The Kerala State Electricity Board vs Mariamma Peter

Thottathil B. Radhakrishnan, J.—This appeal by the Kerala State Electricity Board against a decree for compensation granted in a case of electrocution, comes with an application seeking condonation of delay of 533 days. We do not see any valid ground that could be treated as sufficient cause to condone the delay. Yet, we have looked into the merits as well.

Plaintiffs pleaded that late M.J. Peter died on 02.04.2003 at 9 p.m. due to electrocution as he happened come into contact with the stay wire drawn from the electric post through the courtyard of his residence. He suffered serious burn injuries and, later, succumbed to the injuries at medical college hospital. KSEB set up the defence that a cable TV operator had unauthorisedly placed an amplifier in the electric post or line. Thus, the second defendant was brought on record. Whatever be the inter se contentions between defendants 1 and 2, one thing is certain. The obligation and responsibility of the KSEB as a licensee under the Electricity Supply Act and the Electricity Supply Rules, foist on it, the liability of a statutory licensee dealing with a dangerous substance. Under such circumstances, the doctrine of strict liability applies. On the aforesaid facts situation, the doctrine of strict liability as enunciated by the Apex Court and this Court in 2002 ACJ 337 (SC) , Madhya Pradesh Electricity Board Vs. Shail Kumari and Others, and Varghese and Thressiamma Vs. Kerala State Electricity Board, , also following Quebec Rly., Light, Heat and Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry[ 1920 AC 662], clearly rules out the defence set up by the Board. K.S.E.B. being the statutory licensee dealing with dangerous substance, electricity, we do not find any ground to uphold its appeal challenging the finding on the question of negligence.

Onto the question of compensation, we see that the court below has granted an amount of Rs. 2 lakhs as compensation, taking into consideration that the deceased was a mason aged 57 years at the time of death and had daily income which was quantified on monthly basis. We are unable to hold that the quantification of compensation by the court below is exorbitant, unjust or unreasonable.

In the ultimate analysis, we see no ground to interfere with the impugned decree.

In the result:

(i) The C.M. Application is dismissed.

(ii) As a consequence of the dismissal of the C.M. Application, the appeal is barred by limitation and it is hence, rejected. Refund the court fee paid on the appeal at the time of institution of the appeal to the appellant.