K.L.M. Ramamoorthy and Others vs State of Madras

Natesan, J.—The Plaintiffs whose title to and possession of the suit land was accepted on the merits in appeal, but whose claim for declaration of title in respect of the land and for injunction restraining the State of Madras from interfering with their possession of the suit property was dismissed on the ground that the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, have preferred this second appeal. The suit land, an extent of 3 acres and of cents going under the name Vanpayirkollai, situated in Ramanathapuram, was purchased by the first Plaintiff (the other Plaintiffs came on record as legal representatives), under exhibit A-1, dated 27th January 1943, from one Karuppana Thevar. Karuppana Thevar claimed title to the property by inheritance from his mother Thropathai Marathi. She purchased the land from one Sheik Mirsa Rowther under exhibit A-7 dated 7th September 1868, an unregistered sale deed, long prior to the passing of the Transfer of Property Act. It is the Plaintiffs'' case that the suit land is ryoti land within the Ramanathapuram Zamindari taken over by the Government under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXVI of 1948), and it has been in the possession of the Plaintiffs and their predecessor in title through the decades. After the taking over or the estate, the revenue authorities were moved for the issue of patta and in 1953, an order was passed by the Tahsildar, Ramanathapuram directing the issue of patta to the 1st Plaintiff. This order was, however, not implemented by the actual issue of patta, and it must be remarked here that the file relating to the patta transfer enquiry has not been made available to the Court by the Defendant, the State of Madras. It is the case of the State that the suit land is not ryoti land but only communal poramboke set apart for the purpose of Eruthukattu festival (bull festival) of the Koorisastha (Ayyanar) temple on the north of the suit property. The problem has been in identifying the Eruthukattu Pottal or poramboke. According to the Plaintiffs Eruthukattu Pottal is west of the suit property and the suit property is bounded on the north by Koorisastha temple, on the east by Moolakothalam, on the south by Madurai Salai Road and on the west of Eruthukattu Pottal. The Defendants would deny the existence of any land between Eruthukattu Pottal and Mulakothalam. The trial Court found against the Plaintiffs on the merits. But on appeal, on an elaborate and careful consideration of the evidence, oral and documentary, the Court has held that Thorapathai Marathi, mother of the first Plaintiff�s vendor, had title to and possession of the suit property. The Court has found against claim of the Defendant that the whole extent of land between Nochivayal in the east and Moolakothalam in the west is communal poramboke used for conducting bull festival. In the Adangal whereas in fasli 1348-49 the extent of Nochivayal was given as 4 acres and 45 cents, in fasli 1358 its extent was given as 6 acres and 45 cents and later the extent of Nochivayal was claimed to be 8 acres 8 cents. The lower appellate Court finds lack of bona fides in the claim. It saw in the very admissions of the various defence witnesses, possession of the suit property with the Plaintiffs'' family, though the suit land, for the most part, was fallow. In the circumstances, the lower appellate Court has held that, while the evidence as to possession was neither adequate nor sufficient to give title to the Plaintiffs by prescription, a presumption of possession following title could be drawn. The finding of the lower appellate Court that the Plaintiffs have made out their title to and possession of the suit property within twelve years prior to the suit has not been the subject of any serious challenge before me, as it could not be in the circumstances of the case.

Before examining the substantial defence of want of jurisdiction in the civil Court to adjudicate on the dispute, another aspect of the case has to be stated. Subsequent to the order of the Tahsildar directing the issue of patta to the Plaintiff, which however, was not followed up'' by granting patta to the Plaintiff, the Raja of Ramanathapuram commenced proceedings u/s 12 of the Estates Abolition Act, claiming an extent of property beginning from the eastern limit of Nochivayal and extending upto Mulakothalam as his pannai land. He gave the extent of the property at 2 acres and 98 cents and described it as Eruthukattu Pottal. The 1st Plaintiff got himself impleaded in the proceedings and objected to the issue of patta for the property in question to the Raja of Ramanathapuram, It is pointed out by the lower appellate Court that the let Plaintiff, in intervening in the proceedings, appeared to have been labouring under a mistake thinking that the suit land was also subject-matter of that enquiry. The Assistant Settlement Officer who passed orders in that enquiry on the application of the Raja of Ramanathapuram, did not go into the question of title claimed by the first Plaintiff. The reason given by him in his order exhibit A-15, dated 24th November 1955, for not going into the question of title is that it was a proceeding instituted u/s 12 of the Estates Abolition Act. Holding that the property was communal poramboke, the Assistant Settlement Officer did not grant patta to the Raja of Ramanathapuram. A plea raised by the State before the learned Subordinate Judge that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer would be res judicata was overruled, and rightly the same was not pressed before me.

The contention strenuously pressed before me by the learned Additional Government Pleader and which found acceptance in the hands of the learned Subordinate Judge is that when the State claims a particular land as Poramboke and contends that it is not ryoti, the remedy of the aggrieved ryoti is only before the forums available under the Abolition Act. The argument is that the claim of the Plaintiff is, in effect and substance, for patta in respect of the land and this is a matter which they could agitate only before the authorities under the Act authorised to issue patta. It is said that the power of adjudication on the question whether the land is ryoti land for which patta could be claimed or is communal poramboke for which no patta could be had is a necessary concomitant of the power to issue patta and so is a matter within the exclusive jurisdiction of the authorities under the Act. The reasoning of the learned Additional Government Pleader briefly summed up, is to the following effect. On the notification of the estate under the Abolition Act, the entire estate, including ryoti lands, stands transferred to and vests in the State and the right of the ryot to patta for his erstwhile ryoti land is only under and in pursuance of the provisions of the Act and not on any independent title. Rights are conferred afresh under the Act on the erstwhile ryots. Section 11 of the Act, read with Section 3(d), proviso (i) and Section 22, provides exclusively for the authorities under the Act to decide and determine the nature and character of the land, whether it is ryoti land or communal poramboke. Such determination is necessary for the purposes of the Act. Outside and except for what is granted under the Act, the ryot can make no claim for any interest in land in an estate after the notification of the estate. Emphasis is laid on Clauses (b), (d), (e) and (g) of Section 3 of the Act. Section 3(d) it is said, only enables a person in possession of land in an estate under & prima facie claim to patta, to retain his possession, pending settlement operations. Of course, if there are rival claimants to land held ryoti, and decision granting patta to one or other of them, it is said, is not a final adjudication and the civil Court will have jurisdiction to examine the title inter se between he rival claimants. But an order by the authorities under the Act as to the character of the land, whether it is ryoti land or communal poramboke, is a different thing and will be an order falling u/s 64-C of the Act. So, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted in cases where the character and nature of land is put in issue. I must say that the inclination on a first impression is to accept the reasoning.

For the Appellants reliance is placed upon the recent decision of a division Bench of this Court in the State of Madras v. Ramalingaswamigal Madam ILR (1969) Mad. 749 and Anr. case in Second Appeal No. 338 of 1963 (hereafter referred to as Ramalingaswami case). Learned Counsel for the Appellants submitted that Section 11 of the Act, even read with proviso (i) to Section 3(d) of the Act, does not provide for the due ascertainment of the true character of the land whether it is ryoti land or communal poramboke. It is pointed out that Section 11 of the Act is the only provision in the Act under which patta to a ryot is granted and this Section does not specifically confer jurisdiction to any authority under the Act for determination as to the character of the land, when the State disputes the claim of the ryot that it is ryoti land and claims the land as communal or other poramboke. The existence of occupancy rights in the land at the time of the notification, that precisely is the dispute, in whatever context it may arise, it is said, is not a matter for the authorities under the Act to finally determine. The decision of the division Bench is on a reference by me in two second appeals, where the question of jurisdiction directly arose for consideration. In the two second appeals, while the Plaintiffs contended that the land was ryoti land, it was the defence of the State that the land was communal poramboke. The Courts below found against the State''s claim that the land was communal poramboke and overruling the objection that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suits decreed the suits as prayed for. In the second appeals, the point pressed for the State was the absence of jurisdiction in the Civil Court to entertain the suits. The division Bench (Srinivasan and Sabasivam JJ.) if I may say so with respect, after an elaborate consideration of the law, has held that the decrees and judgment of the Courts below upholding the title of the Plaintiffs in the suits could not be said to be without jurisdiction. Notwithstanding this, the learned Additional Government Pleader has strenuously but unsuccessfully contended before me that the earlier decisions holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such suits have been accepted by the division Bench and are still good law. In this attempt, he took me through the decision of the division Bench more than once. Having regard to the arguments presented, I heard the case at greater length than is strictly necessary and also had the benefit of hearing arguments on the issues raised from Mr. Vedanthachariar, senior Counsel at my instance. I may even here thank him for the valuable assistance he rendered.

Mr. Vedanthachari''s approach to the question of Jurisdiction is two-fold as I see it. It runs: first, ryoti land in an estate does not vest or get transferred to the Government under the Act. Therefore, the question of the right of a ryot to ryoti land within an estate is outside the scope of adjudication under the Act. Alternatively, even if ryoti land also vests in the State, the vesting is not absolute and of all the interests in the land. The vesting is for the limited purpose of effecting ryotwari settlement in the region without disturbing the existing title of ryots. The occupancy rights of the ryots are not in the least affected adversely to their interest. The vesting is not in possession but notional for legalising the substitution of the State for the erstwhile landholder and enlarging the interest of the ryot to that of a ryotwari proprietor. The pre-existing right of a ryot in ryoti land is not put an end to and destroyed; but statutorily it is provided that it has to be recognized in the ryotwari settlement that has to follow the notification of the estate. There is no adequate and satisfactory machinery provided under the Act to determine whether land in the possession of a tenant is ryoti land or communal poramboke, in contrast with the provisions for certain other matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act. Any determination on the title claimed by a ryot in proceedings for the issue of patta under the Act is only an incidental determination collateral to the purpose of the Act. Such determination can have no finality. The Civil Court in all the circumstances is the proper forum for final adjudication of the title to occupancy rights in land in an erstwhile estate, though the grant of ryotwari patta for the land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of authorities under the Act. It makes no difference whether the dispute is between rival claimants for patta for a land or between the State and the ryot.

The Additional Government Pleader contends that in Bamalingaswamigal''s case ILR (1969) Mad. 749 the learned Judges have wholly rejected the contention of Mr. Vedanthachari as to the vesting of ryoti land. That it is not so, is clear from the following conclusion of the learned Judges:

Hence, however, attractive the arguments of Sri Vedanthachari are, it is not possible to accede to them in full and find that the rights of a ryot in a ryoti land are not affected by the Act, that they do not vest in the Government and therefore any claim to such right could not be the subject-matter of any decision under the Act, but could be dealt with only by Civil Courts.

