High CourtsSingle Bench(1982) 11 MAD CK 0057

K.M. Venkataraman Chettiar and Sons vs N.G. Kutram Kasthuri Rangiah Chettiar Charity Estate Trichy and Others

Madras High Court · Decided on 26 November 1982 · Citation: (1984) ILR (Mad) 289

HON’BLE JUDGES
Maheswaran, J
RESULT
Dismissed
CASE NUMBER
Second Appeal No. 1510 of 1978

AI Structured Summary

Not yet generated for this judgment

Judgment

20 paragraphs · 3,701 words

Maheswaran, J.—The Defendant against whom an order of eviction has been passed is the Appellant in this second appeal.

2.

The Suit property, a building, of which the Appellant was a tenant, belonging to the Plaintiff-trust. A petition for eviction was filed in House Rent Control Original Petition No. 328 of 1978 on the file of the Rent Controller by the Plaintiff-trust against the Appellant on the ground that he is in arrears of rent and has also sublet a portion of the building. An order for eviction was passed. When the appeal was pending G.O. Ms. No. 1998, dated 12th August, 1974 was passed exempting all buildings belonging to religious endowments from the operation of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The appeal was therefore dismissed and later the Respondent filed the suit after giving a valid notice to the Defendant.

3.

The suit was resisted by the Defendant, who inter alius eon-tended that the first Plaintiff is not the trustee of the Plaintiff-trust, that the Plaintiff-trust is neither a religious trust for a charitable institution, and that G.O. Ms. No. 1998, dated 20th August, 1974 will not apply. The trial Court has observed that the Plaintiff has admitted that it is private-trust and that the G.O. does not make a distinction between public and private trusts and therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to claim exemption from the provision of the Rent Control Act and in the end decreed the suit. In appeal, the District Judge, without discussing the question at issue, concurred with the finding of the trial court and dismissed the appeal. The Appellant challenges that judgment and decree in this second appeal.

4.

At the time of admission of the second appeal, the High Court formulated the following substantial question of law:

Is the suit maintainable in a Civil Court for eviction and whether G. O. Ms. No. 2000, dated 16th August, 1976 is applicable to only public-trusts and not to private-trusts as that of the Plaintiff.

What is contended before me is that G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home Department, dated 12th August, 1974 was superseded by G.O.Ms. No. 2000, Home Department, dated 16th August, 1976 and that the later G.O. exempts all buildings owned by the Hindu, Christian and Muslim public-trusts and public charities from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act and there being an admission by P.W. 1 that this is a private-trust the Civil Court will not have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. As far as I could see, there appears to be no such admission by P.W. 1 that it is a private-trust. The appellate Judge has not give a any finding as to whether the property is a public trust or a private trust. As there is no clinching finding as to whether the Plaintiff-trusts is a public trust or a private-trust, a finding has to be called for and the lower appellate Court will give a finding as to whether the Plaintiff-trust is a public-trust or a private-trust. The finding will be given within two months from the date of receipt of records.

Findings submitted as per direction made in second Appeal No. 1510 of 1978 on 9th March, 1980 by the High Court, Madras.

Appeal Suit No. 389 of 1977 is the appeal filed by the Defendant against the decree for eviction passed by the learned District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli. One of my learned predecessors dismissed the said appeal with cost. The Defendant preferred a second appeal in the High Court in Second Appeal No. 1510 of 1978. The High Court has been pleased to call for a finding from this Court as to whether the Plaintiff-trust (first Respondents) is a public-trust or a private-trust.

After the records were received from the High Court notices were given to the counsels for the, Appellant and the Respondents. The counsels entered appearance and made an endorsement that they are not letting in any additional oral or documentary evidence. The counsels contended themselves with advancing arguments on their respective side.

The only point for determination in the light of the direction given by the High Court is Whether the first Respondent-trust is a public-trust or a private trust?.

The Point: The Appellant is a tenant in the suit property which admittedly belongs to the first Respondent-trust. A petition for eviction was filed in H.R.C.O.P. No. 328of 1973 on the file of the Rent Controller by the Respondent-trust against the Appellant on the grounds of arrears of rent and sub-letting. Against the order of eviction passed by the Rent Controller, ah any was filed by the tenant. When the appeal was pending, (sic) Ms. No. 1998, Home Department, dated 12th August (sic) was passed exempting all the buildings owned by the Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable (sic) from all the provisions of the Rent Controller Act.(sic) was dismissed with the observation that the evicti(sic) in executable. Thereupon the trust filed a suit for (sic) giving valid notice to quit to the Appellant. If (sic) the trial Court had held that the trust was entitled to (sic) tion from the provisions of the Rent, Control A (sic) the Suit. In an appeal one of my pre-de-cesso(sic) trial Court''s finding and dismissed the appeal. circumstences the tenant preferred the second High Court. The first Respondent is one N.G.V. Kasthuri Rengiah Chettiar Charity Estate, Tiruchi by its Trustee''s T.R. Karunakaran. The second Respondent having died pending the second appeal, one V. Perumal was impleaded as the third Respondent as trustee in the place of the deceased second Respondent. For determination to the question whether the first Respondent is a public-trust or a private-trust, it is necessary to examine the two government orders which provide for exemptions from the operation of the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act to certain buildings. The first Government order is G.O. Ms. No. 1998, Home Department, dated 12th August, 1974 and the same, is in these terms; In, exercise of the powers conferred by Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act 16 of 1960) the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby exempts all the buildings and charitable institutions from all the provisions of the said Act. In the above notification evidently no distinction was made between public-trust and private-trust and whether the trust belonged to one or other of three religious denominations, viz., Hindu, Muslim and Chiristian. The Appellant''s contention was that the aforesaid Government Order would not apply to the first Respondent. The argument advanced on behalf of the Appellant was that the Respondent-trust was neither a religious trust nor a charitable institution and hence the G.O. Ms. No. 1998, dated 12th August, 1974 would not apply. But then the question of applicability or otherwise of the above G.O. the Respondent-trust has become purely academic in view of the suppression of the same by a latter Government Order passed in 1976. G.O. Ms. No. 2000, Home department, dated 16th August, 1976 provides as follows:

The Government in G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home Deartmen dated 12th August, 1974, issued a notification exempting all the buildings owned, by the Hindu, Chiristian and Muslim (sic)eligious trusts and Charitable institutions from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. The Government have now decided to dify the orders in G.O. Ms. No. 1998, Home Dept., dated 12th August, 1974 so as to exclude private-trusts from the exemption granted and to limit its application to public, charitable trusts only. Notification reads as follows:

In exercise of the powers conferred by, Section 29 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 (Tamil Nadu Act 18 of 1860) and in supersession of the Home Department, Notification No. II(2)/HO/3811 74, dated 12th August, 1974 published at page 444 of part II, Section II of the Tamil Nadu Government Gazette, dated the 21st August, 1974, the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby exempts all the buildings owned by the Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public-trusts and public charitable trusts from all the provisions of the said Act. The principal feature of the above Government Notification is that the building sowned by Hindu, Chiristian and Muslim religious public-trust and public charitable trust are exempted from the provisions of the Rent Control Act. The question to be decided is whether the Respondent-trust is a Hindu religious public-trust or a private-trust. My discussion, in view of the direction by the High Court would, have to be confined to the point as to whether the first Respondent is a public-trust or a private-trust, The High Court has been pleased to observe in its judgment that there is no admission by P.W. 1 that it was a private-trust. On going through the oral evidence of P.W. 1 who is one of the trustees, I do not find any admission to the effect that the trust is a private-trust. While referring to the, purpose of the trust, the witness has stated that on the day when Samayapuram Deity is taken out on horse Vaganam feeding used to take place. The Appellant was the SOLE witness on his side. He has admitted that P.W. 1. was the eldest son of his father and that the witness Used to tender rent to P.W.1''s father. D.W. 1 has absolutely no personal knowledge as to whether the purposes of the trust are being carried out or not. He has stated that he had visited the Chathiram Samayapuram on the date of car Festival and had taken food-It is common ground that the parties herein belong to the same community. From the evidence, it is clear that the persons belonging to Chettiar Community used to be fed on specified days during the festival in Samayapuram in accordance with the stipulation of the trust. No effective contest has been put forward on behalf of the tenant questioning the fact that the first Respondent was a trust.

