Kerala State Electricity Board vs Kathreena

Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.—Heard.

This appeal by the Kerala State Electricity Board is against a decree for compensation granted in a case of electrocution.

The fact that Mr. Benny died on 20.06.1998 by electrocution is not in dispute. The plea set up by the KSEB was that the electric line was snapped not on account of any negligence or latches on the part of the KSEB or its officers and this snapping of conductor was occurred due to rain and wind and therefore, it was essentially an act of God. K.S.E.B. is the statutory licensee dealing with a dangerous substance. On the aforesaid facts situation, the doctrine of strict liability as enunciated by the Apex Court and this Court in 2002 ACJ 337 (SC) , Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumari and Others, and Varghese and Thressiamma Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board, , also following Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [ 1920 AC 662], clearly rules out the defence set up by the Board.

Onto the question of compensation, we have heard the learned counsel for both parties. The court below concluded that an amount of Rs. 4 lakhs could be granted as the deceased was a mason by profession and was getting Rs. 4,000/- per month. He was managing the affairs of the family consisting of his mother and his younger brother. Deceased Benny was 28 years of age at the time of his electrocution. The pleaded case is that he was earning Rs. 4,000/- per month. There is no documentary evidence in support of that, though there is no contra evidence as well. He remained unmarried. The second plaintiff is his brother. The first plaintiff is his mother. Going by the impugned judgment, first plaintiff died on 04.01.2000. This means that even at the time of the judgment, the court below had known the length of dependency of the mother during the currency of the lifetime of the mother on Benny. That comes to around two years. If that be so, even if we accept that Benny had monthly earning of Rs. 4,000/-, his consolidated income for the two years would be Rs. 96,000/-. Let us take it that he contributed one half of that to his mother. That means that he would have contributed an amount of Rs. 48,000/- to his mother until she died. With that, we will put a component towards loss of love and affection, pain and suffering of the mother and the loss of the company of the adult son for love and care. For that, we would fix an amount of Rs. 30,000/-. This takes a total compensation due to the first plaintiff mother at Rs. 78,000/-. The second plaintiff, being the brother of Benny, is not entitled to the compensation under the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 as is evident from the second paragraph of Section 1A of that Act. With the passage of time, as on the date of decreeing the suit, he was the heir of the mother and thus, the second plaintiff was the legal representative of the first plaintiff. Therefore, the court below granted the decree in favour of the second plaintiff only as a representative of the estate of the first plaintiff mother.

Having regard to the nature of the litigation and the economically marginalised sector to which the plaintiffs belong, we hold that they are eligible to be exempted from paying court fee in the court of first instance in view of order XXXIII Rule 11 of CPC as amended by notification dated 13.01.1999-see for support, Joseph v. Kerala State Electricity Board[ILR 2013 (1) Ker. 26]. That modification to the impugned judgment and decree can be made in favour of the plaintiffs in exercise of power under Order XLI Rule 33 CPC. In exercise of authority as afore-noted, the direction contained in the judgment and decree ordering realisation of court fee from the plaintiffs is vacated, and it has to be ordered that no court fee shall be recovered from them.

In the result:

(i) The impugned decree is vacated.

(ii) A decree for recovery of Rs. 78,000/- with 6% interest thereon from 20.06.1998, the date of the electrocution of Benny, is granted in favour of the estate of the first plaintiff Kathreena. The second plaintiff will be entitled to execute the decree on behalf of the estate of his mother Kathreena for recovery against the defendants.

(iii) It is directed that no court fee shall be recovered from the plaintiffs, insofar as the suit is concerned. Any order for recovery as contained in the impugned judgment and the revenue recovery proceedings against in that regard will stand set aside.

(iv) No costs.