The words underlined by me bring out forcibly that the vesting is not absolute as claimed for the State. The extreme contention of Mr. Vedanthachari that rights in ryoti land do not at all vest have been overruled. Mr. Vedanathachari, in this connection, draws my attention to the views expressed by the same learned Judges recently in the State of Madras v. M. Doraipandian (Second Appeal Nos. 473 and 474 of 1963). They say:

The contention of the learned Additional Government Pleader on behalf of the State that even the ryot''s interest in the land is destroyed and a fresh right conferred upon him by reason of the other provisions of the Act is no doubt supported by these decisions. But, another view is also possible, viz. that in so far as the ryoti lands and ryots in lawful possession of them under patta engagement with the land-holder are concerned, the Act did not disturb their right or possession, though the machinery established for the grant of ryotwari patta was intended only to secure those rights in the shape of different tenure.

Section 3 itself starts by saying that

save as otherwise expressly provided in the Act the entire estate shall stand transferred to the Government.

If we examine Section 3, Clause (b), closely, the entire estate is described thus:

The entire estate (including all communal lands and porambokes, other than non-ryoti lands, waste lands, pasture lands, lanka lands, forests, mines and minerals, quarries, rivers and streams, tanks and irrigation works, fisheries and ferries).

The deposition is no doubt an inclusive one: but with such detailed specification to what the entire estate consists of, it is interesting to notice that ryoti lands are left out from this specification. The omission appears to have some significance, and it is possible to construe it as meaning that ryoti lands in the possession of ryots are not so taken over. This proviso Section 3(d) which cuts down the amplitude of the power conferred upon the Government to take possession of the estate, read along with the significant omission of ryoti lands in the detailed description of the estates securing in Section 3(b) of the Act may well connote that it was not the intention of the Government to disturb the position of the ryot in so far as he is in possession of ryoti land under a proper engagement between himself and the erstwhile land-holder. Indeed, the Act itself was enacted for the purpose of removing the intermediaries, and the long title of the Act clearly states that it is intended to provide for the repeal of the permanent settlement, the acquisition of the rights of the landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the province of Madras and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates--if the object then is to remove the intermediary from the scene and to establish a direct relationship between the State as the overlord and the ryot as the cultivator, it would not have been the intention of the Act to deprive the ryot of his title to or possession of the holding, and it is quite possible to look upon the other provisions relating to the grant of ryotwari pattas as a machinery only intended to confirm the pre-existing rights of the ryots though in a different form.

The learned Judges, however, felt it unnecessary to examine their final view in the matter.

Mr. Vedanthachari presents his case as to jurisdiction from certain perspectives which call for careful examination. Having regard to the purpose of the Act, introduction of ryotwari settlement abolishing the estate tenure recognized and protected under the Estates Land Act, learned Counsel rightly referred to the distinction between the two tenures. Counsel submitted that a ryot in an estate does not derive title from the landholder and his interest is not that of an ordinary tenant or lessee of the landholder. His interest has been either statutorily conferred or recognized by the Estates Land Act. It is an independent right in land. As observed in Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dandamudi Kottayya ILR (1897) Mad. 299 land is held in these parts in two great interest, melwaram interest and kudiwaram interest, and the holder of kudiwaram right, far from being a tenant of the holder of melwaram right, is a co-owner with him. In Lakshmanna v. Venkateswarlu ILR (1950) Mad. 567 the Judicial Committee referred to the nature of tenure of a ryot in India, citing the aforesaid decision of this Court. In Dewan Bhadur Srinivasaraghava Ayyangar''s Book, Progress of the Madras Presidency During The Last Forty Years of British Administration at page 218, the relationship between the sovereign and cultivator is thus set out:

Ancient Hindu Law recognized only two beneficial interests in land, viz. I.L.R.(1897) Mad. 299 that of the Sovereign or his representatives, and ILR (1950) Mad. 567 that of the cultivators holding the land either individually or as members of a joint family or joint village community, neither the sovereign nor the cultivators had unlimited proprietary right or full ownership in the modern sense. The sovereign''s right consisted in his power to collect a share of the produce of the cultivated lands known by the name of melwaram in the southern districts of the Presidency; and this melwaram is not rent in the strict signification of the term. The share of the ryots or cultivation is known by the name kudiwaram; and by ryots is to be understood cultivators who employ, superintend and assist the labourer, and who are every-where the farmers of the country, the creators and payers of the land revenue. The ryot''s right to land arises from mere occupation and is not derived from the sovereign in the manner in which the right of the English tenant under the Modern English law derived from his landlord. The relation between the Government and the ryot may perhaps be described as of co-partnership, but is certainly not that of a landlord and tenant.

The independent relationship of a ryot in India to his cultivable land has been considered by the Supreme Court in Sunkavilli Subanna v. Coli Sathirajan A.I.R.1961 S.C. 342 citing Venkatanarasimha Naidu v. Dandamudi Kotayya I.L.R (1897) Mad. 299. Mr. Vedanthachari submits that, this being the true position of a ryot in an estate, it is unthinkable that without express provision and specific words in that regard all his rights got transferred and vested in the Government. There is studied omission from Section 3(b) of ryoti and private lands in the specification of the properties included in the concept of estate that stood transferred to the Government and vested in them on the notification of the estate. The plain language of Section 3 does not necessarily warrant such an inference. In Craies on Statute Law, sixth edition, at page 92 it is said:

With regard to what is meant by the expression "the plain meaning of the words of a statute", it is necessary on all occasions, to give the legislature credit for employing those words which will express its meaning more clearly than any other words; so that if in any particular instance it can be shown that there are two expressions which might have been used to convey a certain intention, but one of those expressions will convey that intention more clearly than that the other, it is proper to conclude that, if the legislature I uses that one of the two expression which would convey the intention less clearly, it does not intend to convey that intention at all, and in that event it becomes necessary to discover what intention it did intend to convey.

