadi police station in crime No 78/1987 for offences u/s 379, 323, 336 and 506(ii) of the Indian Penal Code.

4.

The distinction between ''law and order'' and ''public order'' is fine, but real. The distinction lies in the gravity of the act committed by the detenu.

In Ashok Kumar Vs. Delhi Administration and Others, he learned Judges of the Supreme Court observed:

The true distinction between the areas of ''public order'' and ''law and order'' lies not in the nature of quality of the act, but in the degree and extent

of its reach upon society. The distinction between the two concepts of ''law and order'' and ''public order'' is a fine one but this does not mean that

there can be no overlapping acts similar in nature but commuted in different contexts and circumstances; might cause different reactions. In One

case it might affect specific individuals only and therefore touch the problem of law and order, while in an there it might affect public order. The act

by itself therefore is not determinant of its own gravity. It is the potentiality of the act to disturb the even tempo of the life of the community which

makes it prejudicial to the maintenance of public order.

5.

The Petitioner in this case has stopped in a public road in the busy evening an innocent passer-by, authoritatively asked him to give the contents

of his pocket and when the victim was stunned speechless the Petitioner has himself thrust his hands into the pocket and taken away the purse. He

has thus wrongfully restrained the victim and taken away his purse by putting him in the fear of instant hurt. This act on the part of the Petitioner

which really amounts to committing of robbery is not a mere threat to the victim put to the general public as well. It affects not only the person who

is deprived of his valuables, but also the other persons, who frequent the highway. The nature of the act, the circumstances of its commission, the

impact on the people around and such like factors constitute the pathology of ''public order'' One cannot isolate the act from its public setting or

analyse its molecule as in a laboratory to take its total effect on the flow of orderly life. It may be a question of degree and quality of the activity,

the sensitivity of the situation and the psychic response of the involved people. The act perpetrated by the Petitioner is likely to have an impact on

the general public. It is clearly an act against the public order and the provisions of Section 3(l) are squarely attracted. The order of detention is not

therefore liable to be impugned.

6.

In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed.