Ramaswami Naicker vs Parimala Pandian alias Rangaswami Bootham Pallavar Naicker and Others

Veeraswami, J.—This petition is to revise the order of the learned Subordinate Judge of Ramanathapuram on issue 12 framed in the suit

holding that he had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit. Issue 12 road as to whether the suit was maintainable in a civil Court to determine the

character of the suit lands. The lands are admittedly situate in Rosalpatti village, an inam estate which was notified and taken over by the

Government in October 1, 1951 under the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948. The Plaintiffs claimed that the lands are ryoti lands within the

limits of the inam estate and prayed on that footing for a declaration of their title thereto and a permanent injunction restraining the State of Madras

and certain other Defendants from, interfering with their possession and enjoyment of the lands. In the plaint which they filed they have claimed that

the lands covered by pattas 3, 4, 5, 10, 25, 28, 32, 35 and 43 have been treated in the village accounts as ryoti lands, that, although after the inam

estate was notified and taken over they applied to the settlement authorities for the issue of a ryotwari patta, the Settlement Officer refused to grant

pattas and treated the lands as assessed waste as if they belonged to the Government. Sri M.S. Venkatarama Iyer who appeared for the Plaintiffs,

however, pointed out that this recital in the plaint that the Plaintiffs had applied for ryotwari patta is a mistake and that as a matter of fact they never

applied for grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of the lands. But the plaint proceeds upon the basis that the Plaintiffs have occupancy rights in the

land and that the State of Madras is not entitled to treat these lands as waste lands and evict them from the lands. There is a further averment in the

plaint that there were certain proceedings u/s 133 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the Executive first-class Magistrate, Sivakasi, for

establishing a public cart track through some of the suit lands and that the Magistrate referred the Petitioners in those proceedings to establish the

right to the cart-track in a civil Court and that the settlement authorities, instigated by those Petitioners have taken proceedings to evict the Plaintiffs

from the lands. The Plaintiffs claimed that they had been in possession and enjoyment of the lands and that as ryots they could not be evicted from

their holdings. In effect, therefore, the plaint was rested upon the footing that the lands were ryoti lands, that the Plaintiffs had occupancy rights

therein and that as such neither the State of Madras, the first Defendant, could evict them from the lands, nor any of the Defendants could interfere

with their possession and enjoyment of the lands. The Plaintiffs, therefore, asked for a declaration from the Court that they were owners of the suit

lands and for a permanent injunction as already mentioned. In the written statement tiled on behalf of the first Defendant the plea was taken that the

suit was virtually one for grant, of a patta and that the Court had no jurisdiction, therefore, to entertain the suit. It was in such circumstances issue

12 came to be framed in the manner aforesaid. The learned Subordinate Judge considered that the question whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to

continue in possession of the lands as against the State was not a matter falling within any question to-be decided by the authorities set up under

Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and on that view held that the suit was maintainable and the Court had jurisdiction to grant, the reliefs. But from the

order of the learned Subordinate Judge it does not appear that he applied his mind with particular reference to the prayer for declaration that the

Plaintiffs were owners of the suit lands. He rather proceeded upon the assumption that the suit was for an injunction to restrain the State of Madras

from evicting the Plaintiffs from the suit lands. This petition filed by the third Defendant is, as I said, to revise that order.

Sri V.V. Raghavan for the Petitioner contends that the view of the learned Subordinate Judge that the suit as framed was maintainable cannot be

supported. Learned Counsel urges that the suit is in effect for grant of a ryotwari patta in respect of a land in a village notified as an inam estate and

taken over under the provisions of Madras Act XXVI of 1948 and that being the case, the civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain such a suit.

The State of Madras which is added as one of the Respondents in the revision supports the Petitioner. On the other hand, Sri M.S. Venkatarama

Iyer, learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Respondents urges that the scope of the suit is a more limited one, though the first prayer is worded as

though one for a declaration of the Plaintiffs'' title to the lands. He states that the basis of the plaint is the proviso to Section 3(d) and that the nature

of the lands in question was finally held by the Settlement Officer concerned to be not ryoti in character, the Plaintiffs were entitled under that

proviso to continue in possession. According to him it is on that basis the prayer for injunction has been asked for.

In order to decide the question of jurisdiction, it is necessary to notice the relevant statutory provisions. Madras Act XXVI of 1948 was

enacted for the express object of abolishing the Zamindari system and introducing the ryotwari settlement in the tracts covered by that system.

With that object in view Section 3 provides that upon a notification of an estate or an inam, estate all rights and interests therein, in whomsoever it

was vested, would automatically stand transferred to the Government. But this effect is made subject to the other previsions in the Act. One of

such provisions is the right of a person claiming to be a ryot or a landholder to apply for a ryotwari patta in respect of what is claimed to be ryoti or

pannai land and incidentally to this right a proviso is added to Clause (d) of Section 3 to the effect that where the Government is pruning facie of

the view that a person is entitled for ryotwari patta he shall not be dispossessed until there is decision by the Settlement Officer as to whether he is

actually entitled to such a patta. The position, therefore, is that upon notification all titles in the land are extinguished and are vested in the

Government with the result the Government will be entitled after removing any obstruction that may be offered, to forthwith take possession of the

estate leaving the persons affected to work out their ''rights, if any, under the provisions of the Act themselves. Section II accordingly provides for

grant of patta to ryoti lands and sections 12 and 14 provide for a similar right to landholders to claim ryotwari patta in respect of either private land

or ryoti land of the description found in those provisions. The jurisdiction to decide the question of grant of patta is in the first instance vested in the

Settlement Officer and in cases covered by Sections 12 to 14 , appeals against orders of the Settlement Officer are provided for before a Tribunal

established for purpose of the Act. It, is therefore, clear that the Act while extinguishing existing rights, provides for working out certain interests of

individuals through forums specially constituted for the purpose. Where a question of jurisdiction of a civil Court arises, the normal rule is that the

jurisdiction exists unless it is excluded by express terms of a statutory provision or by necessary intendment thereof. But it is also a settled

proposition that where rights or liabilities which do not exist at common law are created by a statute which also provides remedies in respect

thereof, the Court''s jurisdiction is clearly excluded in respect of such matters. Madras Act XXVI of 1948 falls under this category and excludes

the jurisdiction of the civil Court to the extent it create certain interests and directs that those interests should be worked out through the particular

authority or tribunal specified.

The question, therefore, is whether on the averments in the plaint and having regard to the prayers therein, the jurisdiction of the Court in respect

thereof is excluded. The first prayer, as I said, clearly asks for a declaration of the Plaintiff''s title to the suit lands. It is obvious that such a prayer

necessarily involves an examination of the nature of the lands as to whether they are ryoti or not in character. But the jurisdiction to enquire and

decide the character of lands in a quondam estate notified and taken over is specially entrusted by the provisions of the statute to stated authorities

or forums. That being the case, it is not within the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil Court, to go into the nature of the lands and grant a declaration of

title to the lands. There is also another aspect of the matter. As I said, the effect of a notification u/s 3 is to abolish all titles. The only right that can

at all be said to survive after such a notification is the right of a person to apply for and get a ryotwari patta. Unless he successfully pursues that

right, he cannot claim any title to any land in a notified estate de hors that procedure. It follows, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the civil Court is

certainly excluded from determining the nature of the lands in a notified estate and granting declarations of title. Where the nature of the land is

determined and ryotwari patta is directed under the provisions of the Act, a question of conflicting claims to title may be a different matter which

may well come within the jurisdiction of the civil Court. But this is not such a case.

This Court has consistently taken the view in several decided cases that whatever may be the form in which the plaint has been drafted, if in

effect it asks for grant of ryotwari patta in respect of a land in a notified estate, such a suit does not lie in a civil Court. The State of Madras v.

Swaminathan (1955) 1 M.L.J. 178, and State of Madras v. Karuppiah Ambalam (1959) I M.L.J. 185, to which my attention was invited, dealt

with this proposition and established the same.

Realising this position, Sri M.S. Venkatarama Iyer, contended that although he cannot support the jurisdiction of the trial Court to grant the first

prayer, viz. a declaration that the Plaintiffs were in possession of the lands even from a date prior to the date of the notification of the inam estate,

they were entitled to the benefit of the proviso to Clause (d), Section 3. Learned Counsel further mentions that even after the date of notification

the Plaintiffs were allowed to continue in possession, they were assessed to land revenue and the same was collected from them and that this can

only be on the basis that in the opinion of the Government, Plaintiffs have title to the suit lands, the suit for injunction could nevertheless be

maintained. His argument is that it being not disputed by the State that the Plaintiffs were prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta for the lands in

question. The contention, therefore, is that until the Settlement Officer concerned finally decided that the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a ryotwari

patta, their possession was entitled to protection. It is precisely this, according to Sri M.S. Venkatarama Iyer that the plaint has asked for, in the