According to Counsel it is plain from the relevant provisions of the Act that the Act recognized the interest of the ryot in an estate. That interest was not extinguished. By the Act only the landholder is removed from the scene and additional rights are conferred on the ryot. He is made proprietor of the land and the dual ownership of land is put an end to. At the least a fair inference from the provisions of the statute, it is said, is that they exclude from vesting the possessory right of a ryot in the Government while extinguishing the landholder''s interest to the melwaram in the ryoti land, compensating the landholder for his interest that is taken away. My attention is drawn to Section 3(f) of the Act which provides that the relationship of landholders and ryot shall, as between them, be extinguished. The phrase as between them in Section 3(f) is significant. What is extinguished by the Act is the relationship between the landholder and ryot, and not the rights of the ryot. If it is otherwise, it could be said, that there is no purpose for this provision and it would be a surplusage when the interests of both the landholder and ryot vest in and get transferred to the Government u/s 3(b). When all the clauses of Section 3 are read together, Section 3(f) highlights the position that the State gets substituted for the landholder and there is no extinguishment of the rights of ryots. Their position is bettered by making them ryotwari proprietors by grant of pattas u/s 11. While Section 3(b) provides for the transfer and vesting in the Government with effect on and from the notified date, Section 11 entitles the ryot to ryotwari patta with effect on and from the notified date in respect of his ryoti lands. Learned Counsel contends that, for a proper construction of the statute, regard must be had to the actual language used and effect must be given to words or expression which, it could properly be said and is obvious, are by design omitted. There is considerable force in these arguments. The Court has to remember that as the Act is expropriatory that interpretation should be accepted which throw the least burden on persons affected.

Counsel would limit the observations of the Supreme Court in Kumararajah of Venkatagiri v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1960) 1 M.L.J. 28 (S.C.) relied on for the State to matters falling u/s 3(c) of the Act which deals with rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder. Manifestly the occupancy right of a ryot in ryoti land statutorily recognized is not a creation of the landholder. When in relation to Section 3(c) it was contended before the Supreme Court that the long title and preamble to the Abolition Act indicated that the object of the Act was to provide for the acquisition of the rights of the landholders and that the policy of the Act was not to interfere with the rights of other persons in the estate, the Court observed that the assumption was not borne out by the substantive provisions of the Act itself. The Supreme Court remarked:

Section 3 sets forth the consequences which ensue on the notification of an estate and it is clear that on an estate being notified the entire estate is to stand transferred to the Government and all rights and interests created in or over the estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder must, as against the Government, cease and determine.

Dealing with the absence of any provisions as to compensation, it is said:

In the circumstances, the Court must interpret the Abolition Act as it finds by giving the ordinary and natural meaning to the words used by the Madras Legislature and uninfluenced by any preconceived notion as to validity of the Abolition Act.

Counsel submits that he is here emphasizing only the ordinary and natural meaning of the words in their context. In Mustafa v. Udayanachiammal ILR (1968) Mad. 728 Veeraswami J., (as he then was), with reference to Pannai or Private land, delivering the judgment of the division Bench, observed:

In effect both possession and title of person who is entitled to a ryotwari patta are saved from the effect of the notification u/s 3(b) and the ownership in such lands continues in the quondam landholder notwithstanding the notification and the fact that it is subject to determine the character of the land for which he will be entitled to a ryotwari patta. The only change, however, brought about is not to the ownership but to the tenure of the land for which ryot-wari patta is granted. Before notification such land was subject to payment of peshkush and after the notification, its character as private or ryoti land is destroyed and it will be held after the notification and determination of its character and grant of ryotwari patta as ryotwari land subject to payment of assessment as finally settled u/s 22. It was obviously for this reason that even in the computation of the quantum of compensation so payable such private lands were not taken into account and expressly excluded from that context. We do not rely upon this feature to establish continuance of the ownership in the quondam landlord in such land but the exclusion from the computation of compensation of stick lands appears to be logical because the ownership in such lands is continued. The continuance of such ownership with the quondam landholder, though under an altered tenure, is quite in keeping with the intention of the Act which, as we mentioned, was directed to the abolition of the Permanent Settlement the acquisition of the rights of landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates and to bring into being ryotwari settlement in such estates (Emphasis mine).

With respect, I would adopt what has been said with reference to the pannai or private land of a landholder, particularly what I have emphasised, mutatis mutandis to the interests of a ryot in ryoti land within an estate. The interest of the ryot in land in the estate is separate and distinct, he being a co-owner or as occasionally stated a co-partner with the land lord. He is not given any compensation, as his ownership of the kudiwaram is not affected by taking over the estate. On the abolition of the estate, his rights of occupancy in the land are not extinguished and transferred to the Government, but continued in him. Under the Act he is entitled to be granted ryotwari patta for his former ryoti holding as the Act makes him a ryotwari proprietor of the holding. Again, in State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar (1961) 2 M.L.J. 285 Jagadjsan J., speaking for the division Bench said:

The immunity from dispossession as vouchsafed under the proviso to Section 3(d) in favour of persons in possession of parcels of lands in the estate is part and parcel of the vesting of the entire estate in favour of the State Government and it can be said that to the extent to which this right of immunity has to be recognized the operation of the vesting itself has to be limited. The Act does not create new rights of ownership and grant of ryotwari patta under the Act is not a conferment of rights by way of grant or conveyance. The obtaining of ryotwari patta by the persons entitled to such patta under the Act can, if at all, be only in recognition of pre-existing rights of ownership. A ryotwari patta granted by the Revenue Authorities in respect of lands in a Government village is not a title deed but is only a bill for rent.