The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted three authorise in support of his case that the first Respondent cannot be regarded as a trust in the true sense of the term. The Bihar State Board Religious Trust, Patna Vs. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das, was the first decision cited by him. It was held that feeding of Sadhu and giving hospitality to way-farers is not by itself indicative of temple being subject to a public-trust. It was further held that unless the as that (Religious Mutt) itself is a public-trust for religious or charitable purposes, properties appertaining there to would not be properties of public-trust for religious or charitable purposes. So far as this case is concerned, the rental income from the property is said to be used for providing food to the worshippers of the community at Samayapuram on specified days. There appears to be no restriction to the effect that only family members of the first Respondents would be fed on a particular date in Samayapuram. The very fact that the Appellant himself has taken food (it is nowhere contended that the Appellant is one of the members of the family of the first Respondent) highly probabilise the public character of the trust. So no assistance can be derived from the above said decision submitted by the learned Counsel for the Appellant. The next decision cited is Trustees, C.G.F. Trust v. C.I.T. Bombay AIR 1973 S.C. 623. It was held in that case where the trust is created primarily for the benefit of the members of the settler''s family it is a private-trust and it cannot be said that the Trust in question is a trust for any public purpose. The above decision would not per se be applicable to the case on hand. The next decision cited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant is Appal Raja S.A. v. Common Fund of Senguntha Mudaliar Community (1981) 95 L.W. 157. In the above case their Lordships have held that ''the religious trusts referred to in the said notification denote only public religious trusts since they are proceeded by the words ''Hindu'', "Christian" and ''Muslim'' If the intention were to refer to private-trust'', the reference to the three great religious denominations would have been quite unnecessary. Likewise the expression "Charitable institutions" can refer only to public charitable institutions. Charity, per se, has a well defined meaning in many advanced legal systems, including our own. Charity is not alms-giving or private charity. It refers to advancement of any object of public utility or benefit, such as education, public health poor relief and the like....Subsequent notification of 10th August, 1976 did not make for a departure in the Government''s exemption policy, but only made explicitly what was implicit in the earlier notification. The above decision is the authority for the position that second notification would apply as well as its pre-de-cessor, to public-trust only and not be private-trust?.

The learned Counsel for the Respondent contended that public charitable purpose being the dominant object of the trust, the first Respondent should be regarded only as a public-trust, which would entile itself to claim that benefit of the exemption from the provisions of the Rent Control Act, In this connection, he referred to Sections 6(5), (618), 6(19), 6(16) and 6(17) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (1959) in support of his contention that the first Respondent-trust is a Hindu religious charitable institution. Religious charity according to Sub-section it means a public charity associated with a Hindu festival or observance of a religious character whether it be connected with a math or temple or not. On a scrutiny of the Sub-sections of Section 6 of the Act, I am inclined to agree with the learned Counsel for the Respondent that the first Respondent is a public charitable trust or institution. The next decision cited by the first Respondents is G. Radhakrishna Chettiar and Others Vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, . In that case Charitable institution was intended to feed Arya Vysya Pilgrims to religious festivals upon the stated occasions it was held that the endowment would be a ''religious charities. Even apart from the performance of puja and nevedyam. The Arya Vysya of the region would constitute the'' ''Public'' within the, scope of that term. Having regard to the purpose of the trust, and the decisions bearing on the point in issue. I am satisfied that the first Respondent trust is a Hindu Religious public charitable trust and that G.O.Ms. No. 2000, Mome Department, dated 16th August, 1976 is applicable to the said trust. The legal consequences that would flow from the said finding is that the suit filed by the trust for eviction will be maintainable is a civil Court. The point is accordingly found.

In the result, I submit the following finding to the High Court the first Respondent trust is a public trust.

JUDGMENT

5.