form of an injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiffs'' possession. But it must be stated that a perusal of the plaint

makes it manifest that this is not the basis on which it is founded. The plaint, as I said, proceeded on the basis of ownership or title and the prayer

for injunction was rested on title. But reference is made on behalf of the Plaintiff''s to a rejoinder tiled by them in the trial Court in which there is a

vague reference to the relief being based on the factum of the Plaintiffs'' possession. But as no evidence has been let in, facts which are necessary

to rely of the proviso are hardly clear. If the plaint is to be construed as being based upon the proviso, there is no doubt that on the principle of the

decision of this Court in Letters Patent Appeal No. 107 of 1959 the Plaintiffs will be entitled to sue for and obtain an injunction. The proviso to

Clause (d) of Section 3 says:

Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which they consider that he is prima fade

entitled to a ryotwari patta if such persons is a ryot pending the decision of the Settlement Officer as to Whether he is actually entitled to such

patta.

In exercise of the rule-making power the Government have framed certain rules providing for the procedure to be followed in the application of

the proviso Rule 1 of these rules enjoins that before taking possession of any land in an estate under the proviso the manager of the estate shall

examine 1 whether any ryot or landholder holding the land is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta or not. In a case where the manager considers

that the occupant of a land on the date of the notification of the estate was prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta, he should under Rule 2 allow

such occupation tentatively to continue subject to the payment of assessment on the area occupied as laid down in Section23. But this rule makes it

clear that the person is allowed to continue only on condition that the payment of assessment shall not confer any right of occupancy upon him.

Nevertheless when the manager thinks that the person concerned has no prima facie title is a ryotwari patta under the proviso, he should

communicate his view in Form I and call upon the person to show cause why he should not be dispossessed. Rule 3 further provides that if on

examining the representations he considers that the person is not prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta or that he is prima facie entitled to continue

in occupation, he should cause notice in Form II to be served upon the persons concerned. Even this rule is to the effect that the person in

possession shall not be dispossessed until after expiry of seven days, after the lapse of the appeal time of 50 days or such further time as the

Appellate Authority may allow in its discretion. An appeal is provided for against the order of the manager. The scheme of these rules suggests,

therefore, that before a person in occupation of lands in a notified estate is dispossessed, the procedure prescribed should be followed. But

unfortunately neither the plaint nor the re joinder, as I said, makes specific averments of facts and circumstances which will attract the application of

the proviso. In my opinion the plaint as framed cannot be regarded as one rested upon the proviso to Clause (d) of Section 3 Sri M.S.

Venkatarama Iyer, at one stage urged that the Plaintiffs were sought to be evicted under the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act. But I can

find no basis for this contention in the plaint or the re joinder of the Plaintiff''s either. As a matter of fact, as I have already mentioned, the plaint

proceeded; though erroneously, on the looting that the Plaintiffs unsuccessfully applied to the Settlement Officer for a ryotwari patta. It further

appears that though the settlement proceedings are said to be not yet over, during those proceedings the Settlement Officer on the objections filed

by the Plaintiffs in respect of the rough patta which did not include the suit lands, held that the Plaintiffs as land-holders should have invoked section

13 and in the absence of which the lands in question could not be included in the patta. What is the effect of this order which does not appear to

have been further agitated by the Plaintiffs, does not fall to be decided in this proceeding. All that is necessary to point out with reference to the

contention of the learned Counsel for the Plaintiffs is that the plaint and the re joinder re joinder as framed and filed by them are certainly not rested

on the proviso to Clause, (d) of Section 3. If that is so, as I held it is, and the suit in effect and essence being one for ryotwari patta, the second

prayer cannot stand by itself; dependant as it is on the first prayer which as I held, is clearly outside the jurisdiction of the Court

The Civil Revision Petition is allowed the Order of the Court below is set aside and the suit is dismissed. No costs throughout.

[This petition having been set down this day Wednesday, the 5th day of September 1962 for being mentioned, the Court made the following

order.

Mr. Venkatarama Iyer says that this is a proper case for amendment of the plaint so as to make it one under the proviso to Section 3(d) of

Madras Act XXVI of 1948. But the view I have taken of the plaint is that it is one in effect and essence for ryotwari patta. Not a word is to be

found anywhere in the plaint relating to the proviso. The plaint was not obviously based on the proviso. If it is a matter of mere construction of the

pleading, it would be a different matter. But this is not one such case. In view of the suit as framed is one for grant of ryotwari patta, I am unable to

modify the order dismissing the suit.