True this decision has been overruled by the Supreme Court in Special Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation Officer, Sagar Vs. M.S. Seshagiri Rao and Another, but on a different point, unconnected with the above discussion. As I read the judgment in Bamalinga Swamigal case ILR (1969) Mad. 749, evidently having regard to the above considerations, the learned Judges have not completely ruled out the contention of Mr. Vedanthachari that the interests of a ryot in land in an estate are not transferred to the State. In fact they observe:

It is clear from the provisions of the Act that what really vests in the Government in respect of ryotwari or private land is merely title and there is no vesting of possession which is protected under the proviso to Section 3(d) of the Act.

The word title can connote and relate to any of the several facets of full ownership, and the right to possession or title to possession, the learned Judges say is not vested in the Government. It is in that the ryot is interested. Even so, there is no support in the judgment for the claim of the State that after the notification, the ryot can have only what is granted by the authorities under the Act. The decision in S. Marimuthu Pillai and Others Vs. T.R. Krishna Joshi and Others, does not advance the case of the State. In that case, the question for consideration was whether the melwaram interest which a kudiwaramdar acquired was transferred on the estate being notified entitling the holder to compensation. In rejecting the contention that melwaram interest was not transferred to the Government and that no compensation was to be payable in respect of it, it is observed:

When under the terms of Section 3(b), "The estate becomes transferred to the Government and becomes vested in them, the interest thus transferred would in our opinion include not merely that Of "the landholder" as defined in Sections 3(5) of the Estates Land Act but also the melwaram interest held by such persons as the Appellants. The language employed in Section 3(b) is of the most comprehensive character and is not confined to any designated interests. If, as we have held the Appellants had a separate and distinct and transferable interest in the melwaram, apart from the kudiwaram interest in their holdings, such an interest is, in our opinion, comprehended within Section 3(6). Such an interest partook of the nature of the landholder''s interest....

The learned Judges in that case were not holding that the kudiwaram interest was transferred. All that was held was that the melwaram interest which had vested in the kudiwaramdar was transferred.

In my opinion, it is not necessary to labour further on this question. It is clear from a reading of Sections 11 to 14 that it is in recognition of the rights of a ryot in ryoti land that ryotwari patta is granted to him; there is no extinguishment of such rights with the notification of the estate. The idea behind the Act so far as a ryoti holding is concerned, is to affirm the holding to the ryot on a more permanent basis under the ryotwari system. The ryot, the holder of Kudiwaram interest in an estate as defined in the Estates Land Act 1908, has only permanent right of occupancy. It is certainly a very valuable legal right. His position might have been equated to that of a co-owner; but it is not the same thing as proprietorship. It is a right resembling emphyteusis in Roman law, the right of a person who is not the owner of a piece of land but uses it as his own in perpetuity subject to forfeiture of the same on non-payment of the fixed rent and on certain other contingencies. The ryotwari settlement made on the abolition of estates completely changes the position of a ryot in relation to his holding. u/s 11 of the Act, every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from the notified date, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of his ryoti land. As a result of the Abolition Act, a cultivator having only occupancy right in law is raised to the stature of proprietor of the land, subject to the prerogative of the State to impose assessment on the land varying from time to time. Under the ryotwari system, the Government does not purport to grant any title deed to the proprietor or holder of the land. But what is granted is only a patta which, as has been repeatedly pointed out in decisions, is not a title deed but only a bill or documentary evidence of the fiscal arrangement between the ryotwari proprietor and the Government. The pattadar, that is, the person registered as the owner of a ryotwari holding, is, as regards the Government, the responsible proprietor of the ryotwari land registered in his name in the Land Register of the District. As pointed out in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 168, the patta granted under Sections 11 to 14 also is nothing more than a bill and does not itself confer any title. Of course, with the abolition of the estate, ryoti lands undergo a statutory change but that is as regards their tenure. They become ryotwari entitling the holder to a ryotwari patta. To use the convenient expression, they become the ryots freehold property.