The learned District Judge has rendered a finding that the Plaintiff-trust is a public-trust. If it is held to be a public-trust, the suit for eviction of the Defendant-Appellant would be maintainable. The Counsel for the Appellant invited my attention to the object kens filed by him and contended that P.W. 1 has clearly admitted that the, Plaintiff-trust is only a private-trust and that the finding of the District Judge is contrary to the evidence and is unsustainable in law. Even in my order calling for a finding I have clearly stated that there appears to be DO such admission by P.W. 1 that the trust is a private-trust, Even the District Judge has observed that on going through the oral evidence of P. W. 1, who is one of the trustees, he does not find any admission that the trust is a private-trust, While so. it is rather strange that the Appellant says that P.W. 1 has admitted that the trust is a private-trust. From E.A. 4 and from the evidence of P.W. 1 it is clear that a charity is conducted. P.W. 1''s evidence would show that at Samayapuram temple on the day when the deity is taken out in procession on horse vahanam they feed the members of Chettiar community. In G. Radhakrishna Chettiar and Others Vs. The Commissioner, Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments, , a Division Bench of this Court look the view that the charitable institution which fed Arya Vysya Pilgrims to religious festivals upon stated occasions would be a religious charity even apart from the performance of pooja and nevedyam. The learned Judges following Sri Venkataramana Devaru v. State of Mysore (1958) 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 109, held that the word public includes in its ordinary acceptation any section of the public. In Ahmedabad Rana Caste Association Vs. The Commissioner of Income Tax, Gujarat, the Supreme Court held that an object beneficial to a section of the public is an object of general public utility and to serve a charitable purpose, it is not necessary that the Object should be to benefit the whole of mankind or all persons in a particular country or State and that it is sufficient if the intention to benefit a section of the public as distinguished from a specified individual is present. D.W. 1 the only witness examined for the Defendant has stated that he is not denying that the first Plaintiff is the trustee. He has further admitted that he has gone to the Chettiar Chatram at Samayapuram and has also taken food. Therefore, it is clear that feeding of the Chettiar community by the Plaintiff-trust was carried on. My attention was invited by the learned Counsel for the Appellant to the ruling Trustees of Gordhandas Govindram family Charity Trust v. C.I.T., Bombay (1973) 2 S.C.J. 533. That was a case where it was held that the trust concerned in that case was created primarily for the benefit of the members of the family of Gordhandas Govind ram Seksaria and that fact is clear from the title given to the trust as well as from the various provisions of the trust deed and therefore the Supreme Court held that it is not possible to hold that the trust in question is a trust for any public purpose, and that it is purely a private-trust. Such, however, is not the case here. The primary purpose of the settler was not to benefit the members of his family. In the instant case, the charity is to feed the members of Chettiar community on certain occasions during the festival at Samayapuram. The finding by the District Judge that the trust in question is a public-trust is accepted. The Plaintiff-trust which is a public-trust will be entitled to the benefits of exemption from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu. Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act by virtue of G.O. Ms. No. 2000, Home Department dated 16th August, 1976. The suit is therefore perfectly maintainable.

6.

I have already extracted the substantial question of law formulated by one of the learned Judges of this Court at the time of admission of the Second Appeal. It has been found that the trust in question is a public-trust. Therefore, the suit for eviction is perfectly maintainable in a civil Court. As regards the question whether G.O. Ms. No. 2000, Home Department, dated 16th August, 1976 is applicable only to public trusts and not to private trusts. I must at once point out that the G.O. itself which modifies the earlier G.O. Ms. No. 1998, Home Department, dated 12th August, 1974 exempts all the buildings owned by the Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public trusts and public charitable trusts from all the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. BALASUBRAHMANYAN. J., in Appal Raja S.A. v. Common Fund of Senguntha Mudaliar Community, (1981) 95 L.W. 157 had occasion to deal with the earlier notification, dated 12th August, 1974 and the subsequent notification, dated 16th August, 1976 which supersedes the earlier notification, dated 12th August, 1974. The Learned Judge was of the view that the notification, dated 12th August,1974 refers only to public religious trusts as the Words religious trusts are proceeded by the words Hindu, Christian and Muslim and if the intention were to refer to private trusts, the reference to the three great religious denominations would have been quite unnecessary and likewise the expression Charitable Institutions will only refer to public charitable institutions and that the prior notification, dated 12th August, 1974 while it referred to Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions, had in mind only public religious trusts and public charitable institutions and the subsequent notification, dated 16th August, 1976 did not make for a departure in the Government''s exemption policy, but only made explicit what was made implicit in the earlier notification. This view of the learned Judge would show that both the notifications exempted only public-trusts. The question whether the earlier notification is applicable to both the trusts is purely academical in view of the fact that it has now been superseded. But, I may point out, with respect to the learned Judge, that the earlier notification, in my view, would apply to both private and public trusts and not to public-trusts alone. Or else, there was no reason for the Government to modify the orders in G.O.Ms. No. 1998, Home Department, dated 12th August, 1974 so as to exclude private trusts from the exemption granted and to limit its application to public charitable trusts only, as seen from the notification. The mere fact that the words Hindu, Christian, Muslim religious trusts and charitable institutions occurring in the earlier notifies ion are replaced by the words Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public-trusts and public Charitable trusts and the fact that the earlier notification is superseded by the later notification are clear indications that the earlier notification exempted both public and private religious rusts. There is no doubt that G.O.Ms. No. 2000, Home Department, dated 16th August, 1976 exempts all buildings owned by Hindu, Christian and Muslim religious public-trusts and public charitable trusts from the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. These points are found accordingly.

7.

The result is, the second appeal is dismissed with costs throughout.