Section 2 of the Madras Land Encroachment Act (III of 1905), referring to the properties of the Government, exempts, among other properties, lands held under ryotwari tenure from the ownership of the Government. Under the tenure the full ownership is vested in the ryotwari proprietor. The levy by the Government on the land under ryotwari settlement, though in origin calculated as a share of the produce, has been held to be not rent but a tax imposed by virtue of a prerogative of the State. See Kelu Nair v. Secretary, of State for India I.L.R (1925) Mad. 586, S. Gopalan Vs. State of Madras, , Secretary of State for India v. Venkatapati Rajau 23 M.L.J. 746 and Rajagopalachariar v. State of Madras ILR (1959) Mad. 1073. See also Board Standing Order 28. In contract, to emphasise over again, a ryot''s interest in an estate is limited to occupancy right. It is a right to continue in possession in perpetuity under certain conditions. On abandonment or relinquishment, ryoti land vests in the landholder, though it continues to be ryoti land and he may or may not be entitled to ryotwari patta for the land under the Act. The Abolition Act, extinguishing all residuary or reversionary interests of the landholder in ryoti land enlarges the rights that could be had in cultivable land to the fullest extent. The effect of ryotwari settlement is to end the dual rights melwaram and kudiwaram in land. For that there is no need to first transfer the possessory right of the ryot in his holding to the Government. In a sense, the landholder is also seized of ryoti land, though he is not possessed of the same. So viewed, for the purpose of the ryotwari settlement, there can properly be a transfer and a vesting in the State of the residuary interest of the landholder in ryoti land. One need not shy at that. The vesting is conditional, so to say in trust to benefit the ryot. Occupancy rights lawfully held and enjoyed are not disturbed by the notification of the estate. The residuary proprietary rights in the soil, subject to the occupancy right of the ryot in ryoti land transferred to the Government on the abolition of the estate, pass, by the force, of the statue, to the ryot on the ryotwari settlement. In recognition the ryot is granted a ryotwari patta for the land. His occupancy right is not put in jeopardy and made subject to regrant. Confiscation and restoration of his occupancy right is not necessary for the conversion of the estate tenure of the land to ryotwari tenure. The settlement operations and the issue of patta u/s 11 and are in the course of the conversion to the tenure under which the land is to be held. The ryotwari settlement is in relation to the land and not with reference to persons occupying it. It follows that the contention for the State that there is extinguishment of all rights of a ryot on the notification of an estate and there is a fresh grant of rights in recognition of the rights taken away under the provisions of the Act, has to fail. In a matter like this, I am not for adopting a construction which is not strictly warranted by the language used by the Legislature. Such being the operation of the Act, can it be said that determination of the existence of occupancy right in a particular land as ryoti land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of authorities under the Act? On the Act as it now stands, no special authority with necessary powers for effective adjudication of the questions of fact and law that may arise if there is a dispute in the matter, has been constituted. No duty is placed by the Act u/s 11 to decide on the character of the land if it is put in issue, and Section 3(d)(i) requires only a decision as to whether a person in possession is actually entitled to ryotwari patta. Notwithstanding that the land is proved to be ryoti land and the ryot has been admitted to possession of the land, if it was on or after 1st day of July 1945, by reason of the proviso to Section 11, the ryot will not, as of course, be entitled to ryotwari patta. Under the proviso no person who has been admitted into possession of any land by a landholder on or after 1st day of July 1945, shall, except where the Government, after an examination of all the circumstances otherwise direct, be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of such land. A decision u/s 3(d)(i) could well be in relation to the proviso to Section 11. u/s 67, the Government may make rules to carry out the purposes of the Act; but for finality of orders made by authorities under the Act, they must be in respect of matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act.

The learned Additional Government Pleader would contend that there are observations in the judgment in Ramalingaswami case ILR (1969) Mad. 749 opposed to the recognition of the jurisdiction of the civil Court in the matter. Reliance is particularly placed upon the following observations in the judgment:

We have already pointed out that the grant of a ryotwari patta under the Act is a right created under the Act and that the machinery provided under the Act is the only remedy for obtaining ryotwari patta....

We have pointed out that the right to secure patta is one given under the Act and it could be obtained only under the provision of the Act. Therefore, no suit would lie for the grant of patta and this principle has been stated in several decisions.

Emphasis is laid on the following passage in the judgment:

Having regard to Section 21 of the Act providing for survey of the estates, and the proviso to Section 3(d) protecting the possession of a ryot in a ryoti land and the general Section 11 providing for the grant of ryotwari patta to such ryots, it could not be said that the Act does not contemplate an order by the authority under the Act for the grant of ryotwari patta and there could be a doubt about the finality of such an order u/s 64-C of the Act.

And also on the observation:

So long as possession of the land continues to vest in the ryot, he would be entitled to protect his rights in respect of the same by resorting to the civil Court.

Learned Counsel adds that the protection afforded under the proviso to Section 3(d) is, therefore, only temporary and once patta is refused or denied on the ground that the land is not ryoti, the decision is final. There is a result of taking passages in the judgment disjunctively. The contention for the State misses the force of the observations. The reference is only to the claim for patta and all that is said is that there could be no suit in a civil Court for the issue of patta. Section 64-C of the Act provides for finality of orders passed by the Government or other authority under the Act only in respect of matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act, subject to any appeal or revision provided by or under the Act. Such orders, it is enjoined, are not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. The Act by Section 11 provides only for the issue of patta in respect of ryoti land. As is noticed by the Division Bench, to repeat, there is no provision in relation to Section 11 for adequate investigation and effective adjudication of the claim of a ryot that a particular land is his ryoti land, and not other land or another claimant''s ryoti land. As brought out by Section3(d)(i), the Act provides only for the decision on the actual entitlement of the Applicant in possession to patta as for instance under the proviso to Section 11 an Applicant in possession of ryoti land may not get patta. In this context the Court has to bear in mind the important principle of construction which is, that if a statute purports to exclude the ordinary jurisdiction of a civil Court it must do so either by express terms or terms that necessarily imply such exclusion. It is now firmly established and before me it is not questioned that a dispute between rival claimants to ryoti land could be adjudged by the civil Court. A ryot may be denied patta either on the ground that the land is not ryoti or that he is not the ryot. I see nothing specific in the Act to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court in one case and find it for the other.

The question as to when and under what conditions the jurisdiction of a civil Court to adjudicate upon a civil matter can be said to be excluded has been the subject of several decisions of the Judicial Committee and the Supreme Court. In a recent case Dhulabhai and Others Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another, arising under the Madhya Pradesh Sales Tax Act the position is summarised by the Supreme Court thus : (head-note)

Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the civil courts'' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

(2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil Court.

Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so construed, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not....

(7) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply.

Applying the above principles, clearly a dispute whether a land is ryoti, that is, whether a ryot had occupancy right therein under the Estate Land Act would not be within the exclusive jurisdiction of any authority under the Act. Under the Abolition Acts finality of orders is given only in respect of the matters to be determined for the purpose of the Act and Section 11 statutorily entitles a ryot to ryotwari patta in respect of his ryoti land. Having regard to the nature of a ryotwari patta which is neither a grant nor a conveyance but a bill showing assessment of the land, for effecting ryotwari settlement in the geographical area of the estate, the enquiry contemplated u/s 11 will necessarily be summary. If a ryot was entitled in fact and law to patta from the landlord before notification, if he was a lawful ryot of the holding before notification he would, by virtue of that right, be entitled to the grant of ryotwari patta u/s 11. In the context, the function of the authorities under the Act in proceedings u/s 11 by a ryot for the issue of a ryotwari patta in respect of his holding, in my opinion, falls directly under the first part of the principles enunciated by Lord Esher, in The Queen v. The Commissioner for the Special Purposes of income tax (1888) 21 Q.B.D. 313 quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Addanki Tiruvenkata Thata Desika Charyulu (Since deceased) and after him his legal representatives Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another, Lord Esher stated:

When an inferior court or tribunal or body which to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that if a certain state of facts exists and it shows to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of fact exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned and it will be held that they have acted without jurisdiction.

The question whether a particular case falls under this part depends on the purpose of the statute and its general scheme, taken in context with the scope of the enquiry entrusted to the tribunal and other relevant factors. Here Section 11 states that every ryot in an estate shall be entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of all ryoti lands which, immediately before the notified date, were properly included or ought to have been included in his holding. Reading the Act as a whole and bearing in mind the character of the hierarchy of authorities that could be had in a proceeding relating to grant of patta, it is manifest that the statute does not make the existence of the preliminary facts which give jurisdiction to the authorities to grant ryotwari patta an issue for conclusive decision by the Tribunal. Indeed it would be extremely anomalous if authorities under the Act could claim exclusive jurisdiction to determine the existence of occupancy rights in land, for that is the essence of ryoti land, when the Act cannot extinguish it. It is significant that when we come to a landholder''s application for patta, we have a specially constituted hierarchy of authorities and Section 15 provides for the examination of the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims ryotwari patta under Sections 12, 13 or 14. We may also take into consideration the fact that the pendency of suits in a civil Court as to the character of the land is not likely to retard the proceedings for ryotwari settlement in the erstwhile estate. If ultimately the ryot succeeds in establishing that the land is ryoti land that he had occupancy rights therein at the time of notification, all that is called for is to assess the land on ryotwari basis. The view expressed by Ramachandra Ayyar J., (as he then was) in Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 168 referred to by the division Bench in more than one place is to the same effect. Another decision of the learned Judge in State of Madra v. Karuppiah Ambalam (1959) 1 M.L.J. 185 on which considerable reliance was placed by the learned Additional Government Pleader was in a case under the Abolition Act as it stood prior to its amendment by deletion of Section 56 of the Act. The entire reasoning of that judgment proceeds on the basis of Section 56, the learned Judge observing that Section 3 proviso read with Section 56 would be wide enough to embrace a dispute where land in respect of which patta is claimed is classified as tank poramboke, though Section 56 only contemplated a dispute as to who was the lawful owner of the holding. In Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 168, the learned Judge distinguished State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam (1959) 1 M.L.J. 185 and Soosai Udayar v. Andiyappan (1959) 1 M.L.J. 195 as cases falling u/s 56. In State of Madras v. Parisutha Nadar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 285, Jagadisan J., while referring to Krishnaswami Thevar v. Perumal Konar (1961) 1 M.L.J. 168 and the effect of the deletion of Section 56, points out that the legal position relating to the maintainability of suits in civil Courts in respect of ryoti lands has undergone a material and radical change after the repeal of Section 56 of the Act. The decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court (Chandra Reddy C.J., and Jaganmohan Reddy J.) in Venlcata Subba Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1961) 2 AW.R. 329, a case where the character of land was involved does not advance the case of the State. All that is decided therein is that the Settlement Officer was vested with jurisdiction to decide whether a ryot would be entitled to ryotwari patta and that it was competent for the Settlement Officer to go into the question as to the nature of the land. The finality or conclusiveness of his decision was not the subject of consideration. The decision was under Article 226 of the Constitution and the question in the present form did not arise.

In my opinion it is unnecessary to examine the case law further. But the context requires my reference to two decisions under the Estates Land Act where the question of jurisdiction of civil Courts and when a decision of the Revenue Court would be final and binding on the civil Courts have in similar situations come up for consideration. The discussion is really otiose as the entire case law has been discussed in Ramalingaswami case ILR (1969) Mad. 749. The apology for my reference to the decisions is the vigorous endeavour of the learned Additional Government Pleader to limit the scope of Ramalingaswami case. u/s 55 of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908, when a landholder fails to grant a patta in such terms as the ryot is entitled to receive, the ryot could institute a suit for such patta before the Collector. Similarly, u/s 56, the landholder could sue the ryot to accept patta. In the adjudication of the suit, if the Collector finds that the Defendant is not bound to grant or accept a patta, he shall dismiss the suit. In such suits, questions have arisen whether title can be adjudicated upon by the Revenue Court and, if it can be done so, whether the decision will constitute res judicata in later proceedings in civil Courts. In a suit for patta, one essential circumstance that has to be established is the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant and for this purpose, the question of title may have to be gone into. Section 189 of the Estates Land Act provides that no civil Court, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall take cognizance of any dispute or matter in respect of which such suit or application might be brought or made under the Act. u/s 189(3), the decision of a revenue Court on a matter falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court shall be binding on the parties thereto and their privies in any suit or proceeding in a civil Court in which the matter may be in issue between them. In Appa Rao v. Gurraju I.L.R.(1920) Mad. 859, 866 the prior proceeding in the Revenue Court was a suit to enforce acceptance of pattas. In the subsequent suit instituted by the landlord against the tenants in a civil Court on the basis that they were trespassers who had been in possession of the lands on temporary grazing leases, the tenants contending that the lands were part of their Jirayati holdings, a question arose whether the decision of the Revenue Court as to the character of the lands in the prior proceeding was final and res judicata in the subsequent proceeding. In dealing with this question, Spencer J. said that the correct answer was that

in deciding the propriety of the terms of a patta the question of the Defendants'' occupancy rights does no doubt arise for incidental decision, but it cannot be said that it arises so directly and substantially for decision that the decision thereon by a Revenue Court can be said to be res judicata in a subsequent ejectment suit in a civil Court when the question may again directly and substantially crop up.

The correctness of the decision was approved by the Full Bench in Venkatarama Rao v. Venkayya ILR (1954) Mad. 715 (F.B.) Rajamannar C.J., pronouncing the opinion for the Full Bench said:

Moreover there is nothing to prevent a civil Court declaring his right of occupancy and referring him to a Revenue Court for further relief. We agree with Spencer J. that the dispute as to occupancy right and the question whether the lands are situated in an estate or not are not matters falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Revenue Court.

Applying the same principles to a dispute arising under the Abolition Act about the ryoti character of a land, there may be incidental determination as to the character of land in the enquiry u/s 11 of the Act for the issue of patta ; but that is not final. Whether the ryot had occupancy right in the land prior to the notification of the estate and whether the land was his ryoti land, are matters properly for adjudication by the civil Court. Of course, the civil Court cannot direct the issue or itself grant patta. No suit would lie for the grant of patta. That is a matter within the exclusive competence of the authorities under the Act, for under the Proviso to Section11, despite a finding that the land is ryoti, the ryot may be denied patta.

The argument that by settling the plaint as one for declaration of the ryotwari character of the land and protection of the ryot''s possession, by a camouflage the bar of jurisdiction could be by passed is without substance. As the division Bench, points out, if the suit is really one for patta, the civil Court will not entertain it. But the relief for declaration of the true character of the land prior to the notification of the estate or the title the Plaintiff had therein, and a claim of right to the grant of ryotwari patta are distinct reliefs. The latter is a right conferred under the Act. The former are rights claimed as owned by the Plaintiff without reference to the Act. In a manner the Full Bench in Venkatarama Rao v. Venkayya ILR (1954) Mad. 715 (F.B.) furnishes the answer in the observations:

The proviso to Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act would not apply when the further relief consequent on the declaration is a relief which cannot be sought in a civil Court. The Plaintiff in such a case cannot be said to be able to seek further relief. There is no question of camouflaging for a relief which cannot be had in the civil Court.

As I understand, this is precisely what the learned Judge say in Ramalingaswami case I.L.R.(1969) Mad. 749 and the strenuous arguments of the learned Additional Government Pleader for a different interpretation of the judgment have left me unconvinced. The learned Judges limit the scope of the decision in Ramaswami v. Parimala Pandian I.L.R.(1964) Mad. 740 and Somasundara Servai v. State of Madras I.L.R.(1966) Mad. 539 which take a contrary view on the civil Court''s jurisdiction to suits in effect for grant of patta. To the extent decisions contra of learned single Judges of this Court could be said to go beyond and deny the civil Court''s jurisdiction to protect the ryot''s lawful possession of his ryoti land or declare his former title thereto, manifestly they have not been accepted by the division Bench. In my view to the extent the decisions deny the jurisdiction of the civil Court to adjudicate on the matter they cannot stand after the decision in Ramalingaswami case ILR (1969) Mad. 749. As I said at the outset, the question directly and squarely arose for decision in Ramalingasimmi case I.L.R.(1969) Mad. 749 and the Division Bench upheld the jurisdiction of the civil Court in such matters. The learned Judges on a careful analysis of the case law, conclude the position thus:

There is also no provision u/s 11 of the Act read with the proviso 1 to Section 3(2) of the Act for the ascertainment of the character of the land, namely whether it is ryoti land, or communal land. The decision of a Settlement Officer whether a land is ryoti land or not is only for the purpose of granting a ryotwari patta and it is only an incidental determination for the purposes of granting patta.

In upholding the jurisdiction of the civil Court to enquire into the title of the Plaintiffs to the land as ryoti land, the learned Judges said:

Even in respect of an enquiry for grant of a ryotwari patta u/s 11 read with Section 3(2) of the Act, the decision as to question of title by the statutory authorities is only an incidental matter which would not preclude a civil Court independently enquiring into it in a properly constituted suit. Hence Section 64-C of the Act cannot be held to be a bar to the present units....

Apart from my sharing their view on the question, the case on hand is clearly covered by their decision in Ramalingaswami case, the suit out of which the present second appeal arises is for declaration of title and for permanent injunction restraining the State from interfering with the Plaintiff�s possession. The Plaintiffs have made out their claim to the land as their ryoti land, the Court below also finding possession in them. Clearly they are entitled to protection of that possession unless they could be evicted there from in due course of law.

In the result, the second appeal is allowed with costs. The suit for declaration of title and injunction is decreed as prayed for. No leave.